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 ABSTRACT 
 
The Production of Autism Diagnoses within an Institutional Network:  
Towards a Theory of Diagnosis 
 
Natasha Toni Rossi 
 
Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by impairments in verbal and nonverbal 
communication and socialization, and behaviors that are restricted and repetitive in nature. As 
there is no cure, inherent in an autism diagnosis is a high degree of uncertainty, and prognosis 
is highly dependent on how the child responds to his or her individual treatment. Beginning 
with the empirical finding that all but two children undergoing assessment at an autism clinic 
received a diagnosis of the disorder, this dissertation argues for an institutional understanding 
of diagnosis. Parents and children are processed through a network of agents and organizations 
which eventually leads to the assignment of the diagnostic label of autism. Diagnosis is not an 
isolated act; rather, it is a prolonged process that is neither independent of the content of the 
diagnostic category itself nor its history. Based on participant observation, in-depth interviews 
and content analysis, I analyze the process through which parents and clinicians arrive at an 
autism diagnosis. I argue that the interests of parents and clinicians are not pre-conceived, 
motivational factors that direct their actions, but that their interests are constituted through 
interaction with the institutional matrix in which they are embedded. Parents do not enter this 
process wanting ambiguity about their child’s potential, they wish for a cure; clinicians do not 
want to dispense ambiguous diagnoses, but aim at providing definitive prognoses. However, 
 during the diagnostic process, the interests and actions of both are mutually adjusted to, and 
coordinated with, one another. From their initial interactions with Early Intervention therapists, 
parents learn how to identify the symptoms of autism in their children. They also learn how to 
find a physician who can diagnose autism, and how to obtain treatment services. In effect, 
children become patients-in-waiting, occupying a liminal state between health and disability, 
and parents enter a race against time to re-train aberrant neural pathways. In diagnostic 
interviews, clinicians alternate between narrative modes which frame autism as either a real 
disease, a performance, or a label with which to obtain services. Depending on parents’ needs, 
clinicians switch between these different frames in order to re-translate parents’ interests, 
ushering them from the temporality of cure to that of “one day at a time.” Ultimately, I 
observed that nearly all children received a diagnosis of autism as a result of the clinic’s 
positioning within the institutional funnel. Finally, this study describes the historical use of 
autism diagnostic instruments as they reveal the looping processes that have altered the 
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A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
 
 Parents, just as anyone new to autism, are often confused by the numerous acronyms 
that are used to label autism and related disorders: AD, ASD, PDD, PDD-NOS, and so on. As 
such, it is necessary to briefly clarify their referents as well as the way they will be used in this 
dissertation.  
 To begin with, the terms ‘autism spectrum disorders’ (ASDs) and ‘pervasive 
developmental disorders’ (PDDs) are synonymous, both referring to the entire class of disorders 
that make up the spectrum: Autistic Disorder, Asperger’s Syndrome, Rett’s Syndrome, 
Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder – Not Otherwise 
Specified. However, confusion arises from the manner in which the term ‘PDD’ is used by both 
professionals and parents when they talk about a child’s diagnosis. Specifically, a diagnosis of 
PDD-NOS is rarely referred to by its full acronym but is instead shortened to ‘PDD’. To maintain 
consistency with my data, I stick to this tradition, though often in the text I will explicitly name 
PDD-NOS. Thus, when I refer to a diagnosis of PDD, I mean PDD-NOS and not the entire range 
of spectrum disorders. In an attempt to minimize confusion, to denote the complete set of 
disorders I use ‘ASD’ instead of the equivalent ‘PDD’. Matters are complicated further by the 
clinical use – or lack thereof – of the more technical term ‘autistic disorder’ to refer to this 
specific diagnosis, which is instead commonly referred to simply as ‘autism.’ And to further 
exacerbate the situation, parents (though not professionals) will often use the term ‘autism’ for 





son ‘has autism.’ In these situations, I will clarify which particular diagnosis is the referent, 







“I assume he’s somewhere on the spectrum if you’re here.” 
 
So spoke Dr. Daly, a clinical psychologist at the Autism Medical Center (AMC), a hospital-
based clinic which specializes in the assessment and management of Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD). After almost one-and-a-half years of participant observation, only two patients at the 
AMC did not receive an ASD diagnosis. This I found surprising, not the least because autism – at 
least as presented in the medical literature – is a relatively complex disorder. A 
neurodevelopmental disorder, it characterized by a triad of impairments in verbal and 
nonverbal communication, reciprocal social interaction, and behaviors that are restricted and 
repetitive in nature (American Psychiatric Association 2000). Not only does autism overlap with 
many other conditions, and mental retardation in particular,1 but there are numerous reports 
of the difficulty of obtaining an autism diagnosis, due in no small part to the lack of awareness 
amongst pediatricians of the disorder’s more subtle symptoms (see, for example, Goin-Kochel, 
Mackintosh et al. 2006; Dover and Le Couteur 2007).  
In addition to these obstacles, the inventory of manifesting autistic symptoms is large 
and varied, ranging from the absence of eye contact to a lack of interest in others to 
stereotyped mannerisms such as hand-flapping. Consequently, and with a lack of any must-
have symptoms to warrant a diagnosis, it is theoretically possible for each patient to have a 
unique symptom profile, and controversy still surrounds the notion of a broader clinical 
phenotype (Filipek, Accardo et al. 1999). This to me indicated that at the AMC, I would have the 
                                                             
1 Rapin (1997) reports that 75% of children with autism are also mentally retarded. Rapin, I. (1997). "Autism." New 





opportunity to witness firsthand the “work” that is undertaken to separate children into their 
respective diagnostic categories. Many would get autism, of course, but some, as a co-
diagnosis, would be deemed mentally retarded or speech-delayed. But not only did all but two 
children receive an autism diagnosis, none were co-diagnosed with mental retardation. What is 
more, clinicians rarely struggled when making their diagnoses – children were either obviously 
autistic or obviously not.  
In stark contrast to my own surprise, the AMC staff were unmoved by the clinic’s high 
diagnosis rate. As one nurse put it, “With the prevalence of autism what it is today, I don’t 
understand why that’s so surprising.”2 She certainly had a point: autism today is so frequently 
diagnosed that the phrase “autism epidemic” has entered common parlance. Indeed, the 
number of cases of what was once considered a rare condition has risen dramatically in the last 
decades. The Center for Disease Control reckons that the prevalence of autism has risen from 4 
per 10,000 in 1989 to 67 per 10,000 in 2000, with the most recent estimate reaching 1 in 110 
(2009). Some believe the prevalence to be even greater than 1% (see, for example, Kogan, 
Blumberg et al. 2009).  
This dissertation argues that this unusual finding – that almost all patients at the AMC 
received a diagnosis of autism – is best understood in relation to the clinic’s position within the 
“institutional funnel,”3 that network of agents and institutions through which children and their 
parents are processed, beginning at the moment when symptoms are first detected to when 
prescriptions for treatment and educational programs are made. Its central argument is that 
                                                             
2
 Quotes, unless otherwise noted, are drawn from my fieldnotes and interviews.  
 





diagnosis is an institutional process, such that the placement of a child in a particular diagnostic 
category results not only from the manifesting symptoms, but the particular configuration of 
this institutional funnel.   
I believe that the Dr. Daly quote I opened this introduction with has at least two major 
implications. First, although diagnosis is often defined as an act of classification in which the 
range of symptoms experienced by an individual are formally linked to a specific disease 
category, it is better understood as an ongoing process extending well beyond the precise 
labeling act, beginning with the instant symptoms are first recognized, continuing throughout 
the time when prescriptions for treatment and prognosis are made and persisting throughout 
the period when treatment ensues. Diagnosis is the end result of a longer series of events, as 
well as the beginning of an entirely new one. These events do not transpire in a social vacuum, 
but within the matrix of social institutions and practices that surround the actual classification.  
Second, I am convinced that a new, alternative portrait of diagnosis can help us better 
understand why nearly every child visiting the AMC left with an ASD finding. Whereas the well-
established sociology of professions interprets diagnosis as an interested act of professionals 
seeking to enforce their monopoly and jurisdiction (Freidson 1970; Abbott 1988), my approach, 
espoused in this dissertation, and drawing from the work of Bruno Latour, Ian Hacking and 
others, views diagnosis as an act of translation, accomplished by networks and embedded in 
institutions.  
Few would question the value of medical diagnosis. Upon feeling ill, we visit our 





meaningful structure in which to understand our symptoms, as well as guides our doctors’ 
prescriptions for treatment and prognosis. Of course, it is not always this simple; sometimes 
additional testing is necessary to rule out competing diagnoses. At other times, the exact 
nature of the ailment eludes physicians, necessitating a succession of visits to various specialists 
and exposure to an assortment of pokes and prods. Still, we acquiesce, for without a diagnosis 
treatment can be difficult to determine. In these cases, as is common in medicine, physicians 
may employ the reverse logic. They may begin not with a diagnosis but the treatment: if it 
works, we will have discovered the diagnosis; if it is ineffective, we will know what the diagnosis 
is not and adjust our strategy accordingly. Ultimately, we hope that the method of trial-and-
error prevails and the nature of the mysterious illness is revealed. Differential diagnosis, 
therefore, may occur in an instant or may comprise a lengthier, more drawn-out process.  
Diagnosis is a significant event, both psychologically and sociologically. It permits 
patients – and their parents, in the case of autism – to gain some degree of personal and 
emotional control in knowing what exactly is wrong (Brown 1995). It legitimates their suffering 
and grants them the right to treatment; it offers a powerful narrative whereby patients can 
construct a meaningful, organized account of what was a disorganized illness experience prior 
to diagnosis; and it gives them a sense of direction about the future, particularly in terms of 
expectations for prognosis and treatment that typically accompany diagnostic information. 
Similarly, diagnosis offers physicians a roadmap for disease management: they now know which 
treatments to administer and are thereby empowered to serve as the knowledgeable 





Some scholars have called for the delineation of a sociology of diagnosis (Brown 1990; 
Jutel 2009). Such a discipline, it is argued, would constitute an important avenue for 
understanding the social framing of disease definitions, lay experience of illness, and how 
authority is conferred to medicine, among many other aspects of health and illness. Noticeably 
absent from this conversation is any discussion of a coherent theory of diagnosis. Both Jutel 
(2009) and Brown (1990) refer to Blaxter’s (1978) recognition of diagnosis as both a category, 
i.e., a list of diseases, and as a process, i.e., the act that the physician performs. Jutel’s review 
focuses more on the former, and though she does not deny that process is equally as important 
as category, her, Brown’s and Blaxter’s consideration of two independent facets neglects the 
possibility that category and process are acted upon simultaneously, and can act upon and 
change one another.  This oversight is where this dissertation begins. How does category affect 
process, and how does process affect category? What is the influence of the broader social and 
institutional context in which a particular diagnosis is embedded? Through an analysis of the 
process by which children arrive at an autism diagnosis, I hope to further our understanding of 
how diagnosis actually works.  
Scholars within the sociology of professions have emphasized the authority of the 
physician and dominance of medicine when reflecting on doctor-patient interaction. Simply 
put, the physician possesses expert medical knowledge that the lay patient does not. With 
diagnosis, a cluster of behaviors is medicalized and thereby brought under the purview of the 
medical profession which, as Freidson (1970) notes, has first claim to jurisdiction over anything 
that relates to the functioning of the body. By defining a problem as a medical one, this 





knowledge monopolist: it effectively removes the problem from public debate and places it on 
a platform from which only medical experts can discuss it (Conrad 1975). As a consequence, by 
claiming jurisdiction not only does medicine reserve the right to diagnose deviance but it also 
holds exclusive title to its prognosis and treatment. Rosenberg has referred to this as the 
“tyranny of diagnosis” (2002). Accordingly, diagnosis can be seen as an exercise of professional 
power: relaxing the diagnostic criteria for autism to include a broader range of behaviors 
becomes a means for medicine to increase its jurisdiction. In part, this is accomplished by 
attaching the individual experience of illness to the abstract, academic knowledge of the 
disease entity, and diagnosis constitutes the ritual through which this is realized (Abbott 1988; 
Rosenberg 2002). Both the disease entity and the profession’s right to treat it are 
simultaneously justified. At the level of interaction, the physician’s identification of the category 
to refer to when dealing with the patient – with a solid foundation in scientific research and 
cultural values – convinces both that intervention is legitimized (Rosenberg 2002). The 
physician’s authority is therefore justifiably imposed on the patient.  
Diagnosis, however, encompasses more than just the doctor-patient interaction. Not 
only are children passed from professional to professional in order to arrive at an autism 
diagnosis; but they are processed through a network of organizations: schools, pediatricians’ 
offices, hospitals, and other institutions such as Early Intervention. Medical professionals do not 
act alone as entrepreneurs, but as members of organizations, and “it is the organizations that 
attract the clientele, attempt to control both supply and demand, and provide resources, not 
the professionals as individuals” (Freidson 1986: 71). Because professionals rely on these 





employment practices of these institutions. One strategy is institutional credentialing, i.e. 
mandating that certain positions or jobs be only provided to members or particular 
occupational groups (Freidson 1986). For example, a professional association of physicians 
requires that certain conditions are met before certifying a hospital with their endorsement. 
Through such action professionals partake in “gatekeeping,” the institutionalized control over 
desired resources. Situated between parents and an autism diagnosis, physicians become 
gatekeepers opportunely positioned between the client and a benefit the client seeks.  
The sociology of professions recognizes knowledge monopolies and gatekeeping as the 
two dominant sources of professional powers. Its representation of expertise is primarily top-
down oriented: medical professionals assert that a problem is a medical one and devise a 
strategy for treatment, and barring any revolt of public opinion,4 their description holds. This 
concept has proven illuminative as it allows for an appreciation of how external institutions 
may create demand for a professional service, such as autism diagnoses being provided by a 
physician and not a psychologist. In New Jersey, for instance, the Early Intervention System (EIS) 
implements that state’s particular method for providing assistance to developmentally delayed 
infants and toddlers. While EIS policy recognizes psychologists as appropriate providers of 
counseling for children or consultation on child development, only licensed physicians are 
recognized as appropriate providers of diagnoses. Through such political practices, physicians 
are sheltered from the jurisdictional competition that psychologists and other autism specialists 
might otherwise present.  
                                                             
4 For example, during the preparation of the DSM-III, gay-rights advocates objected to the inclusion of 
homosexuality as a mental illness. Their efforts resulted in the removal of homosexuality as a diagnostic category. 






There are two principal differences between a theory of diagnosis as understood 
through the sociology of professions and one from the perspective of translation espoused 
here. First, as Heritage and Maynard (2006) argue, the asymmetry in the doctor-patient 
relationship is not imposed but interactively achieved. Though the medical setting (for example, 
the physician’s office, medical degree and clinical experience) certainly provides solid grounding 
for the physician’s authority, patients – and this is certainly true of autism parents – are not 
passive recipients of diagnostic labels. They do not, as Freidson suggests, “acquiesce to the 
physician’s perspective and advice, whether they agree with it or not, because of the 
physician’s gatekeeping monopoly over such matters as therapy, surgery, prescriptions, 
insurance, and sick leave” (1970: 116-7). Maynard (1989) has suggested that diagnosis is 
product of patient-clinician interaction, in which the clinician is aware of and responsive to the 
ways in which the patient perceives the diagnostic category. The communication of diagnostic 
news is not a simple labeling process, but involves strategic action by participants (Gill and 
Maynard 1995), both of whom use their knowledge of the social environment as well as the 
diagnostic category and all that it implies (treatment, stigma, insurance coverage, etc.). Gill and 
Maynard (1995), working in the tradition of Conversation Analysis, have shown how diagnostic 
informing appears more like a negotiation than an instance of top-down labeling. Using data of 
physician-parent interactions from a diagnostic clinic for developmental disabilities, they reveal 
how clinicians employ different conversation strategies depending on the parent’s response to 
the diagnosis: they might give parents some authorship of the news or otherwise adjust their 
approach in order to obtain agreement. The point is that clinicians are cautious in their actions, 





parental resistance. For instance, clinicians sometimes referred to the diagnostic criteria to 
account for the diagnosis, whereas at other times they focused on the access to services that 
the label would provide. According to Gill and Maynard, a clinician’s chosen presentation 
appeared to result as much from the parents’ concerns as those of the clinic. 
This last point underscores the second difference between the sociology of profession’s 
perspective of diagnosis and one based on the notion of translation: namely, the manner in 
which interests and agency are construed. For the former, it is preconceived interests which 
dictate the action of professionals in jurisdictional competition. In other words, professional 
interests determine the diagnosis, which is essentially treated as a labeling process. I argue that 
interests are not just responsible for the shaping of a diagnosis but are themselves shaped by 
the diagnosis; the diagnosis works to translate and coordinate the interests of all actors, 
professional or otherwise. The resulting configuration of interests thus hinges on the particular 
matrix of institutions in which they are embedded. Consequently, actors’ interests are more 
than just motivational factors: they are “attempts to define the institutions, groups or 
organizations that exist from time to time in the social world” (Callon and Law 1982: 622), and 
in my view they continue to enforce these institutions, and are themselves shaped by these 
institutions. Any theory of diagnosis, then, would be wanting without accounting for the role 
diagnosis plays in structuring relationships between individuals and institutions, and facilitating 
their organizational coherence.  
In a refutation of the argument that we are in the midst of an autism epidemic, Grinker 





prevalence of autism in recent decades. He credits the “epidemic” to better awareness of the 
disorder amongst pediatricians and teachers, the diagnosis of children at younger ages (which 
can be credited in part to the fact that more children attend daycare and preschool, and are 
therefore more likely to be compared to other children; no doubt initiatives like Early 
Intervention have also contributed to earlier diagnosis), the broadening of the concept of 
autism as represented by the changing diagnostic criteria in the DSM, diagnostic substitution 
from mental retardation and learning disabilities, as well as changes in epidemiological 
methods and the use of instruments such as the ADOS. Changes in prevalence are thus rooted 
in changes in diagnostic practices which, as I have argued above, have both institutional and 
interactional moorings. As Grinker points out, “the growth of child psychiatry as a field  of 
inquiry and area of practice, the decline of psychoanalysis, the rise of advocacy organizations, 
greater public sensitivity to children’s educational problems, and changes in public policy ... 
have together changed the way autism is diagnosed and defined” (2007: 4).  
With respect to a theory of diagnosis, the sociology of professions certainly contains 
useful insights. Ultimately, however, it cannot explain why most children at the AMC received 
the diagnosis they received, because it does not attend to the content of professional 
knowledge and of diagnostic categories and what both accomplish in practice. Why is this 
important? The observation that the definition of autism has changed since it was first 
described nearly seven decades ago emphasizes that the disorder’s diagnosis cannot be 
envisioned as a static process in which the rules of interaction are constant over time. Autism is 
an example of what Hacking (1999) refers to as an “interactive” kind, a classificatory type that 





individuals and their actions and behaviors. The diagnosis can change the way people 
experience their identity by altering the way they imagine themselves as well as the way they 
are treated by others. The modified self-perception leads people to envision a different range 
of possibilities for actions and behavior. This does not only have a significant impact on the life 
of a single person, but is also highly consequential when applied to an entire class of 
individuals, who may be led to acquire a set of behaviors by nature of being classified. Thus, 
over time, “kinds may become false because people of that kind have changed in virtue of how 
they have been classified, what they believe about themselves, or because of how they have 
been treated as so classified” (Hacking 1999: 104). Hacking refers to this as a “looping effect.” It 
offers a mechanism through which we can understand how the diagnosis of autism changes 
over time, and more importantly, how the diagnostic category and process can interact with 
one another. Experts create or modify classifications that are assigned to individuals who 
subsequently internalize them and make them their own. At the same time, the new behavior 
of the classified persons creates a reality that the experts must contend with in terms of their 
classifications. This means that the act of diagnosis is not solely the deployment of medical 
power, because the diagnosis already contains within itself a history of looping effects, of the 
actions of patients (and in the case of autism, their parents), and thereby acts within a pre-
existing network. 
Chloe Silverman (2012) has investigated how the definition of autism and its key 
diagnostic features have changed over time. As she shows, new directions in research – and 
consequently, in the definition of autism – have sometimes resulted from the popularity of 





point – and this is congruent with current thought in the sociology of science – is that new 
knowledge about autism has not always resulted from new evidence or the solid refutation of 
older theories, but rather from new practices. Thus, diagnostic instruments  can alter the shape 
of diagnostic criteria: Silverman suggests that tests such as the ADOS can promote the 
behaviors that it elicits as the identifying characteristics of the disorder, arguing that this has 
resulted in autism acquiring the identity of a set of core deficits as opposed to a syndrome that 
can manifest such deficits. Treatment practices, too, can impact diagnostic criteria. For 
instance, Silverman shows how the Defeat Autism Now! organization – with both physician and 
parent membership – has brought new meaning to symptoms that are part of the autistic 
prototype, such as gastrointestinal issues and food intolerances. These symptoms have become 
legitimate targets or treatment even outside of the DAN! movement and have led to a 
reframing of autism as a medical disorder. Certainly at the AMC, which does not acknowledge 
any affiliation with DAN!, shares with the organization its recognition of autism as a medical 
disorder.  
To reiterate, this dissertation argues for an alternative understanding of diagnosis: as 
the node in a broader network through which the interests of several different actors – 
children, parents, doctors, schools, clinics, laws, the state, treatment therapies, etc. – are 
translated. From this perspective, expertise is not simply the possession of the powerful, but 
distributed across actors and ultimately the product of negotiation between them. In the 
following chapters, I explore the “meaning” of autism as it is revealed by the process in which 
the diagnosis is obtained. I analyze the diagnosis of autism as a set of practices through which 





regimens, education, and selves. I argue for an institutional understanding of diagnosis whereby 
parents and children are processed through a network of agents and organizations, an 
institutional funnel which eventually leads to the diagnosis of autism. 
Why, then, did all but two patients get an autism diagnosis at the AMC? I suggest that 
this is in part due to the position of the AMC within the institutional funnel. Children who arrive 
at the AMC have, in one way or another, been flagged to receive the diagnosis. As I discuss in 
Chapter 1, most likely the parents noticed some developmental delays and the child was 
subsequently enrolled in Early Intervention in order to undergo therapy – speech therapy, 
physical therapy, occupational therapy, etc. – to address these delays, and one of the therapists 
suggested that the child be assessed for autism. Or perhaps a parent, while searching the 
internet for information about normal developmental milestones, read about autism and felt 
that it described their child perfectly, located the AMC and made an appointment specifically 
requesting a diagnostic assessment. Alternatively, there may have been no suspicion of autism 
whatsoever: since the AMC shares a space as well as administrative staff with the Child 
Development Institute (CDI), referrals to the AMC often result from the telephone screening 
procedure of the CDI, which involves the administration of the Modified Checklist for Autism in 
Toddlers (M-CHAT). Children who screen positively are directed to the AMC whereas negatives 
are assessed at the CDI. In consequence, the children who reach the AMC are not a random 
sample of the developmentally delayed population but a group that has already been pre-





Such pre-screening offers only a partial explanation; the observed phenomenon of 
diagnosis is as much due to the future as it is to the past. As I discuss in Chapter 2, there is a 
degree of uncertainty built into the diagnosis of ASD.5 For one, inherent in the notion of a 
spectrum disorder is the possibility of differing degrees of impairment; knowing that a child is 
on the spectrum could mean that she is severely disabled and profoundly mentally retarded, or 
she could be “high-functioning” and hence on the border of socially-awkward neurotypicality.6 
But there is another, perhaps even more important ambiguity which concerns the notion of 
potential and the response of the child to therapy. As there is no “one size fits all” treatment 
for children diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Diagnosis, each child’s therapy regimen is 
individually tailored to his or her specific deficits and is drawn from a wide range of possibilities. 
There are educational therapies such as speech therapy and applied behavior analysis therapy; 
biomedical therapies such as chelation and the gluten-free, casein-free diet; all these therapies 
are applied with the goal of helping the child ‘catch up’ developmentally to his or her 
neurotypical peers. As a result, the ASD label is not always permanent; it can change over time 
and depends on how the child responds to the therapies.  
Children at the AMC were either diagnosed with Autistic Disorder (AD) or Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder - Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS), the latter being a milder variant 
of the ASDs. Children diagnosed as PDD-NOS are said to show some of the symptoms for AD, 
                                                             
5 As I explain in the Prelude, though Autistic Disorder was originally thought to be a unique syndrome, it is now just 
one of several disorders that constitute Autism Spectrum Disorders. Unless otherwise noted, all references to 
“autism” imply Autism Spectrum Disorder.  
 
6 “Neurotypical” is a term used to refer to people who are not on the autism spectrum and therefore have 





but not enough for that diagnosis.7 In addition, as I describe in Chapter 2, the PDD-NOS label 
implies that improvement is possible; as one clinician explained, while PDD-NOS can become 
AD, it can also remain PDD-NOS or even be dropped altogether should the child’s deficits be 
overcome. AD, on the other hand, tends to be more permanent – though not as permanent as 
mental retardation, which implies little or even no potential for development. While children 
diagnosed with AD might show some improvements with therapy, they are unlikely to lose a 
diagnostic label. As I show in Chapter 3, it is precisely this underlying notion of potential – as 
seen in the child’s response to current therapies – which determines whether the AD or PDD-
NOS diagnosis is given. Here is yet another reason why everyone at the AMC received an autism 
diagnosis: it allows clinicians to provide therapies while suspending judgment about potential 
and improvement until the critical window of development has passed. 
In Chapter 4, I show how the use of autism diagnostic instruments contribute to the 
looping processes that have altered the autistic prototype, and how the structure of each 
instrument is reflexive of the dominant concerns at that particular moment in autism’s history. 
The analysis of these instruments also provides a window into the alternating privileged status 
of parental and clinical expertise over time. Rimland’s Form E-2 adhered strictly to Kanner’s 
diagnostic criteria and therefore maintained the rarity of the diagnosis. Based entirely on 
parent feedback, Rimland recognized parents as experts of their children though not as 
diagnosticians (he himself scored each test). The Autism Behavior Checklist (ABC) was similarly 
based on Kanner’s criteria, though having been constructed by a professor of Special Education, 
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it goal was to facilitate growing concerns over the placement of special needs children within 
the school system. Like the ABC, the Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS) can be completed by 
anyone familiar with the child and necessitates no expert analysis. In addition, the CARS depicts 
a spectrum definition of autism and was the first scale of offer diagnoses based on varying 
degrees of severity. This practice continues with Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, 
though this scale once again privileges clinical opinion in that it may only be administered by a 
trained professional. The ADOS is unique in that it elicits behaviors that are the targets of 
Applied Behavioral Analysis and other therapeutic interventions.  
The sociology of professions essentially treats diagnosis as labeling process, looking only 
at one side of the doctor-patient interaction and ignoring the feedback loop that could modify 
the diagnosis and the content of medical knowledge itself. An account of diagnosis as 
translation, accomplished by networks and embedded in institutions and itself part of the 
historical process of looping, can meaningfully enhance the theory of diagnosis implied by the 
sociology of professions. With respect to the diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder, the 
interests of both parents and clinicians are not preconceived. Parents do not want prognoses 
for their children that are couched in ambiguity; they want a cure. Similarly, clinicians do not 
want to dispense indefinite diagnoses or prescribe treatments that may work for some children 
but not for others; they wish to mete out more parsimonious prescriptions for treatment and 
prognosis. However, the autism diagnosis works best to accommodate both sides, clinicians as 
well as parents and their children, by teaching them to construe their interests in some degree 
of accordance and adjustment to one another. The diagnosis emerges as a crucial point of 





demand in a way that promotes cohesion. As a result, a stable network of mutual 
interdependency is established. 
It should be emphasized that all the institutional conditions that create the epidemic 
within the walls of the AMC are not scope conditions for drawing inferences about the broader 
phenomenon of increased autism prevalence. The findings reported in this dissertation – the 
fact that almost all children at the AMC received a diagnosis, the diagnostic practices 
institutionalized at the AMC, together with the ways in which diagnostic instruments work and 
are historically shaped – explain only the “epidemic” as it occurred at the AMC. Even if we were 
to restrict consideration to the diagnosis of autism alone, institutional conditions are not 
identical across the myriad clinics, pediatrician offices and schools with which autism patients 
come into contact. Consequently, it is important to clarify that only the institutional theory of 
diagnosis proposed in this dissertation – and not the more specific findings – are generalizable. 
Other clinics will have different practices and therefore different results, though we can assume 
that in these settings diagnostic patterns will also depend on the specific location within the 
institutional funnel. 
This dissertation is based on four different types of data and their analysis. First, from 
May 2007 to August 2008, I was a participant observer at the AMC. The AMC provides diagnosis 
and treatment recommendations for children and adolescents with autism and other pervasive 
developmental disorders. I was convinced that in order to understand how autism is diagnosed, 
I had to observe firsthand as it is taking place. The unique opportunity to discover the process 





absent from after-the-fact (or after-the-diagnosis) explanations. At the AMC, I also observed 
private discussions between clinicians and became witness to the division of labor amongst 
professionals. All these experiences became invaluable resources for my understanding of how 
autism is conceptualized and how autism diagnoses materialize.  
I gained entry to the AMC as a student researcher volunteer under the supervision of Dr. 
Michelle Baker, a pediatric neurologist. For the first couple of months, I shadowed Dr. Baker as 
she visited with her patients. I was soon introduced to the two other AMC clinicians who saw 
patients diagnosed as autistic, as well as a psychologist who regularly conducted the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS).8 By the end of the summer, I was at the clinic every 
day that patients diagnosed with autism were seen, typically 2-3 days per week. When two 
clinicians had patients scheduled at the same time, I would prioritize based on whether a 
patient already had a diagnosis or not so as to maximize the chances of observing “new” 
diagnoses. I stopped visiting the AMC in August 2008, confident that after 15 months, I had 
gained a solid understanding of the inner workings of the clinic and the processes by which 
diagnoses were formulated.  
Second, in light of the relative importance given to the ADOS at the AMC, in May of 
2008 I attended a multi-day workshop dedicated to training clinicians and other interested 
parties in the administration of the scale in Philadelphia. The workshop consisted of an 
overview of the ADOS’ four modules and the joint coding and scoring of two of them as well as 
their live administration. Part of the appeal of the ADOS is tied to its claims of “high inter-rater 
reliability.” The scale is touted as the “gold standard” of diagnostic scales for precisely this 
                                                             





reason. Much of the workshop was dedicated to teaching clinicians how to code the ADOS’ 
items, therefore presenting the occasion to understand how clinicians understand autistic 
symptoms and how they define the autistic prototype. Particularly illustrative was how they 
discussed the more debatable symptoms. The workshop thereby offered a unique opportunity 
to observe “science in the making” (Latour 1987) and one of the key foci of this dissertation, 
the translation of interests: although promoters of the ADOS advertise the “ready-made 
science” of high-reliability scores to demonstrate the effectiveness of the ADOS and win 
supporters of the scale, the conflicts that arose amongst the clinicians at the workshop were 
both a demonstration of how the scale’s success was a result of its reinforcement through 
convinced followers.  
Third, to supplement the data collected through observation, I conducted semi-
structured interviews with both parents and clinicians. The parent interviews allow for the 
opportunity to determine the pattern of experts and institutions that families encounter en 
route to a diagnosis, and hence unearth any pivotal role that a particular expert or organization 
performs. While recounting their experiences chronologically, parents were asked to reflect on 
how each of their interactions with professionals altered their future behavior, the way they 
thought about their children as well as how they conceived of themselves and their role as 
autism parents. It is through this back-and-forth between self and society that the moral career 
emerges, the changes in perception and action that are entailed in becoming an autistic 
patient. Interviews with clinicians focused on how they as “autism practitioners” envisioned 
their role in the care and treatment of autistic patients, particularly with respect to establishing 





primary responsibilities within the organizational structure of the hospital or clinic in which 
they function. I conducted a total of nineteen interviews: fifteen with parents who have visited 
the AMC and five with the responsible clinicians there. Through the larger project of which my 
research is a part,9 I also had access to another twenty-one similarly structured interviews with 
parents in the Northeastern United States.  
Fourth and final, my discussion is informed by several different documents. In this 
dissertation I analyze the content, and where available the manuals, of three different autism 
diagnostic scales – the Diagnostic Checklist for Behavior-Disturbed Children, Autism Behavior 
Checklist, and Childhood Autism Rating Scale – in order to compare the different autism 
prototypes they reflect, as well as to learn about the goals and motivating factors as recognized 
by the test constructors themselves. I included journal articles and other writings of the 
checklist authors in my research, as well as the responses of others to the scales. This work 
comprised, but was not limited to, psychometric assessments. An e-mail exchange with David 
Krug, lead author of the Autism Behavior Checklist, offered additional valuable clues as to how 
the test had been produced and regularly updated. 
In order to appropriately contextualize the findings reported in this dissertation, it is 
instructive to recount some major events in the disorder’s history. I therefore begin with a brief 
prelude describing autism’s development From Unique Syndrome to Spectrum Disorder and the 
changing profile of Autism in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. The 
four main chapters – The Making of the Autism Parent, The Structure of the Clinic, The 
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 This project, directed by Gil Eyal, included a socio-historical analysis of the origins of the autism epidemic, as well 
as ethnographic observation at therapy sessions and an autism school. Brendan Hart, Emine Onculer and Neta 





Diagnostic Interview, and Diagnostic Instruments – already briefly addressed above, are 
followed by a conclusion in which I summarize key findings of this dissertation, explore how 
these might contribute to the development of a “sociology of diagnosis,” and make some 







FROM UNIQUE SYNDROME TO SPECTRUM DISORDER 
Autism was first described by psychiatrist Leo Kanner in 1943. In a detailed case analysis 
of eight boys and three girls, Kanner documented a number of “essential common 
characteristics” that formed a “unique ‘syndrome’” (Kanner 1943: 242). According to Kanner, 
the “fundamental disorder is the children’s inability to relate themselves in the ordinary way to 
people and situations from the beginning of life” [emphasis in original]. He phrased this 
extreme autistic aloneness, a quality present at birth that was evidence of the child’s desire to 
be alone. This state induced the child to disregard any external stimuli that risked disrupting his 
or her aloneness. As Kanner saw it, many of the symptoms of Early Infantile Autism (EIA) were 
related to a notion of ‘intrusions.’ For instance, several of the children in his study were afraid 
of loud noises, and others “anxious to keep the outside world away” (244) had difficulties 
feeding. Other commonalities also presented among the children in Kanner’s study: the 
children were seemingly obsessed with the maintenance of sameness, often echoed phrases 
and words in a parrot-like fashion, and their behavior could generally be described as having a 
repetitive quality. The combination of these characteristics – extreme autism, obsessiveness, 
stereotypy, and echolalia – were the central features of Kanner’s autism. Their simultaneous 
presentation was evidence to Kanner that EIA represented a unique syndrome distinct from 
others, especially childhood schizophrenia, which was the most common form of childhood 





Kanner believed that EIA was extremely uncommon, affecting only approximately 150 of 
the 20,000 disturbed children he estimated to have seen over the course of his career. In fact, 
Kanner often expressed concern over the laissez-faire use of the label for children who did not 
manifest the full syndrome, but were instead afflicted by conditions that were “autistic-like.” 
This apprehension with over-diagnosis was echoed in the work of Bernard Rimland. Rimland, 
father of an autistic child and a staunch believer in autism’s rarity, would devote a significant 
portion of his career to advocating for a biomedical model and corresponding treatments for 
autism. He devised a scale that would identify autism from amongst its impostors and authored 
the seminal work that established autism as a biomedical – and not emotional – disorder 
(Rimland 1964). Though Rimland enjoyed much support for delineating a biomedical etiology 
for autism, to his dismay this unique disorder would eventually lose its distinction amongst 
other, similar syndromes, and the collection of conditions would come to be known as the 
Autism Spectrum Disorders.  
The idea of a spectrum of disorders is first evident in an article by Lorna Wing and Judith 
Gould (1979). Dissatisfied with the then-current state of classification of developmental 
disorders, Wing and Gould studied the prevalence of symptoms, not syndromes. Their goal was 
to develop a system of classification that would be usefully both clinically as well as with 
respect to disorder management and the children’s education. They emphasized that many 
independently-named syndromes shared several symptoms with one another – and with 
mental retardation as well. In particular, Wing and Gould found that the majority of children 
diagnosed with autism were either mildly or severely retarded. Because of the great overlap in 





especially autism. Disorders can be classified in a number of different ways, they argued, 
depending on the purpose of the classification. Wing and Gould’s suggestion was that the 
classificatory system be functional with respect to clinical ends as well as its consequences for 
education, treatment and management. They demanded the diagnosis of developmental 
disorders to have eminent practical relevance, providing parents and clinicians with direction as 
to how the child is to receive treatment and an education. 
The ultimate push leading to the creation of autism as a spectrum disorder resulted 
from Lorna Wing’s article on Asperger’s Disorder (Wing 1981; 2005), a condition originally 
described by Hans Asperger in 1944. Though Asperger himself believed that the two afflictions 
were unrelated – for him, autism denoted psychosis, whereas Asperger’s Disorder was 
considered a personality trait – Wing felt that the variation between the two could be 
distinguished simply in terms of severity. The evidence of a relationship, according to Wing, was 
apparent in the fact that the triad of impairments occurs in both autism and Asperger’s 
Disorder, as well as in other conditions such as childhood schizophrenia. Moreover, Wing found 
that classifying Asperger’s Disorder as a personality trait provided no direction with respect to 
treatment or educational implications, whereas it was clear that all children on the spectrum 
would benefit from the same kind of rigidly-structured educational approach.  
AUTISM IN THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
The disagreement and confusion surrounding the diagnosis of autism is reflected in the 
ever-changing diagnostic criteria in the various editions of the DSM. In both the first (DSM-I; 
1952) and second (DSM-II; 1968) editions of the manual, autism and autistic symptoms were 





1980) that autism appeared as a unique disorder that could be differentiated from 
schizophrenia. In this volume, Infantile Autism (IA) was characterized by a lack of 
responsiveness to others, significant deficits in language, odd speech behaviors (if speech was 
at all present), a resistance to change, and an unusual interest in objects. In addition, IA was 
defined by an age of onset prior to 30 months. The DSM-III also marked the first appearance of 
diagnostic criteria for Pervasive Developmental Disorder (PDD). While, like autism, it was to be 
distinguished from childhood schizophrenia, PDD was characterized by an age of onset after 30 
months, impaired social relationships, and several other more specific symptoms such as 
inappropriate affect, anxiety, resistance to change, and abnormal speech behaviors. Thus in 
1980, unlike today, because of the age of onset criterion and despite the similarity in 
symptoms, there could be no overlap between Infantile Autism and PDD. 
This would change with the arrival of the revised third edition (DSM-III-R) in 1987, when 
the age of onset criterion was relaxed from “before 30 months” to “during infancy or early 
childhood.” Moreover, this was no longer a required criterion for the diagnosis of IA, which was 
now called Autistic Disorder. But the changes in the DSM-III-R were much more significant than 
just a new name and less relevance given to the age of onset. For one, autism was now 
represented as a triad of impairments in social interaction, communication and imagination, 
and restricted activities and interests. Each category of impairments contained between five 
and six items (or symptoms), with several examples listed in parentheses alongside each item. 
Secondly, the criteria were now presented in a format more reminiscent of a prix-fixe dinner 
menu than a medical handbook: a diagnosis of Autistic Disorder required that eight out of the 





one each from the remaining two categories. Even more interesting was the way in which the 
behavioral examples given in parentheses next to most items were organized. Specifically, 
those first listed were said to be more likely to apply to younger or more disabled children. Take 
the abnormal nonverbal communication item as an example:  
Markedly abnormal nonverbal communication, as in the use of eye-to-eye gaze, 
facial expression, body posture, or gestures to initiate or modulate social 
interaction (for example, does not anticipate being held, stiffens when held, 
does not look at the person or smile when making a social approach, does not 
greet parents or visitors, has a fixed stare in social situations). 
Thus, a younger or more disabled child might not anticipate being held or stiffen when held, 
whereas an older or less disabled child might not greet visitors or have a fixed stare in social 
situations. Finally, the specific symptoms for PDD listed in the DSM-III were eliminated. Instead, 
in the DSM-III-R, a short paragraph describes a new diagnosis of PDD-NOS (Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder – Not Otherwise Specific) and suggests that this diagnostic code be 
used for children who display some impaired social interaction and communication, but do not 
meet enough of the criteria for Autistic Disorder or any other PDD, i.e. Schizophrenia, or 
Schizotypal and Schizoid Personality Disorders. Children with PDD-NOS may or may not show 
repetitive behaviors and restricted interests. As a consequence, the DSM-III-R not only allowed 
for more variations across different children diagnosed with Autistic Disorder, but the PDD-NOS 
diagnosis opened the door to a milder, more high-functioning variant. Though autism was not 
yet considered a spectrum disorder, the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-III-R certainly appeared 





The autism spectrum ultimately became a diagnostic reality with the publication of the 
DSM-IV (1994) and DSM-IV-TR (2000). The list of Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs, confusingly 
also referred to as PDDs) now included Asperger’s Disorder, Autistic Disorder, Rett’s Disorder, 
Childhood Disintegrative Disorder and PDD-NOS.10 Thus, over time, the DSM criteria for autism 
have broadened and, coupled with greater public awareness of the disorder, are believed to 
have contributed significantly to the increasing prevalence rates observed today. 
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conceptualization is not specific to the ASDs alone, but represents a broader conceptual change for all categories 
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CHAPTER 1: THE MAKING OF THE AUTISM PARENT 
 
The drastic increase in diagnostic rates over the last decades means that continually 
more and more families are living with autism, as both patient and parent. Will my child get 
better? What treatments are recommended? How will they be funded? Will special education 
be necessary, or will he enroll in a mainstream kindergarten classroom? Will he get married and 
have children of his own? These are just a few of the many questions that face those newly 
anointed to the role of the autism parent, as they struggle to make sense of their predicament 
and navigate the unknown territory of this new world. For with the diagnosis of autism comes 
not only a new way to understand their child’s behavior, but fluency with a new vocabulary 
(including words like “stimming” and a myriad of acronyms such as ABA, RDI and PDD), a new 
lifestyle including schedule-filled days shuttling from one therapy to another, a revamped home 
that has become a laboratory-type setting, and a double-role as advocate, all of which after 
several years may amount for some to divorce and declarations of bankruptcy. For these 
parents and their children, the diagnosis of autism is a major transition point demarking a 
point-of-no-return with serious implications for the trajectories of individual lives. It also serves 
as an engine for what Hacking (1999) refers to as “making up people,” providing the conditions 
of possibility for the creation of a new form of personhood.  
This chapter is concerned with the social and moral transformation parents experience 
as their child is diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and attempts to uncover the 
forces – agents, institutions, etc. – through which both the autism parent and autistic child are 





undergo – in terms of the framework they use for understanding themselves and others – in 
becoming autism parents and patients? To address this question, I rely on Goffman’s (1961) 
strategy of tracing the circuit of agents and agencies that parents and children navigate as they 
become autism parents and patients, identifying those events along the way which alter the life 
course and transition parents from one moral experience to the next and ultimately affect their 
social fate. The concept of career is particularly useful, for it allows a back-and-forth between 
the sentimental education of parents and the institutional matrix within which it is embedded 
(Goffman 1961). Similar to the process by which one becomes a mental patient, to become an 
autism patient one must pass through the predetermined steps of the moral career within a 
given institutional matrix, and diagnosis is an essential component of these career 
contingencies. It is a primary switching point, the moment at which the condition is deemed 
existing and legitimate by the medical profession – and hence to other relevant parties such as 
schools and insurance agencies – and not least of all to parents.  
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EARLY INTERVENTION AND THE MORAL CAREER 
 The argument I put forth in this paper is succinctly stated by Howard Becker: 
[The analysis of the genesis of marijuana use shows that] the individuals who 
come in contact with the given object may respond to it at first in a great variety 
of ways. If a stable form of new behavior toward the object is to emerge, a 
transformation of meanings must occur, in which the person develops a new 
conception of the nature of the object. This happens in a series of 
communicative acts in which others point out new aspects of his experience to 
him, present him with new interpretations of events, and help him achieve a 
new conceptual organization of his world, without which the new behavior is not 





Although here Becker speaks of the experience of becoming a marijuana smoker, it parallels 
that of becoming an autism parent. As we shall see, parents have a variety of responses to their 
child’s initial symptoms, but with the assistance of Early Intervention and medical professionals, 
they learn how to interpret these symptoms as being constitutive of autism. Through these 
interactions with therapists and physicians, parents pick up on concrete behavioral referents 
and apply them to their own children. The key point is that this redefinition of experiences does 
not transpire in isolation, but through interaction with others. In the case of autism this is 
accomplished in conjunction with an autism expert (be it a therapist, teacher or physician), who 
teaches parents not only how to “see” the symptoms, but that these are symptoms of autism 
(and not, for instance, a speech disorder). This relearning is a crucial contingency in the moral 
career of the autism parent. 
We will see that in the early stages of the moral career parents suspect that something 
is wrong with their child but most have difficulty obtaining confirmation from a medical 
specialist. But through Early Intervention, parents learn where and how to get a diagnosis for 
their child. Diagnosis is the most salient aspect of the career, both as a contingency point and a 
moral experience, as it transitions parents from this suspicion phase into the role of “patient-in-
waiting” (Timmermans and Buchbinder 2010). This is because of the inherent uncertainty built 
into the diagnosis when given at a young age, when symptoms are more ambiguous and the 
ability to determine a prognosis is poor. The “patient-in-waiting” phase ends with one of two 
possible realizations: the child “loses the label” and is mainstreamed in school as his behavior 
becomes indistinguishable from that of his neurotypical peers, or the diagnosis stays and the 





urgency that the autism diagnosis imposes on families. Physicians cannot predict future 
outcomes, and so parents enter a race with the “ticking kindergarten clock,” mobilizing every 
possible resource that might help them reach the goal of a mainstreamed education.  
The term “patient-in-waiting” was introduced by Timmermans and Buchbinder, who 
suggest that infants testing positive for genetic markers of disease, while remaining 
asymptomatic, “inhabit a liminal state between sickness and health, or more specifically, 
between pathology and a state of normalcy” (2010: 417), requiring continued medical 
surveillance but still evading diagnosis. As with genetic screening, Early Intervention places 
families in this liminal state, though with autism it is not continued medical surveillance but 
rather the initiation of treatment services that is the major consequence. Unlike infants testing 
positive for a particular genetic mutation, some children do receive an autism diagnosis at the 
outset, though just the indication of delay is sufficient to merit the provision of treatment 
services. For instance, in the state of New Jersey, the only requirement for early intervention is 
that the child tests at least 25% delayed in two areas of development. In other states, such as 
Massachusetts, some providers require a diagnosis in order for therapies to begin. The 
motivation behind Early Intervention is to provide children the opportunity to ‘catch up’ to their 
normal peers before the critical window of development is permanently shut and disability 
endures. In this sense, the concept of a patient-in-waiting forces a rethinking of the social 
understanding of diagnosis. While some children may have a diagnosis of autism and others just 
the indication of developmental delay, this status can be revised any number of times, and may 





understanding of diagnosis, with autism there is not always a clearly discernible junction 
between illness and disease (Jutel 2009).  
Timmermans and Buchbinder’s second observation is that “patients-in-waiting face 
externally imposed uncertainty about the nature of disease” (418). The patient-in-waiting is a 
by-product of surveillance medicine (Armstrong 1995). Early Intervention, Child Find, and 
Infants & Toddlers all identify children who are developing more slowly or differently than 
normative standards indicate, but the final diagnosis is deferred until this window of 
developmental intervention firmly closes. Until then, it is precisely these institutions which 
mediate the uncertainty in diagnosis, teaching parents not only how to identify the symptoms 
of autism but how, as part of a team with therapists, they can intervene in order to alter the 
trajectory of development. Early intervention defines the moral duty of parents – they must act 
if they wish for their children to ‘catch up’ to the neurotypicals. To a lesser extent, the medical 
specialists who diagnose autism are also a part of this process even though they are not directly 
involved in the therapies. Parents may still gravitate to the authority of the physician, even 
when they provide few definite answers.  
 The third characteristic of a patient-in-waiting is that the experience is “marked by a 
lengthy trajectory of medical gate keeping to establish or relinquish a diagnosis” (418). Patients 
are kept under observation for long periods during which they undergo repeated testing and 
meetings with clinicians and therapists. The prototypical diagnose-treat-cure process is turned 
on its head, yet rather than weaken medicine’s grip on power the ambiguity of diagnosis 





waiting (Timmermans and Buchbinder 2010). With autism, this means not only medicine but 
also subordinate professions like speech and occupational therapists that work to keep the 
patient-in-waiting under their jurisdiction. Again, diagnosis is less about identifying the precise 
moment of transition from healthy to ill; instead, it is an object which translates the interests of 
all involved parties – parents, child, clinicians, therapists, and teachers – while simultaneously 
reinforcing the institutional matrix which produced it (Callon and Law 1982; Latour 1987). In 
other words, both the diagnosis and those who encounter it each take shape and adjust to one 
another in the same movement. Autism allows parents to enroll their children in Early 
Intervention, and Early Intervention as well as clinicians are justified in their continued 
surveillance. At the same time, parents are comfortable with the constant observation with 
which they feel they are receiving the best possible care as well as regular feedback about their 
child’s progress, which the diagnosis itself cannot provide.  
Finally, and perhaps most significant for the current chapter, the experiences of a 
patient-in-waiting may “shape illness identity profoundly, leading to a shared if not always 
collectively expressed political consciousness” (Timmermans and Buchbinder 2010: 419). When 
the child becomes an autism patient, the parent is gradually transitioned into the multifaceted 
role that is at once advocate, therapist, clinician and parent. While parents are already well-
aware that they are responsible for their children, they now learn that they are responsible for 
their children’s neurological development – in short, for their brains. Through this process of 
responsibilization (O'Malley 1992; Rose 2001), parents learn that they should not passively 
accept what is provided to them, be it a diagnosis, treatment services, or school placement. 





therapies and assess their impact, and are often forced to advocate for these therapies or 
school programs with school districts, doctors, insurance companies, and the like. The circuit of 
mediators – and especially Early Intervention – defines this situation for parents, as well as their 
moral duty to the child. Through Early Intervention, parents learn that they are primarily 
responsible for managing the risk of abnormal neurological development. It responsibilizes 
parents by emphasizing that they are in charge, they are the experts of their own children, they 
are the managers of the intervention team. In short, they are told that no improvement can 
occur without their effort, and the greater the effort, the greater the improvement. This is the 
most salient aspect of the moral career, both as a contingency point and as a moral experience. 
In this way, the very forces that drive the quest for new knowledge about autism – the search 
for effective treatments; the broadening of the spectrum to include new behaviors; the 
struggles over diagnostic criteria and the provision of services – are also the engines which 
produce the conditions of possibility for new ways of being human: autistic personhood and 
parenthood (Hacking 1999).  
DEMAND- AND SUPPLY-SIDE ACCOUNTS OF THE INCREASING PREVALENCE OF AUTISM 
Some media accounts have insinuated that the rise in autism diagnoses is in part due to 
demand-side forces: “pushy parents” who strategically navigate the system, visiting one 
professional after another until they locate someone who is willing to diagnose their child with 
autism. The preference for a diagnosis of autism and not some other developmental disorder, 
the story goes, is driven by the wealth of resources that autism brings parents, including more 
state-funded therapy hours and access to a well-organized network of parents and advocacy 





social constructivist arguments positing that jumps in diagnostic rates fall hard on the heels of 
changes to the definition of autism in the DSM (Gernsbacher, Dawson et al. 2005). Evidence for 
this view is provided by several studies documenting diagnostic substitution from other 
categories of special education to autism. Shattuck (2006) found that as the administrative 
prevalence of autism in U.S. special education increased, there were corresponding decreases 
in the prevalence of both mental retardation and learning disabilities. Croen et al. (2002) too 
found a decreasing prevalence of mental retardation coinciding with an increase in autism, and 
King and Bearman (2009) estimate that almost 27% of the increased autism caseload is 
California is a result of diagnostic substitution from mental retardation to autism. These sources 
seem to imply that the hypothesized direction of influence is top-down, i.e., it is physicians and 
psychiatrists who are responsible for diagnostic change, and families are passive recipients of 
labels. More recent, however, is the suggestion in the academic literature that the diffusion of 
new knowledge about autism amongst parents could be an important contributor to increased 
diagnostic rates. For instance, Liu, King and Bearman (2010) found that children are more likely 
to receive an autism diagnosis when they live in close proximity to a child already so diagnosed. 
Moreover, parents’ proximity to a child with autism within the same school district increased 
the chances that their own child would be diagnosed with autism. After discounting the 
possibility that their finding is due to environmental toxicants, a virus, or an artifact of 
neighborhood selection, these authors suggest that the increased odds of an autism diagnosis 
are the result of an underlying social diffusion mechanism, through which, for example, parents 





doctor who specializes in autism, and how to advocate successfully for treatment services. 
Thus, social influence is posited as a major contributing force in increased prevalence rates. 
Hence there is some debate concerning the direction of influence through which autism 
becomes an official label. Some propose a top-down (or “supply”) process whereby diagnostic 
change has spurred the prevalence, while others suggest a bottom-up (or “demand”) course of 
action, in which parents’ agency is instigated by contact with other autism parents. Why is this 
important? Surely this dissertation does not attempt to enter the debate about the causes of 
the autism epidemic. It does, however, suggest a new way to theorize diagnosis and by 
implication one direction that such research can take, as a coherent theory of diagnosis must 
precede any explanation of increasing diagnostic rates. As we shall see, the data I present here 
identifies a blind spot in demand- and supply-side accounts as well as the social influence 
theory. This is not to say that changing DSM-IV criteria do not affect the diagnostic process, nor 
that parents might prefer an autism diagnosis over others once they learn of the benefits it 
accrues. And though the possibility of parent-to-parent interaction as playing a major role in 
the pre-diagnostic period could be challenged, the structure of Liu et al.’s data renders it 
impossible to ascertain the exact nature of the proximity effect. But what is evident from the 
data presented here is that each of these explanations is only partial. Diagnosis involves a 
redefinition of experiences, and in this chapter I demonstrate the importance of institutional 
factors, Early Intervention, and the shaping of parental identities in the diagnostic process.  
THE STUDY 
 The data used in this study derive from a larger project intended to provide a 





contemporary experiences of parents of children with autism. A collaborative effort between 
five researchers, a convenience sample of parents was approached in four different states – 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Virginia – and the District of Columbia. Parents were 
primarily recruited in person, while visiting a clinic or therapy center with their child. Over 100 
parents of children diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum Disorder participated in the larger 
study, and thirty-seven11 of these parents participated in the interviews reported on here. Four 
different researchers conducted the interviews using the same interview schedule. Thirty-three 
of the interviews were recorded on audiotape and transcribed verbatim. Due to a voice 
recorder transcription, two of the interviews were only partially recorded, and data collection 
for one interview was only possible through note-taking. All names are pseudonyms. While 
there exists no surefire method of determining the truth of parental reports during the 
interviews, whenever possible interview data was corroborated with that collected via 
participant observation. Detailed notes were taken during the course of the interviews, and 
parents were asked to clarify any seemingly contradictory claims. While the analysis 
undertaken here is influenced by participant observations made in the clinical setting, those 
observations were not systematically compared with the results obtained in the interviews. 
THE PARENTS 
 Parents of thirty-seven children diagnosed with an ASD were interviewed.12 Typically, it 
was the mothers who were interviewed, except for four cases in which both parents 
                                                             
11 One interview was eliminated from the analysis because the child in question had not, by the time of the 
interview, secured an autism diagnosis. Naturally, it is presumed that one can only be considered an autism parent 
if one’s child has been diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum Disorder. 
 
12 Data for the variables reported on in this section were not available for all families. When percentages or 





participated. Two-thirds of the respondents described themselves as White, one-eighth as 
Hispanic, one-twelfth each as Black and Asian, and one person as bi-racial. In terms of 
socioeconomic status, the sample is predominantly middle-class. At the time of the interview, 
only one parent reported her highest educational credential to be a high-school diploma. Three 
parents (9%) had earned an Associate’s degree, thirteen (40%) a Bachelor’s degree, four (12%) 
had completed some graduate work, and seven (21%) were in possession of a graduate or 
professional degree. Five parents (15%) had completed some college but not earned a degree. 
In the eleven cases where this information was available for the other parent, five were found 
to be in possession of a Bachelor’s degree, three a graduate or professional degree, and two 
were conducting graduate work. Thirteen mothers (42%) were at home full-time, one was 
retired and one unemployed, with the remainder working part- or full-time in various 
occupations ranging from a fitness instructor to an X-ray technician, nurse, lawyer and 
professor. Seventy-five percent of respondents were married, 14% were divorced, 7% single, 
and 4% separated. Sixty-three percent had at least one other child living in the house. Eight 
respondents reported that one of their other children was also diagnosed with an ASD (n=3), 
Attention Deficit Disorder (n=1), or speech delay (n=2). One parent indicated that one of her 
other children was currently being assessed for an ASD, and another described her teenager as 
having learning difficulties in school but no formal diagnosis. Sixteen (44%) of the families 
interviewed resided in New Jersey, seven (19%) in each of Massachusetts and Virginia, three 
(8%) in Maryland, and one (3%) in each of Georgia, New York, and the District of Columbia. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
these variables is as follows: highest educational credential, n=33; current occupation, n=31; marital status, n=28; 





abstract, the modal respondent was a white, married woman with a Bachelor’s degree working 
at home full-time. She had one other child living at home, in the state of New Jersey. 
FACTS AND NARRATIVES 
An important aspect of every career is the view the person constructs when he 
looks backward over his progress; in a sense, however, the whole of the pre-
patient career derives from this reconstruction. (Goffman 1961: 145) 
Before proceeding to the data analysis, a disclaimer pertaining to my analytical 
approach is warranted. The analysis undertaken below walks a delicate line between the 
interpretation of interview data as factual versus its interpretation as narrative. Or, as others 
have termed it, the naturalist versus constructivist interpretation of qualitative interview data 
(Elliott 2005). At times, parents are taken at their word, their answers given the presumption of 
truth subject to the ordinary errors of recall or social desirability bias with which any social 
scientist relying on human reports must contend. At others, their responses are examined not 
for their content, that is to say, not with respect to what parents said they did, but in terms of 
how they narrate life events to tell a story about themselves and their children. But on what 
logic does such a methodological strategy rely, permitting one to conveniently shift between 
interpreting answers as unaltered declarations of fact, or representations of reality ultimately 
shaped by the ending of the story (i.e., an autism diagnosis), as a reality produced by the 
interview process itself?  
 The student of quantitative data analysis soon learns that there is a limit to how many 
times one can put their hand into the cookie jar: with each additional comparison to be 





to the frowned-upon practice of data mining. Here I face not a numerical limit, but a logical 
one: if I choose to analyze my data as narrative, then I implicitly acknowledge that my 
respondents do not necessarily report events as they happened, but make adjustments in order 
to construct a meaningful and coherent reality, or plot, from them. Events may be 
misrepresented, exaggerated or even omitted in order to preserve this plot to present oneself 
in a particular way. Moreover, the meaning of a past event can be changed by way of what 
happens in the future: an event may be encoded in a particular way as it transpires, but when 
recounted at a later point, is interpreted differently because of some intervening event 
(Bearman, Faris et al. 1999). Take, for instance, the accounts parents give of what signs they 
noticed when they first suspected that something might be wrong with their child. It is highly 
conceivable that a future event, namely the autism diagnosis, shapes responses to this question 
so that they provide answers such as “he didn’t make eye contact” but not “he had frequent 
ear infections.” Parents, as they encounter autism and become familiar with its symptoms, 
learn that the former is a common symptom of autism while the latter is not. 
In the extreme view, the naturalist (or positivist) and constructivist analysis of interviews 
should be mutually exclusive practices: either interview data is seen as a “mirror reflection” of 
social reality, or as a narrative which is produced through the interviewer-interviewee 
interaction.13 I choose a different strategy, one espoused by Miller and Glassner (2004), located 
outside of this dichotomy rather than along it and which takes seriously both the criticism and 
goals of each. As they put it: 
                                                             
13 For a review of this debate, see Silverman, D. (1993). Interpreting qualitative data : methods for analysing talk, 





All we sociologists have are stories. Some come from other people, some from 
us, some from out interactions with others. What matters is to understand how 
and where the stories are produced, which sort of stories they are, and how we 
can put them to honest and intelligent use in theorizing about social life. (Miller 
and Glassner 2004: 138) 
What is most essential for this chapter is the significance of these events for the ways in which 
parents narrate their own and their children’s lives. Miller and Glassner (2004) fully 
acknowledge that in-depth interviewing cannot provide the sort of data that positivists strive 
for, but that it can “provide access to the meanings people attribute to their experiences and 
social worlds” (126). But they argue that this does not imply that interviews cannot yield 
information about realities outside of the interview context, for to assume so is to “grant 
narrative omnipotence” (129).  
Still, analyzing the meaning of events presumes that said events indeed occurred. To be 
sure, I make no attempt to contribute to the growing pool of research reporting on variables 
such as ‘age at diagnosis’ or ‘timing of first suspicion,’ a task not only beyond my scope but 
certainly my sample size. But most of the argument forwarded here rests on the processes by 
which a child comes to be labeled as autistic, the actual events around which moral experiences 
are structured. In other words, I need to be confident that these events actually took place. 
Thus, there is good reason to examine what information may be more or less truthful from 
parents’ accounts.  
Psychological research on human memory shows that the likelihood of parental recall of 
an event that did not take place is small (Khazzoom 2010), and it is difficult to imagine why 





there is no obvious reason to doubt whether or not an event transpired at all, the exact timing 
of events reported by parents must be taken with a grain of salt. Parents are not unlike social 
scientists in that they have a theory about how they arrived at an autism diagnosis, and in 
explicating this theory, they will emphasize some experiences (or “findings”) while minimizing 
others considered less central to the plot (or “theory”). What this suggests is that while we 
should take care in relying heavily on the details of events (such as exact dates), we can be 
confident that the gist of the story adequately mirrors actual events. The risk, then, is less of 
false memories than of flawed ones. Even then, the circumstances surrounding the events 
parents experience en route to an autism diagnosis put us on relatively solid ground. For one, 
we know that emotion enhances memory, and the diagnosis of a incurable neurological 
condition for their child was indeed an incredibly affecting experience for parents. Second, 
rehearsal enhances memory. All of the parents we spoke to had repeated the same events time 
and again to the various physicians, therapists and teachers they encountered throughout the 
diagnostic process. Autism parents – and probably all parents who interact with the health care 
and educational system with such regularity – accumulate a library of dated documents that 
include diagnostic letters, enrollment forms and the like, all constituting a reliable basis for 
their reconstructions of the past.  
Thus, while for the most part my analysis focuses on the way parents narrate 
themselves, I am confident that the events reported did indeed transpire and consequently I 
can make some inferences regarding objective careers. Nevertheless, I have tried to 







As portrayed by Goffman (1961), the initial moral experience of the mental patient 
involves the recognition that one is essentially failing at being human. It was this self-
observation that transitioned one into the pre-patient phase of not-quite meeting the 
requirements for intervention on behalf of the medical profession, but no longer beyond its 
gaze either. The corresponding episode in the case of autism occurs at the moment when 
parents first suspected that their child might not be developing normally. Like the mental pre-
patient, at this point the child is beyond the purview of medical treatment but becomes a blip 
on the radar of the system of surveillance surrounding child development. 
To have their child diagnosed with autism, parents must first recognize symptoms of 
abnormal or delayed development in their child and act on that information to bring it to the 
attention of a medical professional who associates the symptoms with autism. In the 
interviews, parents typically reported that they themselves were the first to notice a problem, 
though on occasion either a family member or schoolteachers raised concern. Generally 
speaking, the more recent the child’s birth year, the younger the child when a problem was first 
suspected. This is in line with recent observations that the age of diagnosis – and hence 
presumably, the age of suspicion – is decreasing (Rogers and Laraine Masters 2000; Mandell, 
Novak et al. 2005; Hertz-Picciotto and Delwiche 2009), and is corroborated by the plethora of 
websites geared towards the early detection of autism, which list the developmental 
milestones parents are to watch for beginning as early as three or four months of age.14 
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Accordingly, half of the parents first noticed symptoms when the child was 18 months old or 
younger, with a few parents indicating that they had been aware of a problem since birth. Of 
the parents who noticed symptoms after 18 months of age, only two became concerned after 
2½ years, at each of 4 and 5 years (born in 1990 and 1996, respectively).15 Other studies have 
reported an average age at suspicion of just over 20 months, with 93% of parents noticing 
symptoms before a child’s third birthday (Howlin and Moore 1997), close to 17 months (Smith, 
Chung et al. 1994), and approximately 15 months (Chawarska, Paul et al. 2007). 
Far more variability was apparent when parents described exactly which behaviors had 
initially raised suspicions. Taken together, they reported a myriad of symptoms as the first 
indication of a problem; in fact, there were more distinct symptoms mentioned that there were 
children being described. These symptoms varied over a wide range of deficits, from delays in 
language, social and physical development to problems sleeping, gastro-intestinal and other 
medical issues, hyper- or hypo-sensitivity, to odd behaviors like head-banging and staring into 
the television. In general, however, these symptoms were mobilized as evidence of one of four 
classes of problems. First, and most common of all, were symptoms representing a failure of 
the child to reach a normative standard of child development, a “milestone.” The term delay 
best describes this category. Speech delay was the most frequently reported symptom, but 
physical delays (walking, rolling over, etc.) and social or social-communicative delays were 
                                                             
15 It should be noted that both of these children have somewhat atypical trajectories even beyond the age of 
suspicion. Most notably, in each case it was the school – and not a parent – who first suspected that something 
might be wrong with the child. In the case of the 5-year-old, the child was already enrolled in a regular 
kindergarten class when the teachers noticed that he didn’t play with toys or other children, and often spent time 
in the class coatroom for bad behavior. This was followed by an assessment by the school psychologist, and the 
subsequent chain of events led to this child being diagnosed with Asperger’s Disorder, the only such case in this 
study. The other case of late suspicion was a child first diagnosed while his family still lived in the Phillipines. 
During a first-grade entrance examination, the school recommended the child be evaluated by their educational 





frequently indicated as well. When describing the latter, parents were most likely to employ the 
language of autism awareness campaigns, as though reading from a brochure: lack of eye 
contact, does not respond to name, does not extend arms to be picked up, does not engage 
with other children. Second, about one-quarter of parents described a course of regression, 
typically with regard to speech,16 in which the child had seemingly acquired the age-appropriate 
skills but then lost them suddenly. In this sense, speech spanned both of these categories, 
described either as a gradual process with the child continuing to miss milestones, or as an 
abrupt change in which the child was using some words but then suddenly ceased to exhibit 
any verbal behavior. Third, the child was sometimes described as exhibiting an excess of 
problem – albeit normal – behaviors, such as crying, screaming, biting, misbehaving, and not 
sleeping. Fourth, and least common of all, parents accounted for the presence of odd or 
unusual behaviors, including stimming,17 head-banging, toe-walking, spinning, obsessive staring 
at the television, and lining up toys. Thus, in describing the pre-autistic phase of the child’s 
moral career, parents employ a multi-dimensional representation of the abnormal. What is 
significant is that the classic symptoms of autism – stereotypy, echolalia, head-banging, etc. – 
are the least common category of signs mentioned by parents, a finding not unique to this 
study. Howlin and Asgharian (1999) found delays in language development to be the problem 
most commonly reported to raise initial concern in parents, followed by delays in social 
development and play, but obsession with routines and rituals were the least frequently 
                                                             
16 While regression was most commonly described in terms of the loss of the use of speech, some parents also 
reported the loss of other skills, such as the ability to make eye contact and pointing. 
 
17 The term “stimming” is short for “self-stimulation,” which refers to behaviors that are hypothesized to stimulate 
one’s own senses, such as hand-flapping or rocking. Retrieved from 
http://www.iancommunity.org/cs/glossary_term;jsessionid=aexfryR3i9G52t5XOb?glossary.id=212&letter=S, last 





reported. Howlin and Moore (1997) reported similar findings in an earlier study, where only 4% 
of parents reported obsessional and ritualistic tendencies as a primary reason for their 
anxieties. Smith et al. (1994) too found these behaviors to be reported by only 5% of parents. 
Perhaps more telling is the Chawarska et al. (2007) finding that stereotyped behaviors were 
reported to raise initial anxieties in 17.6% of parents whose child received an autism diagnosis, 
but none of the parents whose child was diagnosed with PDD-NOS. This latter diagnosis is said 
to be appropriate when a child shows some, but not all, characteristics of the triad of 
impairments. In practice, this usually means that there are delays in communication and 
reciprocal social interaction, but no repetitive or stereotyped behaviors. 
As in these studies, the symptoms most frequently mentioned by parents are those that 
have been adopted by early childhood surveillance programs, formulated in the language of 
delay and evidenced in places such as parenting manuals and announcements of organizations 
like the American Academy of Pediatrics18 that have become the targets of developmental 
surveillance and screening programs. For the most part, these are the signs of communication 
and social delays, and to a lesser extent, physical delays. The diversity of symptoms and their 
age of onset in the current sample of children opens the question as to whether there initially 
exists any obvious reason to group all of these children together under one diagnostic umbrella. 
This is reflective of the fact that the autistic prototype has expanded beyond the characteristics 
described by Leo Kanner (1943), who first described autism to the then-emerging field of child 
psychiatry. Kanner’s autism was an extremely rare condition that he believed to affect only 150 
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 See, for example, the 2001 statement issued alerting pediatricians (and indirectly, parents) to the more “subtle” 
signs of autism: Committee on Children with Disabilities, American Academy of Pediatrics (2001). "Developmental 





of the 20,000 troubled children he saw over the course of his career (Rimland 1964). More 
importantly, all of the children in Kanner’s initial case study displayed at least one odd or 
unusual behavior, such as echolalia or head-banging. As described in the introduction, today 
there exists an entire subset of autism diagnoses – PDD-NOS – for which this particular class of 
symptoms are entirely absent, exemplifying rather concisely how what was once necessary is 
now, in a sense, optional. This reporting pattern also indicates that parents had little previous 
knowledge of this expanded or spectrum definition of autism. As we shall see, parents were 
mostly unfamiliar with autism and especially unaware of the autism spectrum until they 
encountered surveillance programs such as Early Intervention,19 20 a finding that poses a 
particular challenge to proponents of demand-side explanations. 
EARLY ACTION 
In the interval between the initial detection of a problem in their child’s developmental 
trajectory and addressing their concerns with a medical professional or other child specialist, 
parents’ own hunches of the cause – usually speech delay – were for the most part a far cry 
from the diagnoses they would come to adopt. To get a sense of how this wide expanse was 
traversed, I delineate the course of action that was followed once it was acknowledged that the 
child was not developing “normally.” The complainants – those voicing the first official 
grievance to a child development specialist – were most often the parents themselves and 
                                                             
19 Early Intervention, Child Find, Infants & Toddlers and similar programs have been a part of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) since 1986. Part C of IDEA requires states to identify, locate and evaluate all 
persons with disabilities, from birth through to age 21, in need of early intervention or special education services. 
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 Since Child Find and Infants & Toddlers perform the same function as Early Intervention, I use only the term 






almost always the mother,21 but occasionally both parents or the parents together with other 
family members. One parent described this phase as happening as an open dialogue in 
conjunction with the pediatrician carried over several office visits, although this was as much an 
anomaly as the one occasion in which a pediatrician first suggested that something might be 
wrong. The widespread absence of this latter experience, it will be argued, has significant 
implications for the moral career. 
Not surprisingly, almost four-fifths of parents initially raised their concerns at the next 
regular visit with their pediatrician, as they were typically the medical professional most 
familiar with the child, and one parent took her concerns directly to a pediatric neurologist. Half 
of the other children were already under medical surveillance for another problem, or were 
already enrolled in Early Intervention. Three parents were alerted to a potential problem by the 
school in which their child was enrolled. Of the parents who first approached a pediatrician, 
two-thirds were told that their concerns were unwarranted. The doctors’ responses were 
strikingly similar, and parents were given some slightly modified version of the script described 
by this mother:  
The pediatrician gave me a lot of, ‘he’s the third [child], he’s a boy, he doesn’t 
need to communicate because everybody does it for him, some kids aren’t as 
attentive as others, they’re not all the same, you have to understand.’ (NR 001) 
                                                             
21 That the mother was most often the primary complainant could be an artifact of the interview process, since 
mothers were the interviewees 95% of the time. Thus, a sufficient answer to the question, “Who noticed these 
signs?” would have been “I did,” and a more complete response was often not prompted. However, several other 
investigators have found mothers to be the primary managers of their children’s illness. See, for example, Leiter, V. 
(2007). ""Nobody's just normal, you know": The social creation of developmental disability." Social Science & 





Other studies have also indicated that parents are often told either that nothing is wrong with 
the child or that no immediate action is necessary, ranging from 25% of respondents to almost 
50% (Smith, Chung et al. 1994; Howlin and Moore 1997). Most of the other, more responsive 
pediatricians in this study either referred the child for a hearing test (n=4), immediately to Early 
Intervention or a similar organization (n=3), or initially took a wait-and-see approach only to 
later refer the child to a specialist (n=1). Only once did a pediatrician immediately diagnose 
autism.  
About half of the parents whose complaints were initially brushed aside continued to 
raise their concerns with the pediatrician. These physicians eventually responded in a manner 
similar to their more responsive counterparts, either by ordering a hearing test or making a 
referral to Early Intervention or a specialist. When these parents were asked about how they 
were referred onwards, they sometimes explained how they demanded referrals from their 
pediatricians, with one mother telling me that she refused to leave the office without one.22 
Parents whose persistent complaints failed to elicit action by the pediatrician either self-
referred to Early Intervention or a specialist, or were pointed in that direction by a third party 
such as a teacher or therapist. 
Some parents expressed that they experienced feelings of relief when their pediatricians 
told them that nothing was wrong with the child, that they wanted to believe that the doctor 
was correct and that they, the parent, were just overly anxious. But these parents grew 
                                                             
22 In a study of the search for diagnosis in parents of children with movement difficulties, Ahern found that parents 
who asked a vague, nonspecific question were more likely to have their concerns invalidated than parents who 
approached the professional with a more specific request. While not specifically addressed in the data analysis 
reported on here, a similar patterns appears to be indicated. Ahern, K. (2000). ""Something is wrong with my 





increasingly concerned when their own perceptions of their child’s development diverged more 
and more from the pediatricians’ opinions. While this appears to also be the case when a 
condition other than autism is later diagnosed (Ahern 2000), the finding that parents of children 
with autism are more likely to be told that nothing is wrong with their child begs the question 
as to whether this is indeed more common with autism. Certainly the fact that the American 
Academy of Pediatrics has urged its members to take greater care in identifying the symptoms 
of autism is testament to this (Committee on Children with Disabilities 2001).  
In a certain sense, it seems to make little difference whether or not pediatricians act on 
the parent’s complaint, since in either case, most parents eventually find their way to Early 
Intervention or a specialist (usually a developmental pediatrician or pediatric neurologist) 
regardless. Thus, visits with pediatricians do not function as transition points in the sense that 
the interaction propels parents one step closer towards the autism diagnosis. They do not 
directly participate in the passage of the child from “normal development” to an official status 
as “developmentally delayed.” Yet in denying the presence of a delay or other problem, 
pediatricians position themselves as the initial barrier to the acquisition of treatment services 
and legitimization of parents’ suspicions: they are the first medical professionals to provide 
resistance against parents, the first of many obstacles that parents of children with autism must 
overcome along the path to diagnosis and provision of treatment services. This was explicitly 
acknowledged by one parent, who when asked if the diagnosis changed the way she interacted 
with her son, replied: 
Having the diagnosis, not really, because I had worked through it at that point 





Good thing you followed your gut, good thing you followed your instinct, good 
thing you called EI [Early Intervention], good thing you kept calling them to get 
him into speech [therapy], good thing you kept calling them to get re-evaluated 
by the supervisor to get this ABA. […] because I kept pushing on, saying no, my 
son needs more help. (NR 001) 
The path leading toward autism is a great struggle for parents, who must persist in order to 
obtain the diagnosis (Smith, Chung et al. 1994). And the more professionals that parents 
consult en route to diagnosis – between four and five in at least one study – the less satisfied 
parents were with the experience (Goin-Kochel, Mackintosh et al. 2006). Thus, from another 
perspective, pediatricians do serve as a significant career contingency – essentially a rite of 
passage – as  parents are transitioned from a state of viewing the medical profession as an ally, 
to one where they question the expertise and opinions of physicians and begin to decide for 
themselves – and often in conjunction with teachers and therapists – what is and what is not an 
appropriate diagnosis or treatment regimen for their child:  
So at two-and-a-half years old they [Early Intervention] sent me a supervisor 
from EI who sat with my son and said to me, ‘Do you have a diagnosis? We don’t 
have a diagnosis on record.’ And I said, ‘Well, they told me initially upon 
contacting you that I didn’t need a diagnosis.’ […] And she said that she’d like to 
get him started on ABA. She said, ‘I want to treat him as though he’s on the 
spectrum, because from what I’m seeing, he should have a diagnosis.’ (NR 001) 
That fighting medical professionals is central to the experience of the autism parent was 
most evident when parents were asked what they had learned from their experiences with 
autism. This “fighting” was not only an issue with pediatricians, but also involved therapy-
administering institutions such as schools, and even autism itself:  
And I think having James the way he is actually allowed me to realize that I really 





him what he needed, it’s not like I could sit back and have everything drop on my 
lap. I actually have to go out and physically fight for what I want, you have to 
have a voice and you can’t’ just sit there and assume that something is going to 
go the way you want it to go. You have to fight for your kids and you have to 
fight for everything that you want. (NR 022) 
And I think that what you have to do is persevere. And to always… you can’t just 
leave the kids alone, because that’s one thing about autism, they go into their 
own world, and they don’t let anybody in. But you have to fight to get in. You 
have to always be… that’s why my husband was always in their face. (NR 032) 
As this latter parent articulates, adopting the identity of the fighting parent is critical to the 
child’s prognosis, for if parents are to yield or even concede defeat, they risk the child 
retreating into themselves and thereby compromising improvement. Interestingly, parents who 
did not find themselves having to advocate on behalf of their child to obtain more services 
consider themselves to be amongst the lucky few. Thus, fighting professionals appears to be a 
crucial component of becoming an autism parent. It also appears to contradict the supply-side 
suggestion that doctors are handing out autism diagnoses: not only did most parents need to 
go elsewhere for a diagnosis, but their interactions with pediatricians did much to detract them 
from that path.  
DIAGNOSTIC CAREERS 
Upon suspecting a problem in their child’s development, parents were most likely to 
approach their pediatrician for advice but would eventually need to seek assistance elsewhere 
before arriving at a diagnosis. Typically, this meant visiting Early Intervention, a developmental 
specialist, and/or the school district. But not all diagnostic careers are created equal. While 





did not always do so in the same order or with the same results. Table 1 summarizes the five 
different careers discovered in the parent interviews. I now consider each in turn. 
TABLE 1-1: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DIAGNOSTIC CAREERS 
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Amanda,  Mark 
 Received Early 
Intervention for other 
diagnoses prior to the 
first suggestion of autism 
15.33 
 
EARLY INTERVENTION PRECEDES DIAGNOSIS (CAREERS A AND B) Approximately half of the 
parents interviewed had enrolled their children in Early Intervention before receiving a 





the jurisdiction of the school district on the child’s third birthday. All of these children were 
diagnosed before 2½ years of age. Career B parents typically became suspicious of their child’s 
behavior between 10 and 18 months of age, whereas Career A parents sometimes did not 
suspect a problem until the child approached his second birthday.  
Upon arrival at Early Intervention, the child is evaluated by a Child Study Team, typically 
consisting of a speech therapist, occupational therapist, and developmental therapist. In almost 
every case the parent is told that their child is delayed – either in terms of developmental age 
(e.g., their two-and-a-half-year-old functions at a one-year-old level) or as a percentage of 
normative standards (e.g., their child is 33% delayed in speech and 25% in motor development) 
– and qualifies for state-funded services. Early Intervention therapists are not certified 
diagnosticians: while they are responsible for assessing current developmental level, this leads 
only to the suggestion of Developmental Delay, a vague description that does little provide 
parents with a deeper understanding of their child’s difficulties, or what can be done to 
alleviate them. As one website describes it: 
Developmental Delay is when your child does not reach their developmental 
milestones at the expected times. It is an ongoing major or minor delay in the 
process of development. If your child is temporarily lagging behind, that is not 
called developmental delay. Delay can occur in one or many areas—for example, 
gross or fine motor, language, social, or thinking skills. (University of Michigan 
Health System 2011; emphasis added) 
Of course, the difficulty lies in determining whether or not the delay is temporary, which 
can only be resolved retroactively. Developmental Delay is, in effect, a placeholder diagnosis, 
the clarification of which requires continuous follow-up with a medical specialist, such as a 





therapists cannot diagnose autism, they play a crucial role in transitioning the child into the 
patient-in-waiting phase. 
Perhaps most significant for these parents is that these interactions with Early 
Intervention therapists provide the first confirmation from a child development professional 
that something is wrong with their child and probably has been all along, and further proof that 
they were correct to doubt their pediatrician’s judgment. But the significance of this interaction 
with Early Intervention goes beyond the mere validation of parents’ suspicions. It is here that 
many parents first heard the term “autism” mentioned in relation to their own child. It is in fact 
this mention of autism that is the primary distinctive feature between the careers I have 
denoted A and B. Specifically, for twelve of the eighteen parents who visited Early Intervention 
before receiving a formal diagnosis, it was an Early Intervention therapist who first suggested 
that their child might have autism, either during the child’s initial assessment or while she was 
receiving treatment services. As two parents recount the event: 
I: Who then first raised the possibility that James had autism or something 
similar? 
P: Two of the people who came to evaluate him. One of them, she wasn’t very… 
from what I understand, she’s no longer working for EI, but the other one, who I 
value every second of everything that she says now, since she was James’ 
therapist, she had said that he shows very good characteristics of being on the 
autism spectrum. (NR 022) 
 
I: Who first raised the possibility that Charles had autism or a similar condition? 
P: He was receiving Early Intervention services because of his physical delays. He 
didn’t walk until he was over two [years old]. He was 26 months old. So he 
received physical therapy and occupational therapy, and they mentioned it. 
Unofficially mentioned it.  





P: Yes, the physical therapist and the occupational therapist. (NR 015) 
Since Early Intervention does not provide diagnostic services, these exchanges about autism are 
always conducted unofficially; the child continues to receive treatment services but no 
diagnostic code – beyond the purposely indistinct Developmental Delay – is assigned that is 
communicated to other agents such as schools or physicians.  
Prior to this encounter with Early Intervention, Career A parents had not suspected that 
their child was autistic, either because they possessed no prior knowledge about autism 
(including not even having heard the word previously), or because they simply did not see the 
symptoms in their child. During the course of my observations at diagnostic interviews between 
parents and physicians, some parents even seemed to be frightened of the diagnosis, 
prompting one physician to ask if the parents were “okay with the autism diagnosis.” In line 
with this observation, many parents told me that initially they did not believe that the autism 
diagnosis could be correct. In retrospect, they attribute this to their lack of understanding 
about the meaning of autism. For instance, a few parents thought that their child could not 
possibly be autistic since he was so affectionate, and autistic kids are not affectionate. Similarly, 
others described how their “very social” child could not be autistic, since he would never be 
found sitting in the corner by himself: 
I: And were you thinking about autism at this point? 
P: You know, I had thought about it because I had read. He was always so, and 
still, so attached to my husband and I, especially me. I always felt like autism… I 
thought it was that you can’t tell the difference between a person and an object, 
you know, and I was like, that’s not him. He’s so loving, he’s always so snugly, 
he’s always kissing and hugging, although that got less frequent as he got closer 





be open to everything but I didn’t and I think there’s a lot more information out 
there now about the different types of autism. But I’d compare him to Rain Man 
and think no, that’s not him. (eo03300808) 
These same parents later admitted that they had been mistaken, that after having spent some 
time learning about autism, about the spectrum, about how “every child is different,” that they 
came to see how the diagnosis did, in fact, describe their child accurately: 
We didn’t even have a clue and even when the school district said it, we 
disagreed with them and they actually, fortunately the school district had like a… 
they were just starting a parent’s seminar […] of how to work with kids with, 
specifically with autism […] you know, and then hearing other parents talk about 
“my kid will only wear one shirt ever,” you know, and then to hear sensory issues 
could be also if he’s staring at lights or clapping […] so as I learned more about it 
through the workshop I started […] oh you know, he kinda does fall into a lot of 
these categories. (eo04210807) 
I: So you knew something about autism before that, because… 
P: A little bit. But again, I only thought autism, not spectrum autism. Because if 
you look at autism, it’s not my son. But when you look at the spectrum of autism, 
everything that was listed was my son. (NR 022) 
It could be said that the diagnostic criteria for autism are like the prophecies of a fortune cookie 
or horoscope: broad behavioral descriptors for which concrete referents in the child are easily 
discovered. Understanding autism as a spectrum of impairments renders this all the easier, 
encompassing both the hyper- and hypo-sensitive, affectionate and unresponsive, reticent and 
garrulous. Most parents, as we shall soon see, do not connect symptoms to diagnosis 
independently, but are taught this through Early Intervention as they undergo education in 





as how to identify it in their own child’s behavior. Consider the following mother as she 
struggled to understand her son’s behavior:  
So they [Early Intervention] came in when he was about 16 months old by the 
time I made the phone call and we made the appointment, and by about 17 
months they started the early intervention with just the DI [developmental 
intervention], and one of the girls who came here, who I… she was the one I 
cared the least for. He had three separate therapists at that point, and when he 
was, during a session, screaming, and I said, ‘But why is he so upset?’ And she 
said, ‘Well, that’s the autism.’ (NR 001) 
By identifying the behavior as symptomatic of autism, Early Intervention offers parents a way to 
make sense of their child.  
Physicians frequently direct parents to Early Intervention, but they themselves do not 
offer much advice on treatment or school placement, and prognoses are conspicuously absent 
from the parental reports of these interactions. Rather, it was Early Intervention that filled in 
these blanks, and parents such as Julia felt indebted to the Early Intervention therapists: 
P: But you know, she [the developmental pediatrician] didn’t give me much 
information. It wasn’t like… because I remember going home to my husband and 
saying, so now what, what do we do? Where do we go? Am I supposed to go get 
more speech therapy, outside of what the state’s giving me? Do I call the 
insurance company? You know, none of that. It was just, yes, he’s got ASD, and 
she told me to make an appointment to come back in 6 months.  
I: So not really any instructions in terms of next steps? 
P: No. It wasn’t…  
[…] 
I: You said you talked about ABA, so now you would get the ABA? 
P: Because the [Early Intervention] therapist I was working with, they were 
waiting for me, they knew I was going to the doctor. Once I got the diagnosis, 
then they’re the ones who helped me out more, they are the ones who 





handle my child. The doctor doesn’t teach you how to handle this. They 
diagnose, but how do I deal with this kid who’s screaming and throwing himself 
on the floor? They don’t teach you that. So the therapists that were here, they 
were very helpful, walking me through things, teaching me different techniques. 
(NR 024) 
Thus, not only does Early Intervention responsibilize parents for their children’s neurological 
development, they also provide them with the necessarily arsenal of skills. Additionally, shortly 
before children age out of Early Intervention, Early Intervention case workers act as advocates 
in securing an appropriate school placement. Both Early Intervention therapists and case 
workers figure prominently in the design of the children’s Individualized Education Program,23 
and hence the effects of their actions continue to reverberate even after the child ages out of 
Early Intervention.  
Unlike the parents I denote as Career A, Career B parents did suspect that their child 
might have autism, although none of these parents reported being told by Early Intervention 
that autism was a possible diagnosis for their child, even when parents specifically asked 
therapists their opinion on the matter. Take, for instance, the following parent: 
Q: Okay. And they [Child Find] did the evaluation and -- 
A: Yes they did. They did evaluations and they did all these different testing to 
see how he scored but nobody would come out. They would always say we are 
not a doctor. They would not say that he had autism. They would not say that, 
they would just say that he had delays. After he was diagnosed for a very long 
time with having a developmental delay in speech and in his motor skills. But 
pretty much that is what we were told but at that point when I began to see 
characteristics I just felt that okay there is something with this autism here. 
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The presumption is that when parents are already tuned into the possibility of autism – which 
would include more up-to-date knowledge on the spectrum or at least the expanded definition 
– the Early Intervention therapists themselves remain silent on the suggestion. This finding is 
substantiated by an observation made at the AMC. When Martha, the nurse who conducted 
intake interviews with parents before scheduling an appointment for them at either the Autism 
Medical Center (AMC) or the Center for Child Development (CCD),24 explained how she 
determined who would get the AMC appointment and who would be directed instead to the 
CCD, she described how she refrained from mentioning the word ‘autism’ at any point during 
the interview. She repeatedly emphasized that she did not want parents to be influenced in any 
way by her own words or suspicions. In the end, parents who suspected autism and specifically 
mentioned this during the intake were immediately scheduled to see a physician at the AMC. 
Those who did not refer to this particular diagnosis could end up at either clinic, depending on 
Martha’s own impression at the end of the interview. It is difficult to overestimate the 
significance of this finding, for in observing almost fifty families as they visited the AMC, only 
three children were not diagnosed with either autism or PDD. 
While no official diagnosis is made at Early Intervention or its counterparts, and 
regardless of whether or not parents suspected autism themselves (i.e., followed Career A or 
B), it is here where parents learn that to get such a diagnosis, they need to visit a 
developmental pediatrician or pediatric neurologist, from whom approximately two-thirds of 
the children in this study received an autism diagnosis. In fact, parents often reported that it 
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was an Early Intervention therapist who referred them to the particular specialist who 
eventually gave them the autism diagnosis: 
I: So he was almost two when he was evaluated by EI and they suggested it 
[autism]? 
P: And they suggested I see a developmental pediatrician. (NR 022) 
I: And who first raised the possibility that he had autism or a similar condition? 
P: Well after those two [Early Intervention therapists] came in… actually, maybe 
it was before he was 28 months old, because they had come and evaluated him 
and then they suggested a behavioral specialist come and evaluate him, and that 
took a little bit, and then they just suggested that I have him evaluated by a 
developmental pediatrician. (NR 024) 
Through these discussions with therapists, parents also learn that an autism diagnosis will get 
them more therapy hours than they currently receive with only the indication of delay: 
They [Early Intervention] suggested, there’s a real backlog for getting in to see 
people for diagnosis in Boston and so they suggested a study that was being 
done by Boston University and they could get us in within a couple of weeks […] 
it was just a piece of paper that we needed to get services started […] I needed 
the diagnosis to get this group called Building Blocks, which I really wanted. 
(eo03300808) 
And naturally, by this point parents are also well-versed in the mantra that “the best thing you 
can do for your child is get him as much therapy as possible.” Since Early Intervention also 
provides assistance to families in the transition to the education system, parents learn too that 
the autism diagnosis will also permit them to register their child in an autism-only classroom (or 
even an autism-only school):  
By the time they’re three years old, they age out of early intervention, and then 





3 years [of age], when I had to take him to EI, the mothers who brought the 
children, we all had to sit around. It was more like therapy, it was mandatory 
that the parents sat with a social worker and talked about things. At first I was 
very hesitant, […]. But that’s where I learned a lot, from all these parents that 
were about to age out of early intervention, and they were talking about autism 
and special schools. And the woman that was the social worker [for Early 
Intervention], she was very knowledgeable, and she’s the one who said, ‘You’ve 
gotta get things rolling here. You’ve got to get him in a school that deals with 
kids with autism.’ […] The social worker [at Early Intervention] was the one who 
more or less educated us. And she said he needed to go to a special school for 
kids with autism, and there were far and few. She said he needed to have one-
on-one, ABA, discrete trails. They were talking about 40 hours a week. (NR 020) 
Both parents and professionals consider the autistic-only classroom the best placement option 
for autistic children, with promises of more therapy hours, teachers with more specialized 
knowledge about autism and its treatment, and a lower teacher-to-student ratio than the 
comparative multiple-handicapped classroom. Thus, Early Intervention is a significant transition 
point which serves not only to explicitly direct parents to where they can obtain an autism 
diagnosis, but also to provide the initial coaching on how to be an autism parent.  
DIAGNOSIS PRECEDES EARLY INTERVENTION (CAREER C)  Six of the children in our study received 
Early Intervention services only after receiving a diagnosis of autism or PDD. While their 
parents, like their Career A and B peers, typically became suspicious before two years of age, 
were shunned by pediatricians, and received diagnoses before 2½ years, they differ in that their 
children received diagnoses prior to enrolling in Early Intervention. Thus, unlike their 
undiagnosed counterparts, these parents needed no diagnostic guidance from Early 
Intervention therapists. To the contrary, they were referred to Early Intervention by the 





The most striking difference between parents who received a diagnosis before Early 
Intervention and those who received it afterwards was the amount of parental education. 
Career C parents were well-educated: at least one parent in each family possessed a Master’s 
degree or higher, and in all but one case both parents had at least a Bachelor’s degree. As is 
shown in Table 1, on average Career C parents possessed almost eighteen years of schooling, 
approximately equivalent to a Master’s degree. This amounts to more than one year more than 
the next highest average (Career D at 16.71 years) and about 2.5 years more than the 
remaining three careers.25 While parental education or socioeconomic status are no longer 
considered risk factors for autism (Larsson, Eaton et al. 2005), parental education and family 
income have been linked to a lower age of diagnosis and greater satisfaction with the 
diagnostic process (Goin-Kochel, Mackintosh et al. 2006). Kogan et al. (2009) found a negative 
correlation between parental education and the severity of the ASD, as well as a lower 
prevalence of ASD in families with lower parental education and decreased severity in parents 
with higher education. These authors speculate that families with less education have fewer 
resources from which to draw upon in the search for information about their child’s behavior or 
for a diagnosing physician. More educated parents, on the other hand, might possess an 
increased capacity to navigate the system and make certain demands on the professionals, who 
in turn might view these parents differently because of their elevated status. It may be that 
these parents, many of whom are professionals themselves, place greater importance on the 
meaning of the diagnostic act and are therefore more motivated to complete this ritual before 
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moving into the treatment phase. Of course, another possible explanation is that parents with 
more education are pushier, and diagnosis is a response to their demands. This would help 
explain not only the increased satisfaction of these parents with the diagnostic process, but also 
why milder cases of ASD have a lower prevalence in families with less parental education.26  
The upshot is that more education affords parents diagnosis at an age young enough to 
enable the child to enroll in Early Intervention, and in at least some states the autism diagnosis 
qualifies the child for a greater number of therapy hours. Of course, already possessing a 
diagnosis means that, for these families, Early Intervention does not play a significant role in 
directing parents to diagnosing physicians. But it does offer a new way in which to regard Early 
Intervention, as a sort of equalizer that cancels out the effects of higher education. For while 
parents with more education were the only ones to get diagnoses without the assistance of 
Early Intervention, parents with less education were still able to get the same diagnoses within 
the same time frame as their more educated counterparts. As several studies have pointed out 
that lower socioeconomic status was correlated with diagnosis at a later age (see, for example, 
Mandell, Novak et al. 2005), this is no small achievement. Moreover, here we see that Early 
Intervention allows parents to bypass the decision-tree route to diagnosis, where a series of 
tests are conducted in order to rule out other disorders. Instead, with Early Intervention 
parents are immediately directed to services focused on development. Even without assisting in 
the diagnostic process, Early Intervention nevertheless proves itself an essential resource for 
these parents. One mother emphasized the importance of Early Intervention for any child who 
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has any kind of a delay, and regretted what she considered the fear of many parents to have 
their child labeled with a diagnosis and receive services.  
EARLY INTERVENTION ABSENT (CAREER D)  As significant as Early Intervention is for 
parents who encounter it, about one-quarter of the children in our study did not receive any 
such services. Except for three cases (described below), these children were diagnosed after 2½ 
years of age. In fact, in most cases the first symptoms were not even noticed by this point. I 
mention 2½ years as this is the age at which Early Intervention begins to organize a child’s 
transition to school. When diagnosed after this age, professional advice is for parents to begin 
seeking proper school placement rather than Early Intervention services.27 
Children in this category were more likely to come into contact with and/or be 
diagnosed by a psychologist, or be identified by the school in which they are enrolled. About 
20% were directly referred to a pediatric neurologist by an audiologist after a negative hearing 
test. Others were directed to a specialist by the school district (27%) or another physician 
(30%), occasionally passing through a circuit of specialists en route. The remaining 20% were 
seen by a psychologist or psychiatrist. Overall, these children tended to have more responsive 
pediatricians, with less time elapsing between initial suspicions and diagnosis. This is likely due 
to the older age at which the first symptoms appeared. After two years of age, speech delays 
are more apparent and taken more seriously by pediatricians. In fact, only two children who 
showed symptoms after two years of age had non-responsive pediatricians. It was also more 
likely for these children’s symptoms to be noticed by someone other than a parent, such as a 
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health professional or teacher in school. Certainly the latter has the advantage of directly 
comparing the child to his or her neurotypical peers.  
It would seem, then, that after a certain age – approximately 2½ years – both the 
medical and school systems more readily confront the possibility of an autism diagnosis, 
without the assistance of Early Intervention. Still, what Career D families show is that Early 
Intervention allows one to bypass the tradition medical decision tree – first rule out the obvious 
(usually a hearing problem), then begin testing for the most likely problem, etc. – and 
immediately begin focusing on developmental issues. For parents visiting one specialist after 
the other, the process can endure for months. On the other hand, Early Intervention and similar 
institutions conduct all of their testing in one day, giving parents an immediate answer from 
which they can begin strategizing the subsequent course of action. Early Intervention also gives 
parents details about their child’s specific challenges in terms of a percentage – 25% delayed in 
speech, 30% in motor development, and so on. Not only do these figures put the vague notion 
of delay into concrete terms, they also provide parents with intervention targets and help 
structure the course of treatment. At the same time, parents learn how suppress the desire for 
a cure and to instead work on small goals and derive satisfaction from them.  
Three children in this category were diagnosed early enough to qualify for Early 
Intervention, but still did not receive them. Melanie’s family was preparing to move out of the 
country, hence her parents willingly withdrew altogether from the process. Christina and 
Andrew, on the other hand, were certainly diagnosed young enough to benefit from Early 





parents expressed feelings of guilt or anxiety. Christina’s mother, Frances, said she was 
confused when the neurologist instructed her to go to the school district.28 Thinking that at 18 
months, Christina was much too young for school, she waited one year before following the 
doctor’s advice. She explained: 
P: Now, looking back, me not knowing things the way I know now, I feel really 
upset that I allowed that [lack of services] to go on in her young years. Because 
the young years, I realize now, was the years she needed the most services. And 
those were the years that she got no services practically.  
[…] 
I: So even though she was diagnosed at about 1½, they still said… 
P: Right. [So they told me] to go look on the internet. I didn’t really realize about 
all that stuff, and go talk to your school district. I just felt she was young so I 
didn’t pursue it then. And then about two years old, I started looking into what 
they told me. And then at two, when I started looking into it, they’re like, well, 
she’s 2½, she’s kind of too old to do this early intervention because at three you 
become part of the school district. And I believed it all. And when she went to 
the school district, they just had her in like a handicapped program with high-
functioning kids. She never had any kind of ABA or any of that stuff that she 
should have probably had. (NR 021) 
In this case, Frances did not assume the role of the fighting autism parent after Christina was 
diagnosed, and this lead to feelings of guilt. Michael’s mother did not experience guilt so much 
as anxiety as she tried to decipher the diagnosing doctor’s instructions regarding treatment: 
P: But really we couldn’t find an audiologist who could test him either so it was 
very unclear if it was his problem or the testers problem and no one wanted to 
commit at that point too and so for the next four or five months it was just 
gobbledy-gook which is completely not what it’s like now. If you have any issues 
or problems people pretty much know where to send you. But nobody knew 
where to send us or if they did you had to wait months and months to get an 
appointment and the months and months were vital pieces of time we found out 
                                                             





as we went along. So, we saw Dr. Jameson […] So, he saw Michael for like five or 
ten minutes and he just said, ‘Your kid’s retarded.’ Which wasn’t, you know, or 
he’s got autism, take him home, stimulate him and then come back in a year. I 
thought, what is that? And then he called, I called him back later cause I said you 
know I really had to clarify this, this seemed a little much to me, and I didn’t, I 
needed to understand it a little bit better and, he gave me the name of some 
social worker in Manhattan on the west side and I could go talk to her. And by 
the time – 
Q: So he didn’t like make any official diagnosis in the charts or anything, he just-- 
A: No, he just said autism or mentally retarded, doesn’t really matter right now, 
you’ve just got to stimulate him. Which is pretty open, right? 
Q: Yeah. 
A: A little loose. And get a speech therapist. There was no speech therapist to be 
had. I mean it was just incredibly vague. (BH.12.12.07) 
As his mother points out, when Michael was diagnosed in 1994 there were far fewer resources 
available to parents. The absence of this infrastructure or even more detailed instructions lead 
to a desperate scramble to put together a treatment regimen that was sufficiently stimulating, 
without feeling confident about what exactly that meant. It is precisely this gap that Early 
Intervention fills today. 
 The observation that more educated parents (i.e., Career C) are more likely to get a 
diagnosis for their child at a young age before Early Intervention begins begs the question, are 
Career D parents, who receive the diagnosis at an age too late for Early Intervention or do not 
enroll in EI earlier, less educated than other parents? According to Table 1, the mean education 
for these parents is 16.71 years, somewhere between a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree. In fact, 
one parent in this group possessed a doctoral degree, and another was a Ph.D. candidate in – 
strikingly – Special Education. This is a curious result that demanded a closer look, for the only 





are removed from the calculation the mean years of education in Career D drops from 16.71 to 
15.20 (which, consequently, would be the lowest observed average across all career types). 
Though we surely cannot draw any firm conclusions, it is interesting that both of these families 
are unique in that the parents are foreign born. Barry was actually diagnosed in the Philippines 
and did not arrive in the United States until he was thirteen years old. Melanie’s family was 
Kuwaiti and in the process of moving to England when she was diagnosed, so there was little 
time to enroll in Early Intervention. Foreign nationality might also help explain why these 
parents, despite their education, did not initially suspect autism. For one, there may exist 
different cultural expectations of child development. Also, autism awareness was low outside of 
the United States in the late 1990s. And even if these parents had suspected autism, they may 
have been challenged while attempting to navigate a new medical infrastructure. They might 
have also struggled to have clinicians take their claims seriously.29  
Perhaps another way to regard the differences between diagnostic careers is in relation 
to the decreasing age of diagnosis. In the sphere of developmental medicine, the current 
understanding is that there exists a critical window in which certain skills must develop; 
otherwise, the chances of acquiring that particular skill rapidly diminish. On the other hand, it is 
difficult for clinicians to determine whether developmental delays are minor or symptomatic of 
something more serious such as autism. For instance, many parents explained that they 
received a PDD diagnosis because it was too early for autism to be diagnosed. As pressure 
mounds to diagnose autism younger and younger, and with the evidence that this is already 
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happening,30 presumably more parents will find themselves navigating the careers I have 
denoted A and B, and consequently fewer parents missing Early Intervention (and so following 
Career D). With time, then, Early Intervention increasingly bears the greater burden of 
mediating this uncertainty in prognosis. 
DIAGNOSIS AFTER EARLY INTERVENTION (CAREER E)  A small subset of children in this study 
tracked careers which resisted categorization in the present scheme. Three received Early 
Intervention services for problems that were not related to autism, including seizures, physical 
delays, and deafness, and so were already involved with the system of childhood surveillance 
before autism was suspected. These parents reported becoming suspicious of a problem as 
early as five (and no later than seven) months of age, yet only one child received an ASD 
diagnosis before his fourth birthday (and was, coincidentally, also the only child born after 
1994, the year in which the DSM-IV was published). All of these children received the autism 
diagnosis after aging out of Early Intervention, meaning that schools and physicians played a 
more significant role in the labeling process for these children.  
 Two of these children – Mark and Amanda – were amongst the oldest in the sample, 
born in 1989 and 1994, respectively. Mark’s mother was the only parent to describe the 
moment she first thought about autism as a possible diagnosis for her son as a sudden 
revelation, a Eureka! moment. Meredith, who holds a Master’s degree in Public Health and was 
working within the Early Intervention system when Mark was born, attended a conference on 
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autism and developmental disabilities when Mark was three years old. Here she attended a 
session in which the presenter spoke about the new, expanded (or spectrum) definition of 
autism. As she recalls: 
I was sent to a conference where Barry Prizant was the speaker and he was 
speaking about language and specifically autism and the DSM-IV criteria and I 
remember, that was like my Eureka! moment, I sat there and I left the 
conference and called my family who was babysitting and I said, “I think Mark 
has autism.” He fits all the characteristics, but nobody has ever put that 
together. (NR 003) 
Here Meredith provides a supply-side account for Mark’s subsequent diagnosis: the new DSM-
IV criteria for autism described her son perfectly. In a climate where there were few autism 
experts, Meredith sought out a neurologist who specialized in autism and Mark was diagnosed 
with PDD-NOS. Since he had already aged out of Early Intervention, Meredith mobilized her 
own expertise of developmental disabilities to eke out what she felt were the most appropriate 
services and educational plan for her son. Like that of most mothers we spoke to, Meredith’s 
story is replete with rich descriptions of how her own agency determined her child’s 
educational fate.31  
 Amanda, who was enrolled in Early Intervention to help with physical delays, was not 
diagnosed with autism until she was eight or nine years old. At the time, her mother Jackie 
recalls that she already had four other diagnoses, including mental retardation and ADHD.32 
Because of these pre-existing conditions, Amanda regularly visited a neurologist, and it was 
during one of these visits that she was diagnosed with autism. Up until this point, Amanda’s 
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educational setting had always been in a special needs classroom or school. The new diagnosis, 
which Jackie describes as mild autism, did not spur any changes in Amanda’s schooling or 
treatment regimens, perhaps because the mental retardation diagnosis had already solidified a 
poor prognosis.33 In fact, the only change resulting from the diagnosis seems to be a recasting 
of Amanda’s earlier childhood: 
I: Did it change the way you understand Amanda, and the way you interacted 
with her? 
P: No, the only thing was that when I started going back to when she was two or 
three, certain things… when it came to brushing her teeth, as an example, that 
they hate the toothpaste or whatever, like stuff like that where I started to 
realize that she was showing all of these signs since she was a kid, a little baby. 
So going back, reading and stuff like that, it helped me understand her more. (NR 
006) 
Again, Amanda’s story seems to emphasize supply-side forces: changes in the DSM criteria 
coupled with rising awareness amongst clinicians. Her case is quite possibly one of diagnostic 
substitution from mental retardation to autism (Shattuck 2006; King and Bearman 2009), 
initiated by her neurologist. As she was one of only two children who was also diagnosed with 
mental retardation at some point in the career, it is not possible to generalize to other children 
who were similarly reclassified.  
Nicolas, the third child falling into this category, is a rather special case. At birth, Nicolas 
was diagnosed as deaf and began receiving treatment services as a toddler which were 
provided by a specialized school for deaf children. A teacher and speech therapist at this school 
were the first to suggest that Nicolas was autistic. A clinical psychologist observed Nicolas but, 
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unsure of the diagnosis, insisted on continued monitoring until ambiguity could be further 
reduced. When Nicolas was two years old, the school suspected that he had autism and refused 
to continue his services, leaving his mother no option but to home school. At this point the 
psychologist diagnosed Nicolas with PDD-NOS so that he might receive services, but the school 
still refused to accept him, even with a state-provided individual aide. Home-schooling 
continued for over one year, until at 3½ years when he was enrolled in an autism program at a 
public school.  
Thus, excluding Nicolas, whose story is particularly unique,34 what the Career E paths 
are most demonstrative of are supply-side arguments. Neither Meredith nor Jackie were 
shopping for an autism diagnosis; rather, it resulted from their position within the institutional 
matrix. Recall from the introduction that in 1989 – coincidentally, the year in which Mark was 
born – the prevalence of autism was estimated at just 4 in 10,000. At this time, there was little 
public awareness of the condition such that even someone like Meredith who worked in Early 
Intervention essentially found out about autism by chance. Had she not been employed within 
Early Intervention she would not have attended the conference at which she heard Barry 
Prizant speak, and it is likely that Mark, like Amanda, may have waited several more years to 
receive his diagnosis (if he would have received one at all). That Amanda was diagnosed at such 
a late age is illustrative of the rising awareness of autism amongst clinicians of the broadened 
diagnostic criteria. Because Amanda was already under medical surveillance for other 
conditions, particularly mental retardation, she had regular contact with a neurologist at a time 
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 Some of the symptoms of autism parallel those of children born without the ability to hear. Consequently, an 
autism diagnosis cannot be confirmed until a child has had a hearing test. That Nicolas is both deaf and autistic 





when the prevalence had grown to more than 67 in 10,000. Thus, the diagnoses of Mark and 
Amanda appear to result from the changing diagnostic criteria of the DSM-IV and the increasing 
awareness amongst providers with which it was coupled. 
AUTISM EXPECTATIONS 
Given the evidence presented here, what is to be made of the notion that the diagnosis 
of autism is an artifact of supply- and/or demand-side forces? There appears to be at least 
some evidence for both types of explanations. For one, we saw that the diagnostic process for 
Career E parents seems to point to the significance of changes to the autism criteria in the 
DSM-IV as well as rising awareness of the disorder amongst clinicians. But the main strike 
against these theories is the behavior of pediatricians: rather than accelerate the diagnostic 
process, they function as retardants that actually prolong the practice. We have already seen 
that for most parents, the first mention of autism did not arise in the pediatrician’s office. In 
fact, while never asked specifically about the helpfulness of their pediatricians, several parents 
voluntarily reported that their pediatricians were extremely unhelpful during the diagnostic 
process, primarily through their reluctance to acknowledge that the child had a problem, or 
that it was anything more significant than “normal” late development.35 In effect, the conduct 
of pediatricians equips parents with the fighting instinct and teaches them to be suspicious of 
doctors. In part through their interactions with pediatricians, parents learn to follow their own 
interpretations of what is wrong and become prepared to battle for them. 
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Does this imply that demand-side explanations offer a better account of the autism 
diagnosis? We saw that at least one mother demanded a referral to a specialist from her 
pediatrician. At the very least, the fact that parents’ initial suspicions demonstrated 
unfamiliarity with symptoms of autism should give us pause. For one, several parents told us 
that they suspected that their child was either deaf or was only speech delayed, whereas others 
claimed that they initially took their pediatrician at their word that nothing was wrong with 
their child. And only two of the parents interviewed claimed that they knew a lot about autism 
before hearing it mentioned in relation to their child. One had worked in a developmental 
disabilities center for a semester as a psychology major and had been exposed to the disorder 
then; the other explained that she had a neighbor with an autistic child, and also had several 
friends whose children were diagnosed with PDD-NOS.36 The latter was the only parent to 
express familiarity with the notion of the autism spectrum. But most parents admitted to barely 
knowing anything about autism previously, such as John’s mother: 
I: And what did you know about autism before that? 
P: None. Nothing. I’d never even heard of it. I had no knowledge. I had, I guess 
like anybody else, no reason to know about it, because I didn’t know anybody 
that suffered from it, I didn’t know anybody that had… well, my first son had 
these issues with his speech and all. That was like the first of anybody that I 
know, though. No friends who had… anybody with disabilities. (NR 020) 
 
Moreover, when asked what previous knowledge they possessed about autism prior to 
hearing it first mentioned in relation to their child, the majority of parents indicated that they 
either knew very little about the disorder or nothing at all, with some parents admitting that 
they had never before even heard the word ‘autism.’ When these parents elaborated on the 
                                                             





little knowledge they had, they tended to refer to the characteristics that comprise what is now 
referred to by clinicians as “classic” autism,37 such as hand-flapping, head-banging and toe-
walking. More up-to-date knowledge, including of higher-functioning forms of autism, was rare 
– recall that only one mother showed previous familiarity with the autism spectrum. This was 
especially evident as parents sometimes cited the film Rain Man38 (1988) as either a source of 
their knowledge, or the embodiment of it. Accordingly, when describing what they knew, they 
were more likely to refer to the “classic” symptoms as opposed to the spectrum symptoms, 
such as the following mothers: 
I had my girlfriend’s son [with autism who] was a toe-walker, a hand-flapper, a 
lot of these very awkward, obvious signs […] I think everyone’s typical thought is 
Rain Man, you think that severe. […] So it was basically all of those signs, that 
there’s a language delay, that they’re socially… some kind of social… missing 
something, it’s just that they can’t really blend in. I always thought autism – just 
the root of the word – was that a child or person who was autistic was kind of 
into themselves, and pushed themselves outside of the world and the people 
around them… (NR 001) 
I knew autism to be a kid that banged their head against the wall and their hands 
up in the air and shaking them. (NR 016) 
The imagery of a child “in his own world,” of severe social withdrawal and self-isolation, is 
reminiscent Kanner’s (1943) original description of “autistic aloneness,” referring to the child’s 
seeming preference for solitude from his external environment and inability to relate to other 
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people. It resonates too with Bruno Bettelheim’s (1967) “refrigerator mother” hypothesis, 
which claimed that autism was a psychogenic disorder caused by cold and distant mothering. 
According to Bettelheim, as a result of the child’s frustration in his ability to have his needs met, 
“he withdraws to an inner redoubt in an effort to survive,” to an “inner fortress” (1967: 78). 
That the “own world” metaphor was a recurrence in the parent interviews suggests not only 
that the imagery of the “empty fortress” still permeates today, but also that parents’ prior 
understanding of autism was indeed “classic” in more than one sense of the word.39 That such 
limited knowledge of autism was the common state of affairs for these parents prior to 
diagnosis suggests that, despite popular convictions, the diagnosis of autism is not driven by 
demand-side factors alone. One could also argue that in states where treatment services are 
offered even in the absence of a diagnosis, there are less incentives for parents to be 
aggressive. Rather, consonant with the argument put forth in this dissertation, it is institutional 
factors which shape parental responses: parents do not fight by innate instinct, but because 
they were coached to do so by Early Intervention. 
 Finally, some observations appears to support the social influence model. Tyler’s mother 
reports that she had a neighbor with an autistic child, as well as several friends who children 
had been diagnosed with PDD-NOS. It was through these channels that she learned about 
autism and the spectrum of symptoms. Another parent suspected autism because of a strong 
family history – three cousins with autism and an older son with Asperger’s Disorder. Still, this 
theory has limited purchase, as this sort of interaction was not commonly reported in this 
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sample of parents. Most notably, not once did a parent report that another autism parent 
made the initial suggestion. In fact, parents report little communication with other parents until 
after the autism diagnosis is already secured. When they were reported, exchanges between 
parents tended to be mediated by a third party, such as a social worker, as described by John’s 
mother above. 
So how do parents account for the way in which the possibility that their child had 
autism was introduced into the narrative of their child’s problem? Few parents seems to raise 
the possibility themselves, and more importantly, autism was not always a welcomed diagnosis. 
When parents were initially confronted with it, many resisted or even rejected the label and 
expressed shock upon hearing of it. As they describe it, they were unable to “see” autism in 
their child, it did not seem to be a valid description of their child’s symptoms and behaviors. We 
saw above how one mother thought that her child could not possibly have autism since he was 
so affectionate. Other parents – and this was usually in states where the provision of services 
was contingent on a diagnosis – began by referring to the diagnosis as only a “piece of paper,” 
but eventually they too came to identify and accept it. It is primarily through Early Intervention 
or a medical specialist, i.e., representatives of the system of developmental surveillance, that 
parents are introduced to autism as a possible diagnosis. These institutional actors – those 
affiliated with Early Intervention, schools, clinics, etc. – are the key mediators between parents 





CHAPTER 2: THE STRUCTURE OF THE CLINIC 
 
 When I first set out to conduct my fieldwork at the AMC, I was most intrigued by the 
opportunity to witness differential diagnosis in action. How were “normal” kids – or as I would 
learn to refer to them properly, neurotypicals – distinguished from autistic kids? I expected to 
see a lot of ADHD, and maybe even a little bipolar disorder. After having read so much about 
diagnostic substitution from mental retardation to autism, I wondered too how this distinction 
was acted upon in practice, and how much work went into either separating the two diagnostic 
categories or co-diagnosing them. But to my surprise, none of this would I regularly witness at 
the AMC. Instead, all but two of eighteen patients – almost 90% – seeking a diagnosis did in fact 
receive a diagnosis of either Autistic Disorder or PDD (see Table 2-1).40 I did see one ADHD 
patient, though this turned out to be purely by accident: he was supposed to be scheduled at 
his neurologist’s other office, not at the AMC. Moreover, on only one occasion was the mental 
retardation diagnosis even mentioned. And the latter was raised by the parent and 
subsequently denied by the clinician. How could my expectations – based primarily on the 
medical literature and accounts in the media – been so far off base?  
Supply-side theorists would surely snicker at my naïveté: clearly, they would argue, you 
were witnessing the frivolous disposal of autism diagnoses to any child who showed up to get 
one. You saw no differential diagnosis because there is no differential diagnosis, there is only 
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autism and the access to therapies and other benefit that its diagnosis provides. Even one of 
the AMC nurses was confused when I wondered aloud as to why I witnessed so little 
differentiation. With the autism prevalence what it is today, she replied, I don’t think there’s 
anything to be surprised about.  
TABLE 2-1: DIAGNOSES OBSERVED AT THE AMC 
Name Age* Diagnosis 
Luis 29 months Autistic Disorder 
Robert 26 months PDD-NOS 
Marla 5 years Autistic Disorder 
Nelson 29 months PDD-NOS 
Melvin 29 months PDD-NOS 
James 30 months PDD-NOS 
Tyler 22 months PDD-NOS 
Parker 26 months PDD-NOS 
Lucas 3 years Autistic Disorder 
Dylan 21 months Autistic Disorder 
Andy 3 years Autistic Disorder 
Murray 3 years PDD-NOS 
Rachel 24 months (No diagnosis given) 
Emma 4 years PDD-NOS 
George 5 years PDD-NOS 
Nathan 3 years Autistic Disorder 
Sean 3 years PDD-NOS 
Enrica 8 years Communication Impairment 
* Given in months for children under 3 years of age and years otherwise. 
In hindsight, I should probably not be too shocked by my finding, but for reasons other 
than the presumed supply-side mechanisms. We have already seen in chapter one how 
approximately half of the parents interviewed were directed to a diagnostician via Early 
Intervention or a similar institution, so some parents were already prepared for the possibility 
of autism. And at the AMC, as I describe below, children who are most likely to receive a 





I would not observe “pure” differential diagnosis at the AMC because it is an institutional 
process which transcends any specific chronological or geographical location. 
In the previous chapter I recounted the struggle of parents and their search for an 
explanation of their child’s perceived difficulties. Diagnostic careers could take various forms, 
but what they all have in common is that the child eventually came to be diagnosed with an 
Autism Spectrum Disorder even though parents were at first highly suspicious that this could be 
the right diagnosis. It is through interactions with therapists and clinicians, I argued, that 
parents are made aware of the autistic symptoms their child displays and coached on how to be 
an autism parent. In chapter three, I will examine the parent-clinician interactions in more 
detail. This chapter is about the clinic, or more specifically, the institutionalized routines and 
practices through which the patient-in-waiting is funneled at the AMC. As I will show, this 
process extends well beyond the walls of the clinic. We have already seen how it begins with 
Early Intervention, where ‘at-risk’ children are flagged and directed to physicians specializing in 
autism. Next, at the AMC, patients are pre-selected based in part on their results on the 
Modified Checklist for Autism in Toddlers. But diagnosis is more than Early Intervention and the 
M-CHAT – for one, the latter has a tendency to drastically overestimate the number of children 
who merit a diagnosis, so it alone cannot explain the observation that most children visiting the 
AMC receive a diagnosis. Rather, these children are further funneled towards the autism 
diagnosis through the assumptions built into the clinic’s routines and procedures. As Dr. Daly 
told one mother before her son was diagnosed, “I assume he’s somewhere on the spectrum if 
you’re here.” Clinicians are looking for autism – after all, it is an autism clinic. Data on each child 





approach in which testing for autism continues until the child has duly earned the label. Even in 
the face of uncertainty the culture of the clinic favors diagnosis over non-diagnosis, with the 
belief that it is better to diagnose the well than to leave the unwell untreated.  
Crucial to the institutionalized differential diagnosis performed by the clinic is the PDD-
NOS diagnosis. It is through the use of this label that the children who have the potential to 
improve are distinguished from those who do not. This is the diagnosis that parents want, for it 
communicates that the child is not currently “all he will ever be,” but that he has the potential 
to occupy a seat in a mainstream kindergarten class. It is indeed the notion of potential that 
underlies the distinction between mental retardation, Autistic Disorder, and PDD-NOS. Children 
with PDD-NOS are the exemplary patients-in-waiting. These are the children who might 
eventually lose the label. This helps to explain why physicians often delay the decision to 
diagnosis Autistic Disorder until the child is closer to five years of age, and PDD-NOS is used as a 
placeholder until the final diagnostic decision can be made. Thus, the PDD-NOS diagnosis 
constitutes a crucial part of the meaning of parents’ experience of dealing with a diagnosis of 
developmental delay.  
It is also through institutionalized clinical practices and routines that the diagnosis of 
autism by prototype becomes possible, for unless the flows and channels of the clinic are 
stabilized, this skill, the hallmark of medical expertise, cannot work. As more and more children 
outside of the ‘classical’ prototype arrive at the clinic, clinicians learn to expect these deviations 
and recognize them immediately. Thus, diagnosis-cum-prototype is shaped by looping 





differential diagnosis of autism is the totality of these institutional processes. This means that 
diagnosis is more than just the interplay of supply and demand forces: it is produced by this 
institutional funnel.  
Hence, in this chapter I examine more closely the characteristics of the institution and 
those who populate it, setting the stage for chapter three in which parents encounter the clinic 
in the diagnostic interview. After a description of the methodology, I describe the history of the 
AMC, the physical space, and the daily activities that take place there. Next, I relate the routine 
practices of the clinic to the fact that almost every child assessed there receives an autism 
diagnosis. Finally, I take a closer look at the organization of clinical perception at the AMC and 
how clinicians perceive their own role as well as the role of parents, while paying special 
attention to the ways in which the notion of the autism spectrum facilitates interactions in the 
clinic. 
METHODS 
SITE AND ENTRY  Over the fifteen month period from May 2007 until July 2008, I became a 
participant observer at the Autism Medical Center, a clinic specializing in the diagnosis and 
management of Autism Spectrum Disorders. The center is situated within the outpatient 
psychiatry division at a university hospital, which I have dubbed University Medical School, 
located in the tri-state area. Entry to the clinic was negotiated by my dissertation supervisor, Gil 
Eyal, who met with Dr. Michelle Baker, a pediatric neurologist and the clinic’s founding director, 
in November of 2006 and obtained her permission. While the conditions of my entry (as well as 
the title on my identification badge) stipulated that I was a volunteer at the clinic, no physician 





during my residency. Thus, I was free to spend my entire time conducting observations. This 
proved to be particularly advantageous after I learned that the clinicians only met with patients 
on Wednesdays, though beginning in October 2007 one physician began seeing patients on 
Thursdays as well.  
SAMPLING PROCEDURE  By necessity, my sample was one of convenience. For the first two days 
at the clinic, I observed all of Dr. Baker’s appointments. Parental consent was obtained before 
any observations were collected. In the periods between appointments I was introduced by Dr. 
Baker to two other staff pediatricians at the clinic, Drs. Michaels and Johnson, both of whom 
consented to my presence during their appointments. Dr. Johnson brought it to my attention 
that the staff psychologist, Dr. Daly, frequently conducted the ADOS for her patients and 
suggested I make a direct request via email to observe these sessions. Dr. Daly consented, and 
by the third week I was began observing Dr. Daly and the ADOS. Within a few months I had 
established my modus operandi. As my research is most concerned with the diagnosis of 
autism, I prioritized appointments in which a diagnosis was being made. In practical terms, this 
meant that I most often tried to observe families visiting the AMC for the first time, and were 
either seeing one of the pediatricians for a primarily interview-based diagnosis or the 
psychologist for an ADOS. This information was easily obtained from the secretary, whom I 
would call on Monday mornings for the doctors’ weekly schedules. When it became apparent 
that most of the older children visiting the AMC for the first time already had an autism 
diagnosis, I began to ask the secretary about patients’ ages and aimed to recruit patients less 
than five years of age. It soon became evident that new patients without prior diagnoses or 





would have these patients see Dr. Daly for an ADOS, sometimes prior to her examination, but 
more often afterwards. Although Drs. Michaels and Baker also saw younger patients, these 
patients always had previous diagnoses. Thus, when at the AMC, I would prioritize new 
appointments with Dr. Johnson, then new appointments with Drs. Baker or Michaels, and then 
follow-up appointments for patients I had seen previously, and finally, any other type of 
appointment. 
ETHNOGRAPHIC OBSERVATIONS  Once enrolled in the study, I would observe patients whenever 
they had an appointment at the AMC. In total, I recruited 50 patients and four clinicians in the 
study. I sat in the corner of the room to observe the interactions during appointments or ADOS 
administrations, and did not initiate any interaction unless the doctor was not in the room. 
Notes were taken in plain sight. Presumably, this did not come across as unusual since the 
clinicians were often taking notes themselves. If the clinician left the room for any reason, I 
typically made small-talk with the parents, often keeping to autism-related topics. During these 
casual conversations, I would not take notes openly but would later jot down what I could 
remember during the bus ride home, or in the adult waiting room if I was waiting for another 
appointment. With regards to the physicians, I would try to ask as many clarification (i.e., 
“why?” or “how?”) questions about the appointment once the patient had left. Drs. Michaels 
and Baker regularly spent a few minutes clarifying things for me, but Dr. Johnson seldom had 
time between patients and her administrative responsibilities (although she once told me to 
call her later that evening). After administrating the ADOS, Dr. Daly would sit with me and score 
the test while thinking out loud, allowing me to jot down the scores and follow her train of 





responded. Again, notes were always taken in plain sight when talking to clinicians, unless of 
course we were walking and talking, in which case I would jot down the conversation during the 
journey home. There were never any objections to my open note-taking, only the occasional 
joke about my having more information about the appointment than the doctors themselves.  
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS  In addition to brief question-and-answer sessions I tried to 
maintain in the field, I conducted semi-structured telephone interviews with the four clinicians I 
regularly observed at the AMC. All interviewees were females.41 The length of the interviews 
ranged from eighteen to fifty-six minutes. The interview questions touched on four general 
topics: how they became interested in autism; their general views about its etiology and 
treatment; how they diagnose and treat autism, and their views on the role of parents in 
diagnostic and subsequent sessions. 
DATA ANALYSIS  An alternating inductive-deductive approach was used to analyze the interview 
and ethnographic data. To begin, I wrote summaries of the various activities I witnessed and 
based on these summaries, developed a coding scheme in line with the patterns I observed. 
The initial iteration of the analysis involved coding the data according to this scheme, as well as 
introducing new codes and categories for patterns that arose and recurred as I read through 
the entire set data in close detail. At the end of this iteration the coding scheme was revised 
accordingly, and I incorporated the new categories as well as discarded those that proved 
nonviable. At this point, I consulted the medical sociology and sociology of science literature for 
salient themes and consequently restructured the coding scheme. I then reanalyzed the data 
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using this new coding scheme, and continued to do so until general agreement was reached 
between my coding scheme and the raw data. Thus, the resulting analytical framework is 
equally rooted in both theory and data, and as such serves as the basis for the argumentation 
of the dissertation. 
HISTORY OF THE CLINIC 
 The Autism Medical Center (AMC) opened its doors to the public in April of 2002, 
though the seeds of its founding were sown as early as 1999. At this time, the University 
Medical School (UMS) had a new dean who wished to establish two new centers for two 
‘important’ conditions at the University. One was to be a cancer center, but the second had yet 
to be determined, and the dean sought input from his colleagues. Dr. Baker, a pediatric 
neurologist, along with Drs. Jenkins and Krumov (a psychiatrist and psychologist, respectively), 
met with the dean in one of the university cafeterias. Autism had been on the dean’s mind, 
though he was not yet sure if this was the right choice, so a meeting with several parents of 
autistic children was arranged. As Dr. Baker recounts the event, the dean saw that these 
parents tended to be wealthy and he imagined that they would constitute a reliable source of 
endowments for the center. He thus decided that the second center would indeed be an autism 
center.  
 Dr. Baker became the first director of the AMC. The center was intended to establish 
autism as a medical disorder, not psychiatric or behavioral, and in this sense would differ from 
its contemporaries in that it went beyond mere diagnosis and psychological testing. As she 
recalls, theirs was the first – or at least among the first – centers to adopt this perspective. The 





sleep problems and gastrointestinal disorders are common in children with autism and hence 
probably related to its pathology. Since all behavior is controlled by the brain, these physical 
ailments might parallel some of the processes that have gone awry in children with autism. In 
keeping with its theoretical foundation, when the center was staffed Dr. Baker insisted on a 
multidisciplinary team: in addition to the standard psychologists and psychiatrists, she wanted 
an immunologist, a gastroenterologist, geneticist and developmental pediatrician on board. Dr. 
Baker, herself a pediatric neurologist, lobbied aggressively for this team which included putting 
pressure on the president of UMS. In due time, her efforts were rewarded and the team was 
created. This essentially established a one-stop shop for parents, for whom more centralized 
care accrued benefits above and beyond a reduction in commuting time. As one parent put it, 
being able to address most medical issues in one place means at least “one less doctor to go 
to.” Even beyond medical concerns, parents would receive greater oversight for their children 
and be able to consolidate advice on medical, alternative and educational treatments under the 
care of a single physician.    
 The next challenge was to find a physical space in which to house the center. Dr. Baker 
negotiated an agreement with the University Neurological Institute (UNI) in which they would 
provide space for the autism team to see patients for one day of each week. The AMC doctors 
would meet with patients at the UNI each Tuesday, and hold a staff meeting at the end of the 
day to discuss the cases as a group and with a social worker. This arrangement lasted for about 
one year, until the UNI neurosurgeons decided that they wanted to expand their own 
operations and were in need of the space. At this point, frustrated with workplace politics and 





and clinical work, Dr. Baker quit as director of the AMC but remained on its staff. This was a 
rather weak point for the center, as she recalls, as there was neither a director nor a permanent 
home. The only alternate building under consideration was badly in need of renovations. Some 
funds were available, but not enough, and parents were becoming impatient with the 
university, which they had wanted to match their own financial contributions.  
  The center sat in a state of limbo from about six months to one year. Dr. Jenkins, a 
psychiatrist, was then named acting director of the AMC. At the same time, the Department of 
Psychiatry acquired a new building on campus and part of this space was allotted for the AMC. 
But Dr. Jenkins’ conception of the center differed from Dr. Baker’s, and he was less keen on the 
multidisciplinary approach. While the same staff members continued to see patients and 
shared the same physical space, the group meetings were dropped and there was little – if any 
– integration amongst the different physicians. Each clinician cared solely for his or her own 
patients. Apart from the pediatric neurologists and the developmental pediatrician, it appeared 
as though the other medical specialists do not hold their patient consultations at the AMC but 
rather within their own departments. Dr. Baker believed that the problem was rooted in the 
lack of independence afforded the AMC. The clinicians hold only an affiliation with the center, 
but are housed in different departments. The AMC does not compensate its staff, and as a 
result the director has little power. For her own part, Dr. Baker eventually found it difficult to 
see her autism patients in this new space. As several of her patients were also enrolled in her 
research studies, she often needed to draw blood or collect urine samples, and the AMC had 
neither the staff nor the physical resources. By the end of 2007, she had begun to see all of her 





not even physically integrated with the AMC, she still considers herself a staff physician with 
the center.  
THE SPACE 
 The AMC sits on the third floor of the Psychiatry Building, behind a set of glass double 
doors just in front of the elevator. Passing through the doors one immediately encounters the 
front desk whose angular layout encloses the receptionist in a triangular space. The walls in this 
area are a dusty blue and decorated with several small pieces of artwork. The paintings are 
bright-colored oil paintings with abstract designs of mostly vertical brush strokes, but 
sometimes different shapes. The two walls behind the reception desk were windowed, with the 
one on the left facing the adult waiting room and the one on the right the family waiting room. 
Autism is visible from the moment one steps out of the elevator. The center’s name and logo 
are on display behind the reception desk, which itself is littered with pamphlets of various sorts 
– one advertising the local autism advocacy group, another listing upcoming seminars, and a 
small informative booklet. Even the artwork, I would later learn, was made by autistic children. 
 The paintings disappear and blue walls turn eggshell white as the main hallway is 
traversed past the family waiting room to the first intersection. The walls are completely bare 
as are the doors of the offices and examination rooms along this hallway. No signs indicating 
directions, no family pictures to decorate office doors; ‘bland’ is perhaps even an 
understatement. Autism is no longer visible but now audible as the occasional vocalization 
escapes from within the rooms along the first intersecting hallway, where I would conduct most 
of my observations over the next fourteen months. I would seldom venture past this crossing – 





or grab a coffee from the conference room at the third such intersection. To the right are two 
rooms used for medical examinations, equipped with a gurney and blood pressure recorder, as 
well as the office that Dr. Michaels uses to see her patients, equipped only with an empty desk, 
several chairs and some toys. To the left is the office used by Drs. Baker and Johnson during 
their appointments. This was the only room with any personal items – namely, Dr. Johnson’s 
many diplomas on the east wall – but after time this seemed more an oddity than anything 
else. Dr. Johnson was never to be found in this room outside of her consultations with autism 
patients, and always transported the necessary items – files, copies of scales, even a pen – into 
the room when she used it. ADOS examinations were conducted in a room split with a one-way 
mirror (though the other half was never utilized), located off of the second intersection. 
 Several weeks into my ethnography at the clinic, I noticed a number of staff members 
who were seeing patients, but to whom I had never been introduced. I asked the receptionist, 
Carla, if they were also seeing patients with autism. It was then that I learned about the Center 
for Child Development (CCD). The CCD operated in the same space as the AMC, but while there 
was some slight overlap in administrative staff, the two centers functioned entirely 
independently of one another. Moreover, and almost metaphorically, to the unexpecting eye 
the CCD was completely overshadowed by the AMC: no logo was hung in the reception area, 
there were no pamphlets, and Carla always answered the phone with, “Autism Medical Center, 
how may I help you?” Indeed, had I not been so eager to observe as many diagnostic sessions 
as possible as well as explore the boundaries of the center, its presence might have easily 
escaped me as well. The CCD, I was to learn, served to evaluate children with developmental 





pathologists and occupational therapists who evaluate children on a one-time or continuing 
basis in order to provide a report of the child’s abilities and needs, and serve as a 
recommendation for necessary services to be provided by the schools. Like the AMC, the CCD 
does not itself provide treatment services. 
THE DIVISION OF LABOR 
Over the course of fourteen months at the AMC three clinicians emerged as the face of 
the clinic, sharing the responsibility of accommodating the new patient load: Dr. Johnson, a 
developmental pediatrician; Dr. Baker, a pediatric neurologist; and Dr. Michaels, also a pediatric 
neurologist. Over time it became apparent that Dr. Johnson performed the majority of the new 
diagnoses for patients who had not yet been diagnosed or were seeking a second opinion. In 
fact, I did not observe any other clinician conducting the initial diagnostic testing for a patient. I 
also did not witness Dr. Johnson performing the ADOS herself, though she sometimes worked 
in conjunction with clinical psychologist Dr. Daly who had been trained in the administration of 
the ADOS. Dr. Daly’s specialization is not autism but Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, though she does 
work with children who have developmental problems. Typically, a new, undiagnosed patient 
would be scheduled to see Dr. Johnson for an interview in which she would ask parents 
questions and spend some time herself interacting with the patient. The latter could last 
anywhere from a few minutes to several hours, and seemingly depended on how difficult it was 
to categorize the child. Often these “tricky” cases were immediately directed to Dr. Daly for an 
ADOS and would return weeks later for an appointment with Dr. Johnson,42 who would then 
                                                             





interpret the ADOS results in light of her own observations and present the patient’s final 
diagnosis.  
The multidisciplinary team at the AMC also included a geneticist, gastroenterologist, and 
an immunologist. These physicians are affiliated with the clinic but only see patients by referral 
on the part of the three primary physicians. Only the geneticist took autism patients at the 
AMC, the other physicians presumably worked out of their usual office. When any of these 
physicians see patients, they prepare a report for the referring primary physicians which is then 
discussed with the family. Two nurse coordinators, who were not on staff when I joined the 
clinic, were hired during the observation period to lessen the burden for Dr. Johnson. They are 
responsible for the physical examinations of patients and completion of progress reports for 
follow-up patients. Drs. Baker and Michaels perform these examinations themselves. Dr. 
Jenkins usually saw adolescent patients for counseling therapy, sessions which I was not 
granted permission to observe. However, on occasion he was asked to offer his opinion on a 
few of the more complicated cases, which I was able to observe.  
Three non-medical autism specialists also work with the AMC. Melissa Jones assists 
parents with outreach and advocacy. She provides parents with information on social 
programs, community events, as well as the various school programs in the different counties. 
She has also helped parents dispute service provisions they did not agree with, and on occasion 
has even accompanied some families to court. Sara Goldstein is the Director of Outreach and 





was the only therapist working with the center (which was on a contractual basis). In my 
observations, only Dr. Michaels consistently referred patients to Steve. 
Every new diagnosis or ADOS that I observed – of which there were eighteen – was 
conducted or ordered by Dr. Johnson. Thirteen of these were preceded by an ADOS with Dr. 
Daly.43 Dr. Michaels was occasionally consulted by parents for a second opinion on diagnosis, 
but typically saw follow-up patients or parents seeking her opinion regarding treatment. During 
the first five weeks of observation Dr. Baker screened patients for her new research study; 
otherwise, she normally saw follow-up patients. The doctors worked independently of one 
another and I witnessed little formal discussion over patients among them, as results from the 
ADOS or other tests were always communicated by means of a formal report. However, 
clinicians did on occasion consult one another on more complicated diagnostic cases. Still, in all 
of my observations, while both Drs. Baker and Johnson would refer patients to other specialists 
on staff, only Dr. Michaels presented the center to parents as serving more than just medical 
needs, telling parents not only of the other physicians on staff but the behaviorist and outreach 
personnel as well, whom she referred to as the “most important people at the center.”  
DAN!, THE AMC, AND THE BIOMEDICAL TREATMENT OF AUTISM 
The Defeat Autism Now! (DAN!) project was created by the Autism Research Institute, 
which was founded by Bernard Rimland. The project is “dedicated to educating parents and 
clinicians regarding biomedically-based research, appropriate testing and safe and effective 
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interventions for autism.”44 DAN! challenges the notion that autism is an incurable, lifelong 
disorder, and its proponents speak of “cures” and “recoveries” from the disorder. As mentioned 
above, the AMC was established as a center for the medical treatment of autism. Though both 
the AMC and DAN! practitioners contend that autism is caused by a interaction between 
genetic and environmental factors, because of the controversial nature of DAN! treatments, it 
is important to distinguish the practices employed at the AMC from those of the DAN! 
movement, a task which I turn to now. 
There is certainly some overlap between the treatments prescribed by physicians at the 
AMC and DAN! physicians. For instance, I witnessed the frequent prescription of elimination 
diets (especially the gluten-free, casein-free diet), and nutritional supplements on occasion. 
However, as Silverman (2012) reports, these treatments, while originating with DAN! and the 
ARI, are becoming more commonly accepted in the broader medical community. As Dr. Johnson 
put it, the diet is not the “voodoo science” it used to be. Knowledge of DAN! theories and 
treatments is not foreign to Dr. Johnson - indeed, she was the one clinician at the AMC who was 
known to attend DAN! conferences. This, she claimed, was in part to better understand the 
totality of practices her patients might be engaged in outside of the AMC, several of whom 
were regularly visiting DAN! practitioners. Dr. Johnson does not consider herself to be a DAN! 
practitioner: by her own telling, she claims she does not have enough scientific evidence to 
engage in many of the DAN! treatments. In several instances, I witnessed her explaining to 
patients interested in chelation and hyperbaric oxygen chamber therapies that these 
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techniques had not been proven effective. She also does not believe – as is not uncommon 
amongst DAN! doctors – that vaccines cause autism. Finally, I did not find the name of any of 
the AMC clinicians on a searchable database for DAN! practitioners. Thus, despite the 
similarities among etiological theories and prescribed treatments between DAN! and AMC 
physicians, I believe this stems more from a broader acceptance of these ideas by the medical 
community at large, as opposed to any specific allegiance to DAN! 
SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE 
 Medical diagnosis makes for a challenging ethnography. This is especially true when all 
the symptoms of a condition are behavioral. Though I could make note of the questions 
clinicians asked and the answers parents gave, I had no special access to information that was 
thought but not verbalized. What was the clinician looking for when she watched a child play? 
And how much weight did that observation carry in the grand scheme of diagnosis? As I will 
describe in the next chapter, my attempts to ask clinicians these questions directly – when time 
allowed – yielded few definitive answers. But failed attempts at mindreading can be partially 
overcome by taking stock of the various sources of information which clinicians both consume 
and produce (often at the same time) within the clinic. This sort of formalized information 
assumed five different forms at the AMC. Except for the administration of the ADOS, most were 
incorporated into the diagnostic interview. 
INTAKE AND FOLLOW-UP FORMS  Parents could receive an appointment at the AMC through two 





intake with the CCD.45 Once granted an appointment they are required to mail in a set of 
completed intake forms, including the standard demographic and insurance details as well as 
acceptance of the hospital’s privacy practices typically required of any medical clinic. But the 
main component of the intake is a detailed, eleven-page patient history form organized into 
seven sections,46 and the bulk of the information collected is based entirely on parent recall and 
opinion. While one parent told me that she was frustrated when Dr. Johnson seemed not to 
have read the information she had so laboriously provided, all doctors often referred to this 
data during the diagnostic interviews. Indeed, a rehashing of the intake information during the 
initial interview was routine practice at the AMC. Only Dr. Daly did not refer to the intakes 
during her sessions, though she did inquire about several developmental milestones as she 
conducted the ADOS. Parents who are not new to the AMC are asked to complete an 
analogous, follow-up form to record any progress or changes in the child since the previous 
visit. This is the place to indicate any changes – improvements or otherwise – in the child’s 
behavior. Parents are also asked to indicate here whether they have made any changes to the 
child’s treatment regimen.  
 STANDARDIZED TESTS AND SCALES  The ADOS, described in detail in chapter four, was the only 
standardized test that was conducted with any regularity at the AMC. The Gilliam Autism Rating 
Scale (GARS), based on the DSM-IV-TR criteria for autism, was designed to differentiate 
between individuals with autism and those with severe behavioral disorders, as well as 
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46 These are: birth history, family history, medical history, diet (including food allergies/intolerances, supplements, 
and attempted dietary treatments), developmental history (including dates milestones were achieved and details 
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neurotypicals. Unlike the ADOS (which was always conducted separately from the diagnostic 
interview), the GARS can be completed in an unstructured setting by anyone who knows the 
child well, including parents. Despite this flexibility, I only witnessed the GARS being used once. 
Similarly, the Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS) was never performed in my presence, 
though one follow-up appointment Dr. Johnson remarked on how much the patient had 
improved since they did the CARS on his first visit, on which he was classified as ‘mild autism.’ 
Speech and language assessments were the only other tests conducted that were not autism-
specific. Again, they were rarely used, and only by Dr. Johnson.47 More common was less 
structured testing of the patient, such as having him put a puzzle together or stack several 
blocks, or asking him to hand over a particular toy. 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS  Each child underwent a physical examination during their 
appointment, usually after the interview if performed by the physician herself, or before it if 
performed by a nurse. These exams were often the only portion of the experience that 
followed a script most like a ‘normal’ doctor’s appointment, except of course that it can prove 
quite challenging to look inside the ears of a child with autism. Measurements of height, 
weight, blood pressure, and standard neurological and motor skill assessments were all part of 
the program. Physical exams also allowed physicians to assess any of the side effects associated 
with the medications they frequently prescribed, especially weight gain and breast formation. 
Blood testing was regularly ordered to monitor liver function for one commonly-prescribed 
medication in particular.  
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OTHER FORMAL REPORTS  In addition to their own observations, clinicians make use of data and 
observations provided by other physicians, teachers and therapists. Children with digestive 
problems were often referred to the staff gastroenterologist, Dr. Chang, and this information 
was incorporated into the treatment recommendations for these children. The staff geneticist, 
Dr. Artuso, could be called upon to rule out genetic abnormalities such as Fragile X Syndrome, 
which causes symptoms akin to those of the Autism Spectrum Disorders.48  
DIAGNOSTIC OR FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEW  One could say that all roads lead to the interview: it is 
here where the various information sources converge and together culminate in the diagnostic 
act. Here was the opportunity to ask parents to expand on or clarify the data on the intakes, but 
also observe the child and interact with him or her. The interview constituted my primary unit 
of observation at the clinic, and consequently will be the subject of chapter three. Typically, 
diagnostic or new patient interviews lasted between forty-five minutes to one hour but on 
occasion could last the better part of the day. Follow-up interviews lasted about thirty or thirty-
five minutes. No clinician followed any written questionnaire during the interviews though they 
all appeared to adhere to the structure of the intake forms and the manner in which they 
processed new patients was remarkably similar.  
ESTABLISHED ROUTINES AND THE PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE CLINIC 
In part responsible for the high proportion of autism diagnoses at the AMC was the fact 
that the segregation of ‘autistic’ from ‘other’ had begun to be processed before the children 
were assessed at either center. While many parents visiting the AMC were self-referred and 
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suspected autism in particular, they called this center directly. But since many parents know 
nothing (or at least very little) about autism before their own child is diagnosed, and since 
several suspected either speech delay or a hearing loss to be likely, it seemed possible that 
these parents might have first come into contact the CCD. To help me understand how these 
parents might be directed to the AMC and not to the CCD, I spoke to Martha, the intake nurse 
who was primarily responsible for making these distinctions.49  
Martha would use the Modified Checklist for Autism in Toddlers (M-CHAT; Robins, Fein 
et al. 2001) when conducting telephone intakes. The M-CHAT consists of twenty-three yes/no 
questions that can be answered by parents of toddlers 24 months or older over the telephone. 
The questionnaire is an extension of the Checklist for Autism in Toddlers (CHAT) developed by 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1992), but has the added benefit of successfully screening not just for 
Autistic Disorder (as with the CHAT), but the larger population of children with “autistic 
features” (including PDD-NOS) who are in need of intervention. In other words, as a screening 
device the M-CHAT is intended to maximize the pool of positive results because, if effective, it 
will identify at-risk toddlers, including some who will later be diagnosed with autism and some 
who will not. In one study, in which 4797 toddlers were screened at a well-child pediatric visit, 
466 (9.7%) children screened positive on the M-CHAT. Of the 362 children who were then given 
a follow-up interview, only 61 were still found to be at risk (Robins 2008). Leviton et al. (2009) 
found  that children born preterm were more than twice as likely to screen positive on the M-
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CHAT, and that the odds of a positive screen grew to as much as twenty-three times more likely 
of the child was unable to sit or stand independently and eight times for children with major 
vision or hearing impairments. Even when the M-CHAT is supplemented by a follow-up 
interview, the positive predictive value of the questionnaire is only 0.57 (Robins 2008). 
Nevertheless, the M-CHAT attempts to address the same need as does the AMC: to minimize 
the gap between the initial detection of symptoms and the formal diagnosis of an ASD. 
Pediatricians rarely identify autism before a child reaches three years of age, though this is long 
after parents first become concerned and research shows that some early signs of autism can 
be detected at 18 months (Baron-Cohen, Allen et al. 1992; Rogers and Laraine Masters 2000). 
As shown in chapter one and elsewhere (McLaughlin, Sices et al. 2004), parental expression of 
concern to pediatricians does not necessarily result in a referral for diagnosis. Not only does 
this cause a good deal of stress in families, but delayed diagnosis means delayed intervention, 
and early intervention has been shown to improve prognosis for these children (Rogers 1996). 
Thus, “time is of the essence” to identify those at-risk as quickly as possible and bring them into 
the rubric of developmental interventions. 
When I pressed Martha for details about her interviews with parents, she immediately 
declared – without my prompting – that she never mentions the word ‘autism.’ As she 
described it, “I don’t want to put ideas in their head, you know. I don’t want to prejudice them 
in any way.” This sentiment was repeated at least five times in a conversation lasting no longer 
than five minutes. Sometimes the parents are not aware that it is probably autism, sometimes 
the referring doctors do not tell them, but her job is to “make sure they’re coming to the right 





diagnosis they are thinking about, but never whether or not they think their child has autism. 
This, she insisted, would be too suggestive. Martha was not unlike her colleagues at the AMC in 
that during her interview with me, she worked to establish a sense of objectivity with respect to 
the children and parents she encountered and the autism diagnosis. Though it was never 
articulated by any one practitioner, their responses sometimes had the effect of establishing 
the “reality” of the autism epidemic, as if to ensure that I did not get the impression it was 
being created in the clinic by its staff. This was not unlike responses of clinicians to questions 
regarding how they first came to work with autistic patients, which I discuss below. The autism 
epidemic happened to them – that is to say, more and more autistic patients presented at the 
clinic – and not the other way around – i.e., doctors did not change their diagnostic practices so 
as to produce more autism cases. And not only does the increase in diagnoses produce the 
epidemic, but the epidemic serves as the legitimizing narrative for this practice, for one could 
not justify diagnosing almost all patients with an ASD if there were not an epidemic. 
As commendable as Martha’s efforts may be, her vigilance is perhaps less necessary 
than she realizes. As we saw in chapter one, parents often start hearing about autism before 
the child is diagnosed, often at Early Intervention. If one of these parents had spoken to 
Martha, they certainly would have mentioned autism and obtained an appointment at the AMC 
whether Martha herself had mentioned it or not. Earlier steps in the diagnostic career delineate 
the space of the subsequent sequence. Thus, while differential diagnosis is ultimately 
formalized in the physician’s office, it is a process which begins sometimes long before the 
diagnostic interview, and certainly has consequences for the future. The point is that the 





of an autism diagnosis. Even the belief that we are in the midst of an autism epidemic has its 
role. As Bloor (1976) describes a study by Bakwin (1958) of 1000 New York schoolchildren 
undergoing assessment for tonsil-adenoidectomy: 
Sixty-one percent of these children had already lost their tonsils, the remaining 
39% were assessed by a group of school doctors who recommended that 45% of 
the children should undergo ‘T’s and A’s’ and rejected the rest. The rejected 
children were then sent to a second group of doctors who recommended 
surgery for 46% of them. Those children twice rejected were sent to a third 
group of doctors who recommended surgery for 44% of them. At this point only 
65 of the original 1000 children had not been either operated upon or had the 
operation recommended for them. (44) 
Though the results of individual assessments by these doctors is not reproduced from one 
group to the next, the expectation that about 45% of children require the operation is. As 
Martha replied when I wondered aloud how nearly every child at the AMC received and ASD 
diagnosis, I should not be so surprised given the high prevalence of autism today. 
As Berg (1992) has shown in his analysis of how physicians construct medical disposals, 
the presumption that biomedical knowledge directs the physicians actions simply does not 
hold. To the contrary, the data confronting the physician in the diagnostic interview is not so 
much “uncovered” as “(re)constructed” in the diagnostic process. As he puts it, the “type of 
questions a physician asks, the way she asks them and her interpretation of the answers shape 
the symptoms of the patient” (157). Thus, while routines can be useful in facilitating medical 
action, they can also have the effect of pre-structuring the clinician-patient interaction so as to 
produce one diagnosis more favorably than others as it is already embodied in the diagnostic 
process. Consider the general routine at the AMC. As mentioned above, the M-CHAT – which 





intakes. The patient history form, which serves as the basis for the in-person interviews solicits 
information specific to an autism or PDD diagnosis. Children who by this point could not be 
given the diagnosis were tested with the ADOS, a scale with a propensity to overdiagnose PDD-
NOS in neurotypical children (Lord, Rutter et al. 2002). All children tested with the ADOS 
received at least a diagnosis of PDD-NOS. Furthermore, not once did I witness the 
administration of a test for a non-ASD disorder. In other words, other than reliance on clinical 
intuition, no systematic effort was made to eliminate the possibility of false positives. Instead, 
diagnostic work at the AMC appeared to follow what Mehan (1986) refers to as a ‘test until 
find’ approach.  
Similarly, the choice of the standard to which the patient’s symptoms are compared 
shapes whether or not they are considered as part of the autistic prototype or external to it. For 
instance, an estimated 44-83% of children with autism suffer from various sleep disorders 
(Richdale 1999), and this issue is routinely discussed in the diagnostic interview and queried in 
the intake form. Still, when Henry’s mother complained that he has troubles staying awake 
during the day and falling asleep at night, Dr. Baker insisted it was not related to autism and 
noted that compared to normally developing children as represented on a graph of sleep hours 
by chronological age, Henry sleeps for an adequate amount of time. Likewise, when Henry’s 
mother expressed her concern about his weight and eating habits, Dr. Baker referred to a 
similar chart:  






Mom: It takes about an hour everyday to get him through dinner, and then 
another hour to get him to sleep at bedtime. Is there any way to find out about 
that, about how to improve it? 
Dr: A lot of children are like that, not just those with autism. Do you think it’s a 
medical problem? 
Mom: I don’t know, I’m not the expert. 
Dr: I think it’s more behavioral. The 25th percentile is not bad. (Fieldnotes, 
06/13/2007) 
The point is that the tests administered or the standard forms utilized can delineate which 
pieces of information are relevant to the diagnosis, and which are not. I will explore  this further 
in chapter four when I discuss the ADOS. For the remainder of this chapter, I look at the specific 
ways that the clinician’s mode of thinking effects behavior in the clinic. 
THE CLINICAL MENTALITY 
 During my tenure at the AMC only three clinicians provided patients with diagnoses of 
autism, and one psychologist performed the ADOS. Still, despite the small overall sample size, 
they are the population of diagnosticians at the AMC and as the main interface between 
parents and the autism diagnosis, their perspectives merit further analysis. We have seen in the 
previous chapter how parents understand their own actions, but what is the frame of mind of 
those they encounter when they visit the AMC, and what kind of structure does it impose on 
the parent-child-clinician exchanges that take place there? I begin with how the clinicians came 
to work at the AMC and then discuss how they understand the autism spectrum and the role of 
parents in the diagnostic process. 
 Despite the strategic action taken to establish the AMC, this mode of thinking was 
noticeably absent when clinicians described how they began working with autistic children. Nor 





own unique set of skills. Instead, a rather accidental quality possessed their explanations: they 
had not purposely sought out this specialty, engrossed by the mysteriousness of the disorder, it 
had simply ‘happened’ to them. As one clinician put it, “people knock on your door:” 
It’s just that autistic patients came more [into the clinic]. You know, more 
proportion of the patient came in. Everyone calls in, you have an equal chance of 
making an appointment, and there happens to be a lot more autism. Dr. Baker, 
pediatric neurologist. 
Even Dr. Johnson who, after practicing in general pediatrics for several years, was prompted to 
return to undergo fellowship training in developmental pediatrics after her son was diagnosed 
with autism, admitted that the disorder was barely on her radar at that time and that she 
would not have returned for more specialized training had her son been diagnosed with 
something else. Autism, she explained, was not something that she thought much about as a 
practicing pediatrician, and certainly not something that she saw very often in her patients. 
When she did see it, the cases were rather severe and the children behaved very differently 
from the way her son eventually presented. In this way, Dr. Johnson was not unlike her 
colleagues, who also knew little about autism – and in particular, the spectrum – before they 
began working with autistic patients. Dr. Baker, who completed her training in pediatric 
neurology under a supervisor whose primary research interest was autism, admitted that even 
in this setting they saw very few cases, and consequently she is essentially self-taught on the 
disorder. And Dr. Daly’s initial impressions sounded very much like that of the parents 
participating in the interviews: 
I knew it was a developmental disability. I knew there was a range of issues but 





diagnoses you could give a person, because the old model used to be the child in 
the corner, kind of rocking back and forth in his own little world. You know, 
refrigerator parents type of thing. Dr. Daly, clinical psychologist.  
Clinicians’ knowledge about autism before they specialized, it seems, was not so different from 
that of parents before their child became affected: either there was little familiarity with the 
disorder, or their knowledge was that of the classic variety. 
Familiarity with only the classic symptoms of autism is thought to be one of the ills 
plaguing early detection by pediatricians. Because they are likely to be the only medical 
professional to have regular contact with a child, these physicians constitute the first line of 
detection for autistic symptoms. When parents recounted their path to obtain an autism 
diagnosis, many spoke of the struggle to have their pediatrician even acknowledge the 
existence of delay. The general failure of pediatricians to recognize the symptoms of autism – 
particular in toddlers – has been well-documented (Howlin and Moore 1997; McLaughlin, Sices 
et al. 2004; O'Connor 2004), and in recent years the American Academy of Pediatrics has 
conducted an outreach campaign counter this problem and facilitate the diagnostic process for 
parents (Committee on Children with Disabilities 2001). What is interesting is that once parents 
reach a specialist, autism seems to be an easy condition to diagnose. In my interviews with 
clinicians, some spoke of the need to differentiate autism from other disorders, but despite the 
generous overlap of autistic symptoms with those of, say, mental retardation,50 no clinician 
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admitted to having any difficulty in distinguishing autism from amongst the rest. To the 
contrary, autism was immediately visible as if by instinct: 
I: What do you know about your patients when they arrive? 
C: I don’t know them, which is why I spend a lot of time [with them]. I don’t 
know what they have, but a lot of times I can kind of guess what their diagnosis 
is.  
I: Before they enter your office? 
C: No, when I see them in the office, before I start to interview the parents, I can 
tell they’re autistic. I seldom make mistakes on that. Somehow this is a… I guess 
it’s a gut feeling or something [laughs]. Once you get into it you just… they look 
different. […] when they come, and it’s the new patients I’m talking about, I just 
somehow… somehow I just know. Dr. Baker, pediatric neurologist. 
This subjectivism is not an uncommon occurrence in the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders. In 
her study of the training of psychiatric residents, Luhrmann (2000) discovered that residents 
move from recognizing symptoms in line with diagnostic criteria to recognizing prototypes, a 
cluster of traits that constitute the “best example” of a class of objects. Prototype theory, 
popularized in cognitive science, defines a mode of graded categorization whereby an object is 
classified not in terms of whether or not it meets certain criteria but whether it resembles the 
best example – i.e., the prototype – of that class. The theory is based on Wittgenstein’s notion 
of family resemblance, which he used to explicate how things which are thought to be linked by 
a single common feature are actually linked by a group of features, with not one of the said 
features being common to all members of the group. As Luhrmann describes, although 
psychiatrists are taught to formulate diagnoses of patients by comparing what they observe to 
a set of objective criteria, this proves to be a very difficult and confusing task for first-year 
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residents. It is particularly mystifying with respect to differential diagnosis, as there is typically 
much symptom overlap amongst the different mental disorders. First-year residents will read 
the DSM criteria for two conditions and conclude that the patient seems to manifest some, but 
not all, symptoms of both; the boundary between the two categories does not at all appear 
straightforward. But within a year, the same residents learn to think – and consequently 
diagnose – by using prototypes. Residents become adept at teasing out the information in a 
case presentation that corresponds to the prototype and effectively ignoring what does not. 
There is no need to consult the DSM as the difference between two disorders is obvious, and a 
diagnosis can be made within seconds (Luhrmann 2000).  
The AMC clinicians too diagnosed patients within seconds, and those who 
acknowledged using the DSM-IV criteria when they diagnosed autism had no need to consult 
the text itself, or at least not in my presence. Why is this important? For one, clinical intuition, 
the tacit knowing, is indeed the ‘art’ of medicine, the foundation of its power and prestige 
which can only be based on firsthand experience. One could argue that diagnosis by prototype 
– a practical skill based on academic medical knowledge but not wholly dependent on it – is an 
exercise of this power. Second, and more important for autism in particular, it opens up a 
means through which physicians can include treatment considerations within the diagnostic 
process. If a child “looks like” the standard treatments can help him, then the physicians can 
legitimately include him within the rubric of autism. But while the autism diagnosis may be self-
evident to clinicians, it still has to be established as real for parents. As I will begin to argue 
below and elaborate in chapter three, this is primarily achieved through deployment of the 





PARADOXES OF THE CLINICAL WORLD 
What are the needs of the clinical world? Medical practice is rooted in the tradition of 
science, which values the unbiased, objective observer and the general laws of human behavior 
he discovers. Variables are manipulated to control for undesired effects and subjectivity is most 
unwelcome, a weakness of the “soft” sciences to be avoided at all costs. But the rules of the 
laboratory are an impossibility in the clinic, where the variability in the human patient can be in 
no way controlled. A great epistemological gap separates medical knowledge from clinical 
practice, the theoretical from the empirical. Clinical medicine is indeed a “science of 
individuals” (Montgomery Hunter 1991). What, for instance, should a clinician do with the 
information that 75% of patients with autism also suffer from mental retardation? Or that 10% 
of autistic patients improve with a gluten-free, casein-free diet? A known value for the 
population becomes an unknown for the individual, and the pragmatic clinician attends less to 
the 10% population value than to the fact that the patient before her suffers from 
gastrointestinal issues that could indicate a gluten allergy or intolerance.  
Uncertainty is the name of the game in clinical medicine, and broader scientific 
generalizations are of limited value in determining a course of action for the individual patient 
(Freidson 1970). The abstract, formalized knowledge that is medicine’s foundation thus creates 
a dilemma for the practitioner, who must somehow bridge the epistemological divide in order 
to successfully perform his duties as a practicing physician. In this way, the clinician is a sort of 
“interface manager” who administers the space between the individual patient and the disease 
category (Rosenberg 2002). Obviously, they have enjoyed quite some success, as few of us 





this, he must work to minimize the uncertainty that inevitably arises in the clinic where 
individual cases present, but generalized principles prevail. Rosenberg argues that this heavy 
reliance on specific disease categories is one of the great paradoxes of our tendency in the 20th 
century. On the one hand, the physician’s status is enhanced as she alone can provide access to 
knowledge of the disease and its treatment. But on the other hand, she becomes ever more 
vulnerable by the very ambiguity that knowledge creates.  
One way in which uncertainty is mediated is through the culture of individualism that 
pervades the clinic. Individualism was indeed the overarching theme that emerged from the 
interviews with clinicians, and Freidson (1970) argues that this is a dominant component of the 
clinical mentality. The individualist orientation places the burden of proof on the particular as 
opposed to the general, thereby downplaying the role of generalized, scientific knowledge. The 
notion of the autism spectrum itself emphasizes the particularistic and the individualistic in 
each patient, so the friction between the individual case and general theory is lubricated 
through deployment of the concept in the clinical setting. As I describe below, the spectrum 
also rationalizes the prescription of different treatment options for the same disorder. 
 Uncertainty in the clinic may arise not only with respect to the various autism therapies, 
but in considering whether a patient should be treated at all. In other words, for some patients 
the ambiguity lies in whether or not they should be diagnosed with an autism spectrum 
disorder. Thomas Scheff (1984) has argued that certain decision making norms have developed 
in the clinic in order to deal with uncertainties of this sort, such that action is facilitated and not 





diagnose a person who is not ill: “when in doubt, diagnose illness” (80). Serious illness, loss of 
limb or life, contagion – such irreversible effects are the potential consequences of 
undiagnosed illness from the medical practitioner’s point of view. On the other hand, she sees 
little harm in diagnosing that which might not exist or manifest with any negative health 
effects. The pressure to diagnose is not universal, and there are other decision rules that may 
counteract it, like “when in doubt, delay your decision” (78). This norm might take precedence 
when diagnosis implies more aggressive treatment, such as major surgery. Still, says Scheff, 
both the physician and the public are so heavily biased towards diagnosis and treatment that 
not only legal but also moral condemnation may result, something that is rarely observed when 
doctors err on the side of caution. Even in the field of autism, with no shortage of accusations 
of overdiagnosis, public rebuke tends to target pediatricians who find “excuses” because they 
are “afraid” to mention that a child might have autism (see, for example, O'Connor 2004). 
 Of course, from the sociologist’s perspective the social consequences of diagnosing the 
healthy can be rather extensive. In psychiatry diagnosis is often accompanied by stigma, which 
is not easily erased by simply removing the diagnosis. Diagnosing a psychiatric non-illness can 
be rather harmful to the patient’s social status (Scheff 1984). Timmermans and Buchbinder’s 
(2010) findings take this one step further. Based on their research at a clinic for metabolic-
genetic disorders, they describe how having their newborn test positive for a genetic mutation 
requires parents to take any number of precautions with the infant, including waking them 
every hour and adhering to a strict, limited diet. This period was marked by great anxiety on the 
part of the parents. Thus, even just being at risk of disease, of screening positively for risk 





moral consequences for the patient-in-waiting. Even after geneticists assured parents that they 
no longer needed to follow the previously recommended precautions, some continued with 
these practices. As these cases indicate, clearly the physician’s interpretation of the Hippocratic 
oath is more like, “first, do no physical harm.” But diagnosis puts a person into the “sick role” 
regardless of whether or not illness develops.   
 Thus, a culture of individualism and overdiagnosis has developed in the clinic in order to 
mediate the inherent uncertainty of medical practice, and there is little evidence to suggest 
that these same norms do not also operate at the AMC. In fact, one could argue that the 
coerciveness of these norms is even stronger in a clinic specializing in the treatment of autism, 
and this is what helps to make autism such a successful diagnosis. This is because the notion of 
the autism spectrum, and in particular the category of PDD-NOS, is especially tailored to this 
climate of uncertainty. The PDD-NOS diagnosis – casually referred to by one clinician as a 
‘catch-all’ category – identifies those children exhibiting symptoms from some, but not enough, 
of the triad of impairments to qualify for an autism diagnosis. These are children who are not so 
easily diagnosed with Autistic Disorder (AD). They lie at the periphery of the autistic prototype, 
failing to meet the criteria for AD but also those for neurotypicality. It is at this boundary where 
proponents of supply-side explanations of autism diagnosis voice their objections loudest: the 1 
in 110 number, they argue, is merely an artifact of the change in DSM criteria that introduced 
the category of PDD-NOS. Clinicians also recognize that the spectrum enlarges the diagnostic 
pool and thus is responsible for the breakdown of diagnosis-cum-prototype. Thus, it is here 
where diagnostic tools like the ADOS come in, for the “tricky kids” straddling the boundary of 





a battery of tests, tests which have been closely modeled on the DSM criteria and themselves 
rigorously analyzed.  
 Like parents, clinicians came to embrace the idea of the autism spectrum, each 
emphatically expressing their belief in the construct and its validity. On the one hand, the 
spectrum definition of autism is validated by the range of disability they see in their patients. As 
Dr. Michaels explained:  
I truly believe that there is a spectrum, and that each… even each particular 
category such as speech issues, socialization issues. I think that each category 
itself is also a spectrum. For instance, when we talk about speech, we have some 
kids that don’t speak at all, and we have some kids that speak almost as good as 
you and I do. Same thing goes for socialization. Some kids are really introverted 
and kind of stay to themselves, and other kids that want to be social but just may 
be a little bit socially awkward. So I think not only is autism itself a spectrum, but 
almost every facet of the disorder is a spectrum unto itself. Dr. Michaels, 
pediatric neurologist. 
Thus, the spectrum is real because clinicians bear firsthand witness to it in the clinic. At the 
same time, but in the other direction, the notion of the spectrum justifies grouping such a 
diverse cluster of children under the same diagnostic umbrella, a point I will return to in 
chapter three. Dr. Johnson – perhaps drawing on personal experience – takes this one step 
further: the spectrum, she insists, is useful for persuading disbelieving parents that their child is 
autistic. This resonates with the way parents described their reaction to the diagnosis when it 
was first presented to them. As we saw in chapter one, many parents were not convinced that 
the diagnosis was correct until they learned about the spectrum, and about how their child 





diagnostic classification. Diagnosis requires cooperation between parents and clinicians. On the 
one hand, clinicians have to reconcile the presentation of a particular patient with their clinical 
imagination, the entire history that constitutes their ‘clinical experience:’ they need to know 
that they are making the right diagnosis, and they do this by comparing the child with the 
prototypical case that has emerged over the course of their training. Parents, on the other 
hand, want the correct diagnosis because only then will they receive the correct treatment. The 
behaviors they perceive in their child have to match those they see in other children 
undergoing the same treatment, or placed in the same special education category. And they 
need to detect a coherent association between symptoms and treatment, if only because of the 
exorbitant costs. The autism spectrum, in all of its heterogeneity, simultaneously reconciles 
each actor’s dilemma of meaning. As a boundary object, it is flexible enough to meet the 
individual needs of the differing social worlds of parents and clinicians, yet robust enough to 
maintain a common identity across all arenas of its use (Star and Griesemer 1989).  
 Despite the ambiguity brought in by the category and the wide-ranging diversity of the 
children who fall within it, clinicians at the AMC insisted on the utility of a category they all 
believed to rightfully belong on the autism spectrum. I argue that this is in large part due to the 
fact the PDD-NOS diagnosis offers clinicians a way to rationally treat patients who are not so 
obviously autistic, a way to diagnose and treat the as-of-yet unclassifiable. More to the point, it 
lets them diagnose when in doubt. Practically speaking, PDD-NOS means not autism, at least for 
now, and a more permanent diagnosis can be postponed until the therapies have run their 
course. If intervention is timely and intensive, there is hope that the patient might “catch up” to 





child was not autistic to begin with, but no one would suggest conducting a randomized clinical 
trial to find out. And while the uncertainty of medical intervention might characterize the PDD-
NOS diagnosis, ethically the physicians stand on firm ground as it enables them to care for 
patients they feel would benefit from intervention, but who might otherwise fall through the 
cracks. As we saw above, in clinical culture it is considered far worse to judge an sick person 
well than to label a well person sick. But the real power of the PDD-NOS diagnosis is that it 
allows clinicians to simultaneously abide by two opposing norms: when in doubt, do you 
diagnose or do you delay your decision? With PDD-NOS the practitioner does both: she 
postpones a decision about autism specifically but at the same time the child is allowed to 
benefit from the same care and treatment afforded autistic patients. Not everyone who could 
benefit from the therapies fits the criteria. As one clinician put it: “we need something.” 
The benefits of the PDD-NOS diagnosis for clinicians is by now obvious. It offers the 
ability to provide care without settling on a determinate diagnosis, it alleviates the clinician of 
any sort of moral quandary, and – at least from the physician’s perspective – it does not harm 
the patient. But PDD-NOS is also beneficial for parents. As we learned in chapter one, most 
parents were searching for some recognition that their child was not well and the persistent 
lack of legitimization of their concerns induced anxiety. Parents knew something was wrong, 
and they wanted someone to agree with them so they could figure out a way to help their child. 
PDD-NOS, while typically confusing for parents at first, not only legitimized their concerns but 
brought them under the purview of the medical profession which offered not only treatment 
strategies but simply the feeling that everything possible was being done to help the child, that 





Timmermans and Buchbinder. While it was disconcerting that their newborn tested positive for 
a genetic defect, and even though the babies displayed no signs of illness, parents were 
relieved to remain under medical surveillance. For autism parents, while the spectrum 
diagnosis might have been a shock initially, the therapies and the care that came along with it 
brought them much relief. Generally speaking, living without a clinical diagnosis in the presence 
of medically unexplained symptoms is more unsettling, leaving patients to struggle with 
uncertainly and illegitimacy (Nettleton 2006).  
To be sure, there is a corollary to thins sense of relief. Parents are yanked out of what 
Corbin and Strauss (1985) call ‘diagnostic limbo’ and are thrown into the fight: against schools, 
therapists, insurance companies and even other parents.51 But the greatest battle is that 
against time, as parents race against the “ticking kindergarten clock” to alter the trajectory of 
development before the critical window is shut for good. At this point, PDD-NOS elapses and 
autism begins. But despite the complete rearranging of life this entails, no parent opts to 
remain undiagnosed, to “wait and see.” Though PDD-NOS may account for a large proportion of 
the increase in autism diagnoses, this “‘creation’ of illness … may go hand in hand with the 
prevention and treatment of disease in modern medicine” (Scheff 1984: 78). PDD-NOS is 
mutually beneficial to parents and clinicians, as it reassures each that the best course of action 
is taken.  
Because it occupies this interstitial space between autism and neurotypicality, PDD-NOS 
conveys different information about severity and prognosis than does the diagnosis of Autistic 
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Disorder. It is often used to denote milder, higher-functioning cases with a better prognosis. As 
Dr. Daly explained: 
If I see PDD-NOS on a report, I know, number one, he’s on the spectrum; number 
two, he’s not as severe as autistic; and number three, there’s still mild disabilities 
similar to, you know, that would be expected of autism. Dr. Daly, clinical 
psychologist. 
But although the notion of a spectrum of autistic behaviors resonated well with what clinicians 
saw in the daily life of the clinic, as a diagnostic label it communicates too little information to 
be of practical (read: therapeutic) use. Even the more specific diagnosis of Autistic Disorder was 
of little guidance. Both the PDD-NOS and AD diagnoses draw from the same pool of therapies: 
speech, occupational, physical, ABA, etc., but it is the particular combination of therapies that is 
individualized. Not everyone needs occupational therapy, or will benefit from a gluten-free, 
casein-free diet. Even the same therapies might be shaped differently for different children. As 
clinicians explained when asked what therapies they recommend: 
It’s individualized, yeah? I mean usually they all get speech therapy, but then it’s 
a different speech therapy. There is articulation, pragmatic, language therapy, 
social use of language. It’s all different, receptive or expressive, then there’s oral-
motor apraxia, motor therapy. So it depends, it’s individualized. Dr. Baker, 
pediatric neurologist.  
Again, it depends on what the kid is presenting. I don’t automatically say, ‘Oh, 
he’s autistic, therefore he needs blah blah blah.’ Dr. Daly, clinical psychologist. 
While clinicians do not find that the notion of the spectrum plays a significant role in the way 
they formulate diagnoses, it is extremely useful when prescribing a treatment regimen. Every 





of the spectrum is especially evident. On the one hand, it explains how one diagnostic label can 
account for the vast heterogeneity of symptoms. On the other hand, it permits great diversity in 
treatment strategies for children carrying the same diagnostic label. More to the point, the 
spectrum and the individualism go hand in hand. 
VIEW OF PARENTS 
 Whereas at one point in time parents – particularly mothers – were seen as the cause of 
autistic tendencies in their children, they have since come to occupy a role that clinicians deem 
invaluable, that of key informant of their child’s behaviors and abilities. The physicians at the 
AMC ascribed a great deal of validity to the information provided by parents in both the intakes 
and the diagnostic interview, and felt that they place more weight on the information from 
parents than on their own observations as they formulate diagnoses and prescribe treatments. 
Still, physicians were careful not to ascribe this to a unique form of parental expertise or 
possession of special knowledge: 
Sometimes they [the children] don’t always act the same at the office as at 
home, so it’s difficult to judge if it’s just a young kid with speech delay. […] Even 
though I spend a good amount of time with patients, one hour to one and a half 
hours, parents live day to day with these kids. Not all behaviors are going to be 
displayed in the office. Dr. Michaels, pediatric neurologist. 
Thus, parental knowledge is one of convenience, less of quality than of quantity, a simple 
consequence of being the child’s primary caregiver. It holds the bulk of its value in operating as 
a second set of eyes. 
The parental eye, however, was seen by clinicians as highly susceptible to bias. A parent 





impaired than he actually is, or less impaired and therefore not meriting the autism diagnosis. 
As Dr. Baker described after I asked her to expand on some of the problems she has 
encountered with the validity of parental reports: 
Oh you know, the ‘oh, you know, he can do it himself, he doesn’t need to 
communicate.’ You know, they will find an excuse for [their children], they 
don’t… you know ‘he’s pretty talented, his brother would have to ask you for 
everything, he doesn’t have to ask me, he does it himself.’ And I have to tell 
them, well you know, there’s something wrong, he doesn’t communicate with 
you. Dr. Baker, pediatric neurologist. 
Thus, in order to use parent-provided information effectively, clinicians have to work to 
separate the action denoted in the observation from the parents’ interpretation of that action. 
The performance of this sort of work, according to clinicians, is necessary primarily because 
parental denial of the degree of their child’s impairment render these observations less reliable. 
Parental denial was, in turn, seen by clinicians as the principal source of conflict that might arise 
at the center, a source which was always described as external to both the clinician and her 
clinic. To the contrary, the basis of disagreements were often narrated as though they were 
inherent characteristics of parents, whose emotions or lack of knowledge about the diagnosis 
or prognosis led them to challenge the physicians. Clinicians almost portrayed themselves as 
victims:  
C: It’s not easy, practicing autism specialty. It’s actually a high-risk practice.  
I: Why is that? 
C: There are a lot of children with autism who […] may have behavior problems 
that can lead to secondary injuries […]. And then there are parents. Parental 
satisfaction is difficult to obtain for children with autism. […] I have to say, I have 
less satisfied patients than dissatisfied, because, you know, they come in with 





You know studies show co-morbidity of problems in the family, even though this 
is the only child with autism. So sometimes, I tell you, I got into difficulties. It’s 
much easier to treat a headache or even a seizure patient than to treat autism. 
Dr. Baker, pediatric neurologist. 
In this example, Dr. Baker insinuates that difficult parents may share some of the social deficits 
of their children. Even when clinicians were asked how these conflicts could be avoided in the 
future, they did not view this as an area in which they could exercise their own agency. Change, 
if at all possible, could only occur outside of the clinic – for instance if treatments become more 
effective in the future thereby satisfying parent expectations.  
In light of the discussion in chapter one, it should be noted that clinicians did not voice 
any indication that parents were requesting a diagnosis of autism. To the contrary, Dr. Baker 
made it clear that this was specifically not her impression, and that the opposite was in fact 
true, that parents felt their child was less impaired that the diagnosis suggested. Parents may 
have heard about autism as a possible diagnosis, but either they still hold out hope that the 
physician will dismiss it and offer something less severe or they do not make the association 
based on their own child’s behavior. As we saw above, it was in these situations where 
knowledge of the autism spectrum was effectively deployed to diminish conflict. 
CONCLUSION 
In his Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, Ludwik Fleck (1979) illustrated how 
stylistic bonds, conditioned by cultural-historical factors, can exist between concepts. 
Specifically, he revealed how early on, syphilis was associated with the blood and mystical-
ethical overtones of “bad blood”, but it was only with the discovery of the disease agent in the 





as it fits the accepted thought style of the community. One of the goals of this chapter has been 
to highlight this fit between the “fact” of the autistic spectrum and the thought style of the 
medical clinic. Uncertainty, focus on the individual, and the tendency to overdiagnose are all 
accounted for through deployment of the spectrum. Doctors fulfill their moral obligation to 
treat, and parents receive the treatment they feel their children require. As a result, Autism 
Spectrum Disorder is a stable, successful diagnostic category.  
I have also tried to show that the clinic is not merely a place to apply established 
medical knowledge, but through the work of clinicians becomes a site of knowledge production. 
There are several dimensions in which this took place at the AMC. First, it is here where 
children become subjects of the clinical gaze. Their behaviors are scrutinized and documented, 
their bodies poked and prodded. At times they are subjected to further testing, both medical 
and behavioral. Parents are routinely questioned, notes are jotted down and the sum of all 
observations is realized in the patient medical file, essentially an intricate case study.  
Second, the work at the AMC establishes autism as a medical disorder. Though Leo 
Kanner was a psychiatrist, the biomedical model of psychiatric disturbances had in his day not 
yet taken hold. The disorder, presumed to be emotional in nature, was studied largely by 
psychiatrists and psychologists. Still, already in 1964, Bernard Rimland’s Infantile Autism argued 
for a theory of biological causation, and speculated on the underlying mechanisms that led to 
the manifestation of the disorder. But by and large, treatments for autism originate outside of 
the medical field.52 Clinicians at the AMC would certainly not deny that ABA, speech therapy, 
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occupational therapy and the like can be effective treatments for autism. But at the same time, 
they are acutely aware of the potential to systematically treat autism with biomedical therapies 
in addition to the behavioral ones. For instance, when Dr. Baker and I were discussing the goals 
for therapy that might be feasible in the near future, she recounted of an article she had 
recently published on the co-morbidities of autism that could benefit from medical 
intervention. By her own telling, parents applauded her for producing this research, praising 
how she had done a “huge service for the autism community” where most parents face “older 
doctors” who deny that autism can in any way be treated medically. Still, she lamented that 
currently they could only do symptomatic treatment, because at present “everyone studies 
everyone with autism, the subject selection is based on diagnosis, which will be 
heterogeneous.” 
The ASD diagnosis is so well matched to the structure of the clinic that it acts to enforce 
the institution as well as the diagnosis itself. It therefore thrives in the clinic. In the first chapter 
we saw how the notion of the spectrum textures the patient experience. In the next chapter, I 
show how clinicians translate parent experiences of their children using the language of the 
autism spectrum. In doing so, they moderate the transition of parents from a position of 








CHAPTER 3: THE DIAGNOSTIC INTERVIEW 
 
In Chapter 1, I described how parents were initially suspicious at the suggestion of 
autism as a descriptor of their child’s delayed development. Not only did they perceive that 
their child acted differently from autistic children, they simply did not believe that whatever it 
was that ailed the child could be something so severe. Clinicians, of course, were reasoning on 
the basis of a much broader and milder autistic prototype than parents, using the children 
themselves as proof of the reality of the spectrum. Interestingly, no clinician I spoke to 
challenged the unity of the autism diagnosis, despite the varying presentations of different 
patients. The children all look different because they are different, they contend. That is the 
very nature of a spectrum disorder, and it is so compelling and so real that it structures much of 
the activity that transpires in the AMC.  
By the time of the interviews, parents were as convinced as clinicians of the reality of 
the autistic spectrum. They neither expressed discomfort with symptom variability nor 
questioned whether the autism diagnosis was indeed the correct one. Throughout the 
discussions, they often made reference to the fact that “every child with autism is different” 
and when asked if their opinion about autism had changed since their journey began, it was the 
idea of the spectrum that emerged as one of the most important lessons learned. Similarly, in 
Chapter 2 we saw that the PDD-NOS is crucial to the institutionalized differential diagnosis 
performed by the clinic. More precisely, as will be explicated below, it is the attribution of 
potential that underlies diagnostic gradations between mental retardation, Autistic Disorder, 





his deficits – if they must receive one, this is the diagnosis parents want, for it communicates 
the greatest likelihood of improvement. On the other extreme, though 75% of children with 
autism are thought to also be mentally retarded, the MR designation was never raised at the 
AMC (at least not by clinicians). Implicit in this diagnosis is the absence of potential. This is the 
child who, at diagnosis, was “all he is ever going to be.” In a sense, the Autistic Disorder 
designation is a modern-day euphemism for mental retardation, for as we shall see, this 
diagnosis was given when the child demonstrated little progress with his current therapies, and 
therefore little potential for improvement. Still, with AD, but not  with MR, the child is given the 
potential for potential; namely, almost double the therapy hours he would have with a 
diagnosis of PDD-NOS. 
In this chapter I ask how, in the face of such behavioral variability among the children 
diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder, and in the absence of biological markers to assist 
in the process, autism maintains its coherence as a single, unitary diagnosis acceptable to both 
parents and clinicians. I argue that this is accomplished in part through the practices and 
narratives that structure parent-clinician interactions. In these exchanges autism is variously 
and simultaneously constructed as something real, as a performance, and as a label to procure 
services. Through the use of bridging work to connect these narratives into a coherent whole, 
autism becomes a boundary object that performs multiple functions simultaneously in various 
social worlds.  
THE AUTISM NETWORK 
 Autism, in a manner of speaking, is a successful diagnosis. By this I do not mean 





thrived because of a natural symbiosis between its reproductive behaviors and biological 
environment, allowing it to win out over similarly constituted entities. As we well know, in the 
absence of any specific causal entity for autism scientists are far from able to make any such 
claims. But the evolutionary model is perhaps a decent enough metaphor for what I mean 
when I say that autism is a successful object. Historically, amongst a number of rivals, it has 
won out over its competitors. Thus, today we find ourselves in the midst of an autism, and not 
childhood schizophrenia or mental retardation, epidemic (Eyal, Hart et al. 2010).  
As discussed in chapter one, supply-side arguments alone are insufficient to account for 
this success. For this would assume that parents are passive recipients of diagnostic labels, and 
we have already seen that they are not. Besides, as Latour (1987) reminds us, the ultimate fate 
of an object is in part dependent on the behavior of others, i.e., not only those who create – or 
in the case of autism, label – the object. Take, for instance, the removal of homosexuality from 
the DSM, which nicely exemplifies how social advocacy on behalf of the labeled can effectively 
disqualify a diagnosis from the medical lexicon. The reign of medicine – and especially 
psychiatry – is not so absolute as to completely determine the path of its subjects. A clinician 
can diagnose a child with autism, but then what do the child and his parents do from there? 
Many parents initially rejected the label. But even if it is not rejected completely, an object or in 
this case a classification scheme can be modified as it adopted by more and more actors. This 
has certainly been the case with the diagnostic criteria for autism, which some have suggested 





following diagnostic change.53 This is because autism is an example of what Hacking (1999) 
refers to as an interactive kind: a classificatory type that can change by means of interacting 
with what is classified. This means that the autism diagnosis can interact with individuals and 
their actions and behaviors. It can change the way people experience themselves by altering 
the way they imagine themselves as well as the way they are treated by others. This modified 
self-perception leads people to envision a different range of possibilities for actions and 
behavior. While this may be of little impact in reference to a single person, it is of no small 
consequence if it applies to an entire class of individuals, who may be led to acquire a set of 
behaviors by nature of being classified as such. Thus, over time “kinds may become false 
because people of that kind have changed in virtue of how they have been classified, what they 
believe about themselves, or because of how they have been treated as so classified” (Hacking 
1999: 104). This is what Hacking refers to as a looping effect, and it offers a mechanism 
whereby we can understand how the diagnosis of autism can change over time. Experts create 
or modify classifications that are assigned to individuals who subsequently internalize them and 
make them their own. At the same time, but in the other direction, the autonomous behavior 
of the classified persons creates a reality that the experts must contend with in terms of their 
classifications. Thus, autism is not an empty label assigned to patients, but is collectively 
constituted by them (Latour 1987; Hacking 1999). But herein lies a dilemma: if autism is to 
succeed as a diagnosis it needs other actors to participate, but in so doing the nature of the 
object may change based on the behavior of these actors. To escape this quandary, autism 
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must be tailored to the interests of all actors, translated in a way such that the needs of each 
are realized.  
What exactly are these interests? Diagnosis permits patients – or parents, in the case of 
autism – to gain some personal and emotional control in knowing what exactly is wrong. It 
legitimates their suffering and grants them the right to treatment. It offers a powerful narrative 
whereby patients can construct a meaningful, organized account of what was a disorganized 
illness experience prior to diagnosis. It gives them a sense of direction about the future, 
particularly in terms of expectations for prognosis and treatment that typically accompany 
diagnostic information (Brown 1995). An autism diagnosis is particularly empowering because it 
grants access to a wide range of state-funded services as well as activist and advocacy groups – 
an entire community of like sufferers which not only provides families with information and 
expectations, but also a language with which to express and understand themselves. Clinicians 
want to take care of their patients by addressing their medical problems and providing 
appropriate and effective treatment. Schools need public funds, insurance companies 
diagnostic codes, and so on. In the near seven decades since it was first described, autism has 
emerged as a crucial point of intersection between these various actors. It effectively translates 
the needs of each and by so doing coordinates supply and demand in a way that promotes 
cohesion, so that a stable network of interdependency is established.  
Without a doubt, autism has been successfully translated and the very existence of the 
spectrum is intricately bound up with this network. But translation is not a given fact; it is an 





differing social worlds interact and attempt to reconcile the meaning of a given object. We saw 
in chapter two that a central tension that arises in the clinic is the negotiation between 
generalized, medical knowledge and the application of this knowledge to the individual patient. 
I argued in that chapter that this tension is managed through deployment of the notion of the 
autism spectrum. In this chapter, I borrow Star and Griesemer’s (1989) concept of boundary 
objects and Timmermans and Buchbinder’s (2010) notion of bridging work to illustrate how the 
translation of multiple viewpoints is managed in the autism clinic, as manifest in the diagnostic 
interview and maintained in patient follow-ups.  
According to Star and Griesemer, boundary objects manage both diversity and 
cooperation. They 
… inhabit several intersecting social worlds … and satisfy the informational 
requirements of each of them. Boundary objects are objects which are both 
plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties 
employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. 
They are weakly structured in common use, and become strongly structured in 
individual-site use. These objects may be abstract or concrete. They have 
different meanings in different social worlds but their structure is common 
enough to more than one world to make them recognizable, a means of 
translation. The creation and management of boundary objects is a key process 
in developing and maintaining coherence across intersecting social worlds. 
(1989: 393) 
It is clear that the meaning of autism varies across different social groups. For clinicians, autism 
legitimizes the medico-psychiatric gaze. It exemplifies the relationship between the brain and 
behavior. It connects abstract medical knowledge to concrete behaviors. Autism gives parents a 
way to make sense of their child’s behavior and the series of events that brought them to the 





autism provides a discrete set of behaviors on which to work. Autism is a directive for schools 
on to how to educate the child and what sort of classroom environment is suitable, as well as a 
means for schools to appropriate state funds. Autism, then, easily adapts to local needs, but 
through the triad of impairments also preserves a common identity.  
 Still, it is important to recognize that the idea of a concept like autism having variants in 
different social worlds stands as a threat to the unity of the concept as a whole. Herein lies a 
second paradox of translation, as it is the existence of variants themselves that makes the 
concept “work” to begin with. Why does autism – or any other boundary object, for that matter 
– not fracture into its constituent parts? For instance, several parents indicated that the autism 
diagnosis offered them little with respect to a more detailed understanding of the struggles of 
their own child. The spectrum was too general a construct for that; the “problem” of autism is 
constructed differently in different children. For some, their bodies could not process certain 
proteins which led their brains to “starve,” for others it was an improperly wired sensory 
system that was the heart of the matter. For some parents like these, the unity of autism was 
more disconcerting than constructive. Why, they asked, was autism considered a unitary 
disorder? Would it not be more helpful if children were grouped according to their specific 
deficits? The point is that work has be to be done in order to minimize this fracturing. The 
success of any translation endeavor depends on the work done on behalf of all actors to both 
achieve and maintain a common understanding. If autism is to succeed as a diagnosis, to persist 
as a useful concept, it has to maintain a shared meaning amongst all groups. This does not just 
happen naturally, or by accident: rather, actors work to maintain this common identity. This 





maintain this common autistic variant and hence autism’s success as a diagnostic category. I 
argue that the maintenance of autism as a boundary object is accomplished by the 
performance of bridging work, which connects the different meanings of autism across the 
different social worlds.  
Part of what I want to demonstrate with this chapter is that the arguments put forth by 
both the supply-side and the demand-side theorists are all at least partially true. On the one 
hand, better detection techniques sharpened through the development like instruments like 
the ADOS and the implementation of Early Intervention programs greatly increases the number 
of children suspected of having autism. Similarly, as autism awareness spreads through the 
work of advocacy organizations such as Autism Speaks, the disorder not only receives greater 
funding but also becomes less stigmatized, prompting the trends towards diagnostic 
substitution from MR to autism that have been observed. The work at the AMC shows not only 
that there is some truth to all of these claims, but that the different dimensions all converge in 
the diagnostic situation. It can be argued that supply-side theories treat autism as a reality, 
whereas demand-side theories see it as a label. Thus, one way to understand why neither side 
can work in isolation is because autism is mostly neither real nor a label, but a performance. 
Parents are unsatisfied when physicians attribute autism as an all-or-nothing reality – they 
prefer to see that the diagnosing clinician has conducted some tests on the child or otherwise 
made some effort to elicit the performance of autism from him. At the same time, clinicians are 
uncomfortable with the idea of merely handing out a label – they too must see evidence of the 





different frames that permits the institutional funnel to function smoothly and so effortlessly 
manage the concerns of all actors.  
For instance, in the early stages of the moral career, parents are in search of a diagnosis 
and cure for whatever it is that ails their child. But as we saw in Chapter 1, learning that their 
child had autism, a condition for which there is no cure, offered parents little direction in terms 
of treatment and management. In other words, the presentation of autism as a real entity was 
a dead-end of sorts for parents. It is perhaps no surprise, then, that few parents believed that 
their child was indeed autistic. However, by switching to a narrative of autism as a 
performance, clinicians could not only point out the concrete behaviors that were indicative of 
autism, but they could also usher parents into a new temporality of “one day at a time.” This is 
because the distinction between a reality and a performance is also the distinction between an 
illness and a disability, and each are marked by different temporalities: the temporality of the 
cure as compared to the temporality of “one day at a time.” What was originally a concern with 
diagnosis and cure, then, is translated into the concrete task of getting the child to perform 
differently, focusing not on the ultimate goal of neurotypicality, but on making small steps 
toward improvement every day. 
THE HETEROGENEITY OF AUTISM 
 The triad of impairments that characterize autism seem straightforward enough: the 
disorder is marked by deficits in communication, impairment in social interaction, and 
repetitive behaviors and restricted interests. But as I have emphasized throughout these pages 
– to the point of being repetitive myself – is that the manifestation of the disorder varies across 





autism spectrum, how “every child is different,” while offering the reader little evidence of this 
diversity. To contextualize the argument of this chapter I now describe in detail the cases of 
two children, Charles and Matthew, both diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder. The 
descriptions are based both on the parent interviews as well as my observations at the AMC. 
 Charles is a 2½ year old boy. Though he is nonverbal he does make the occasional 
vocalization and babbles frequently. During the interview at the clinic, Charles spends most of 
the time playing by himself at the opposite side of the room from where his parents and the 
doctor are sitting. He engages in a few different activities and rotates between them. At one 
point he is playing with jumbo-sized plastic blocks, one in each hand, banging them together 
and vocalizing. In the next instance, he is playing with a large toy truck which he has turned 
upside down and is spinning the wheels. He often tries to put things in his mouth, including one 
of the blocks, at which point mom and dad loudly say, “Charles, no mouth!” Charles’ parents 
first noticed a problem when he was only three days old. As an infant, he constantly needed to 
be held and slept only about six hours per day in spurts of ten to sixty minutes. As his parents 
put it, Charles has “never been normal” and never met any of the developmental milestones on 
time. He did speak about ten words at one point, but subsequently lost the ability to use them. 
Charles’ pediatrician insisted that there was nothing wrong with the child, but after several 
visits his mother insisted on a referral for physical therapy and an ophthalmologist, and Charles 
was later diagnosed with hypotonia and mystagnis. The autism diagnosis came later – from a 
developmental pediatrician at about twenty-two months – and was spurred by a comment 
from his Early Intervention therapists. His mother admits that she had thought about autism 





checklists she had attempted online: Charles loves to cuddle, she explained, which was 
evidence enough that he was not on the spectrum. When the autism diagnosis did come, 
Charles’ parents expressed relief that they “finally had one.” He was subsequently enrolled in a 
full-day autistic program and received ABA, occupational, physical and speech therapy. In 
addition, melatonin was used to help manage some sleep issues and the GFCF diet to help with 
the later-diagnosed ADHD and yeasty gut. His parents hoped to eventually enroll Charles in 
music therapy, as they felt that he possessed a keen ability to discriminate high-quality music. 
Though Charles exhibits many of Kanner’s original autistic symptoms – like repeatedly 
spinning objects – he also “loves to cuddle,” which falls more in line with the disorder’s modern 
symptomology. Still, he lies closer to the classic prototype than does Matthew, a three-year-old 
patient of Dr. Johnson at the AMC. According to his mother, Matthew was developing normally 
until he was eighteen months old, at which point he began to lose some skills. Within one 
month, Matthew had stopped talking, no longer responded to his name, and screamed much 
more than previously. He also began having between numerous bouts of diarrhea every day. 
The changes in Matthew’s behavior was most striking when a home video taken at Halloween 
was compared to one made at Christmas. His parents were convinced that Matthew’s 
vaccination regime was responsible for the regressive behavior. During the December holidays, 
a cousin who worked in special education suggested that Matthew be formally evaluated for his 
delays. The pediatrician hesitatingly complied and offered the telephone number of Early 
Intervention. Out of fear, Matthew’s mother procrastinated in making the call, but eventually 
had her son evaluated when he was 28 months old. Matthew tested at the one-year-old level. 





Spectrum Disorder. His mother recalls her shock and disbelief at the diagnosis. At the first of 
Matthew’s appointments that I observed, he spoke little but did interact with his family, if only 
to request his diaper be changed. His parents had him on several biomedical therapies and 
were considering chelation. At the next appointment six months later, and after having begun 
chelation therapy, Matthew was regularly using three-word sentences and happily playing with 
his sister (including asking her if she was okay after falling down). His behavior had improved to 
such an extent that Dr. Johnson had to ask, “So what do you need me for now?” 
 Both Matthew and Charles are diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder, but in the 
details you find not only two different sets of symptoms, but two different illness narratives. 
Charles had been affected since birth, whereas Matthew was developing normally until 18 
months of age and then lost many of his skills. Charles was nonverbal; Matthew used 
conversational speech. Charles flitted about and showed little enjoyment in any one particular 
activity; Matthew enthusiastically engaged in play with his younger sister. Charles had many 
other diagnoses (mystagnis, hypotonia, and ADHD); Matthew only showed symptoms in  line 
with the triad of impairments. Charles’ mother was relieved when she received the autism 
diagnosis, happy to finally have one; Matthew’s mother was devastated. 
Behaviorally, as accounted for by the notion of the spectrum, autism is a disorder of 
extremes. As I explicate in later sections and will support with evidence throughout this 
chapter, clinicians have methods with which to manage these difficulties, to reduce the 
indeterminacy that exists between the individual and his diagnosis. Some children, like Charles, 





complete avoidance or disregard of others, but at others emerges as the inappropriate hugging 
and kissing of strangers. Some children are hand-flappers or toe-walkers, others do not exhibit 
any such odd behaviors. And perhaps the most striking paradoxes of all materialize in the 
reaction to sensory stimuli. On the one hand is the hyper-sensitive child who is intolerant to 
certain sounds – covering his ears in an auditorium or at the flush of a toilet – who cannot wear 
certain materials and will only eat foods of a particular texture.54 On the other hand is the child 
who is seemingly oblivious to loud sounds and the sensation of pain, who simply picks up and 
carries on after what seems to his parents as a bad fall. These inter-individual differences are 
further complicated by the intra-individual differences that may manifest over time. For 
instance, in adults with autism childhood stereotypies may persist in a less obtrusive and 
manner, such as finger-rubbing (Rapin 1997). Rimland himself noted that the apparent 
similarities among children with autism were only statistically significant until the age of 5½, 
after which point their developmental trajectories diverged. Of course, autistic children may 
also respond differently to therapies, so that some may reach a higher degree of functioning 
later in life, while others improve little. To complicate matters even further is autism’s co-
morbidity with several other disorders, including mental retardation, epilepsy, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, ADHD, and several communication disorders.  
 The obvious fallout from such great phenotypic variation are thwarted attempts on the 
part of geneticists to uncover a common autistic genotype. Though some studies have shown 
autism to be highly heritable (Rutter and Folstein 1977), the absence of a common phenotype 
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has hindered the identification of causal genes. Moreover, studies that have been able to 
identify a possible causal gene have been found difficult to replicate. What has emerged from 
years of research is the discovery of over twenty-five different loci that may be considered 
“autism susceptibility candidate genes” (Bill and Geschwind 2009). Taken together, these 
findings have lead geneticists to believe that autism is marked by genetic heterogeneity. This 
heterogeneity is two-sided: there are many genes than can render an individual susceptible to 
autism, but these genes also make individuals susceptible to other disorders, including mental 
retardation, schizophrenia, and epilepsy. In addition, a more recent study has estimated 
heritability at 19% for males and 63% for females (Liu, Zerubavel et al. 2010). With 
approximately 4 in 5 autism diagnoses belonging to males, heritability estimates such as these 
put the search for the culpable gene on very shaky ground. 
BRIDGING WORK 
 The heterogeneity of the autism spectrum can be traced to at least two major events. 
First, the expansion of the diagnostic criteria from a unique syndrome to a spectrum of 
impairments inevitably increased the pool of diagnoses and clinical phenotypes. Complicating 
matters further is the fact that the clinical picture for a particular individual can change as a 
person ages. Thus, not only is every child different, but one child may manifest a different 
symptom profile at different points in the life span. Second, the implementation of 
developmental screening of infants and toddlers introduces a more systematic strategy to 
identify at-risk children with developmental delays. In 1997, the definition of disabled children 
in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was expanded to include 





school districts are required by law to identify all children with disabilities within their 
jurisdictions. These children are then required to either receive early intervention services (if 
under age three years) or be provided a free and appropriate public education (if between age 
three and twenty-one years). As with most types of surveillance, when implemented the pool 
of potentially diagnosed inevitably increases. 
 Thus, in an environment in which both the pool of potentially-diagnosed and the 
diagnostic criteria are expanded, autism proliferates. And not just the administrative prevalance 
of autism, but the observed clinical phenotypes. Consequently, questions arise as to what 
constitutes “real” autism. Even the permanency of the condition is called into question: some 
clinicians believe that a child can lose the diagnosis with improvements, whereas others insist 
that “if they ‘fall off the spectrum’ then they probably weren’t autistic to begin with.” 
Comments such as these illustrate the awareness amongst clinicians of how problematic the 
notion of the spectrum can be in clinical practice with respect to a common phenotype. The 
difficulties in identifying clinical subtypes also leads to questions about whether autism is best 
considered many syndromes as opposed to a unitary one. This is a much less trivial challenge 
than it may appear. Already in the 1960s, long before Lorna Wing formally proposed the idea of 
the spectrum (Wing and Gould 1979; Wing 1997), Bernard Rimland made an impassioned call 
for autism to “be rescued from the nosological oblivion toward which it is daily being pushed by 
careless and indiscriminate diagnosis” (1968: 146).55  
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For Rimland, autism was a specific constellation of symptoms, an idea inconsonant with 
the notion of the spectrum. This spectrum definition, in combination with expanded screening 
procedures, took what was once a homogeneous disease – or at least rarer and more narrowly 
defined – and greatly unsettled it, creating not only multiple variants but introducing variability 
in prognosis and prescriptions for treatment. As screening procedures are implemented in new 
institutions and by new agents in pediatrician’s offices, schools, Early Intervention, and the like 
(i.e., different social worlds) the pool of the potentially diagnosed, those red-flagged for further 
testing and observation, inevitably increases. Through looping, not only will the new label 
change the behavior of these newly-identified individuals, but their symptoms and behaviors 
will modify the diagnostic label in return. Uncertainty arises upon the execution of these new 
practices because the diseases no longer behave as the medical experts anticipated, and so 
previous understandings of the condition are now insufficient. Bridging work is a term for the 
various activities that clinicians must perform in order to reconcile the consequences of the 
implementation of screening and diagnostic practices with the contradictions they create in the 
clinic (Timmermans and Buchbinder 2010). Every autistic child is different, yet the absence of a 
common autistic phenotype has not led to the dissolution of the condition into various distinct 
disorders. I argue that this is because clinicians work to maintain a common identity across the 
various manifestations of autism that they face in the clinic. Instead of narrowing in on specific 
symptom profiles, they adhere to the broadly defined “triad of impairments” to reconcile the 






STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTER 
 From the clinician’s perspective, at least three tasks must be accomplished during the 
diagnostic interview and later in follow-up sessions. First, they must determine if the child falls 
on the autism spectrum and recommend appropriate treatments, whether they be educational 
(such as ABA) or medically-based therapies (such as the GFCF diet). In the previous chapter we 
saw how diagnosis is usually easily achieved via the clinician’s “gut instinct.” Second, they must 
connect-the-dots for parents by helping them to identify the symptoms their child presents and 
understand why the prescribed treatments are appropriate. Parents are not only in search of a 
diagnosis, but one that makes sense of their experiences thus far, one that can provide a logical 
connection between the child’s therapies, schooling and prognosis. Finally, they have to situate 
themselves as gate-keepers of the autism diagnosis, as the point of access not only to alleviated 
symptoms but to more therapy hours and an improved school environment. The AMC is not 
only a diagnostic center, but manages patient cases throughout childhood and adolescence. In 
other words, clinicians have to not only translate the symptoms of autism, but also the parent-
clinician relationship. Once achieved, translation has to be maintained, for as Blaxter has 
pointed out, diagnosis is not just a category but also a process (1978). That is to say, diagnosis 
does not only imply a classification scheme but is also something a physician does and must 
continue to do to legitimately keep patients under medical care. This is especially true with 
respect to the autism spectrum, where the uncertainty inherent in both development and 
diagnosis needs to be constantly reassessed. As will be shown below, the provisional nature of 
the PDD-NOS diagnosis necessitates continual reassessment. Children change quickly with or 





 This chapter is organized into four main parts. I begin by examining a central tension in 
the parent-clinician interaction: while clinicians search for general symptoms that link the child 
to the diagnostic category, parents work to assert the individuality of their children by referring 
to their special talents or unique personality traits. In the following section I describe the 
diagnostic process as it was witnessed at the AMC. Diagnostic testing and interviewing 
comprised about 36% of my observations and applied to 34% of the patients I followed. In the 
third part of this chapter I document my impressions of the remainder of appointments I 
observed at the AMC. These consisted of either the follow-up sessions of those previously 
diagnosed, intakes of new patients who were already diagnosed, and follow-up appointments 
for patients who already visit the AMC regularly. In keeping with the discussion above, in the 
remaining sections I will focus on how clinicians translate both autism and the clinician-parent-
child relationship in the interviews while they simultaneously bridge the uncertainty inherent in 
clinical work. At the same time, I demonstrate the multi-faceted nature of the autism diagnosis 
as evidenced by the different narrative styles that are assumed in the talk which surrounds it. 
Finally, I conclude with an examination of how two different types of therapies, biomedical and 
psychopharmacological, are thought of as treating different aspects of the disorder – core 
versus peripheral symptoms, respectively. 
CASE VS. BIOGRAPHY  
The focus of what follows leans more towards the ways in which clinicians act to direct 





behaviors (this is why the supply-side is wrong).56 Instead, they actively engage in the 
performance of their child’s identity, offering alternative explanations for behaviors that are 
not framed in terms of a deficit but as an expression of personhood. The central tension is one 
of descriptions of the child as either a “thick” or “thin” person. Diagnostic assessment strategies 
and tools, and this is particularly true of the ADOS, parse a child’s overall behavior into the 
smallest possible elements that are still capable of conveying a clinically meaningful distinction. 
Does he respond to his name when called? Does she use eye contact to show you something? 
Can he follow simple commands, like “go get your shoes”? Answers to these questions 
constitute the child as a thin person, a patient whose particular set of deficits are at the 
forefront. These characterizations, while useful for directing parental attention to the child’s 
therapeutic needs, are insufficient for parents who view the same individual as a child and not a 
patient, a “thick” person who possesses not just a certain set of deficits but a personality and 
his own interests. 
The medical practitioner compares a patient to all the other cases she has seen before 
him and attends to the ways in which they are the same. Routinely asking questions like those 
above helps clinicians isolate the similarities between patients, ignore the features that make 
them different, and ultimately facilitate decision-making as to whether or not what presents 
before her is a case of autism. When clinicians do ask about the child’s interests, it is always 
immediately followed by an inquiry into their possible repetitive nature: 
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Dr: Does he have any other interests? Does he like to watch TV, or listen to 
music, anything? 
Dad: He likes TV. And if there is a song playing that he likes on TV, he’ll run from 
another room to come and listen. 
Dr: Does he have to watch the same TV program or videos? 
Dad: No, he likes different things. 
Thus, the physician’s curiosity about a child’s interests is motivated by a desire to determine 
whether these interests are repetitive or otherwise odd and subsequently characteristic of 
autism.  
Parents, on the other hand, often refer to the quirks and behaviors that depict their 
child not as a case but as a person. They highlight biographical details that make their child 
unique. I observed two primary strategies they employed to accomplish this at the AMC. First, 
parents would offer alternative explanations for a child’s autistic behaviors or developmental 
delays. They conceived of the deficits noted by clinicians as not deficits at all, but as resulting 
from the child’s personality. For example, after four-year-old Henry had demonstrated his 
remarkable ability to read, Dr. Baker inquired after his ability to comprehend what he had easily 
read. Henry’s mother reasoned that his level of reading comprehension was not low but that 
Henry was simply shy: 
Dr: Does he understand, or just read? 
Mom: I think he does understand, he just doesn’t want to communicate it. [To 
Henry:] What’s on the plate? 
Henry: Orange. 
Mom: That’s the plate in the center. What’s on the plate in front of her? 
Henry: Bacon. 
Dr: What does she ask grandma for? 
Henry: Juice. 
Mom: No, you ask grandma for juice. 
Dr: Yeah, see, he can’t answer questions about the content. 





Though parents never disputed the autism diagnosis, in this fashion they indirectly challenged 
the clinician’s interpretation of the autistic nature of some of the child’s behaviors. They might 
also preemptively offer explanations of how what would normally be considered a symptom of 
autism does not impair their child at all. For instance, Charles’ mother insisted that her son did 
not need to make coordinated eye contact: 
Dr: Does he understand when you speak to him? 
Mom: Everything. He doesn’t have to look at you to understand. He understands 
everything, at least when he wants to.  
Like both Henry’s and Charles’ mothers, parents regularly referred to the fact that the child did 
not want to do something, thereby rephrasing a deficit as pure stubbornness. This most often 
occurred when a parent was asked if the child responded to his or her name when called: 
“when he wants to” was a common response to this question. Parents thereby communicated 
that their child was just like any other (neurotypical) kid, at times behaving badly and ignoring 
his parents because he’s engaging in an activity that interests him, or because “he’s got that 
teenage attitude.” They present a child that while autistic, still possesses intellectual and social 
competencies as well as a sense of humor: 
Dad: He does show some protective qualities towards the baby. One time he 
offered her a cheerio because she was crying. He’s never offered me a cheerio.  
Mom: Yeah, and he also mocks her when she cries. He’s got a really strange 
sense of humor. 
Parents also spoke of their children’s exceptional creative talents. Lucas’ mom recounted how 
her son enjoyed painting and would often return to look at an older piece, tilt his head in 





Mom: The music he likes is very complicated jazz, like [names several artists]… 
Dad: Yeah, [artist], he introduced me to that. He pointed out the CD. He likes 
music an awful lot. I was a music major, and when I look at him when he listens, 
the look on his face, he smiles at the right moment, you know, when he should 
smile. 
Thus, parents focus on the unique characteristics of their children to create biographical 
narratives. They are not passive recipients of the autism diagnosis, but actively work to 
establish the identity of their child. Clinicians, on the other hand, construct cases from these 
narratives, culling the relevant information about patients that makes them similar to all the 
others diagnosed. I now turn to the ways in which clinicians argue the case for autism to 
parents. 
DIAGNOSING AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER AT THE AUTISM MEDICAL CENTER 
 Some parents bringing their children to the AMC for diagnostic testing have already 
received confirmation – either by a pediatrician or other specialist, but probably Early 
Intervention – that something is amiss with their child’s development and they suspect that 
autism might be the cause. Others have already received a diagnosis, usually of PDD-NOS, and 
are seeking a second opinion. Almost all children are already receiving Early Intervention 
services, and parents have accepted the fact of their child’s atypical developmental trajectory. 
The question that remains is whether or not the problem is indeed autism, and if so, what more 
can be done to help. As it turns out, in my observations of diagnostic sessions it almost always 
was autism. In only one instance was the child not diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum 
Disorder: eight-year-old Enrica was diagnosed with significant communication impairment, with 
secondary emotional and social impairment. In no case did diagnostic testing lead to a 





diagnosis but was “kept on” (Latimer, Featherstone et al. 2006) for further observation, even 
though doctors claimed to “like what they see” with respect to her social development. But 
with the exception of these two girls, all children undergoing assessment at the AMC were 
found to fit the criteria for either Autistic Disorder or PDD-NOS.  
 Though this finding may be shocking at first glance, there are many reasons why this 
result is not so unusual. For one, as Martha suggested, autism is becoming more and more 
common, so it is to be expected that an autism clinic commonly diagnoses autism. But is this 
enough to explain a diagnostic rate near 100%? In chapter one I argued that the autistic career 
began long before the child was actually diagnosed, and that early career events served to 
shape the identity of the autism parent. Prior to their arrival at the AMC, parents had already 
learned about autism, be it through Early Intervention therapists or from their own research. 
Young children without a prior diagnosis were screened using the M-CHAT, so clinicians already 
expect to see autistic-like symptoms. As a result, the children who visit the AMC – even those 
without a prior diagnosis – enter the clinic with plenty of “autistic baggage”: most were already 
undergoing Early Intervention therapies, from where child development professionals directed 
them to a specialized clinic. These children were already identified as different, their disability 
identity had already begun to be formed. Furthermore, most of the standardized testing 
conducted at the AMC was with autism-specific instruments. In this way, the referral process to 
the clinic also functions as a confirmation process, and the autistic identity is shaped through it 
(Goffman 1961; Mehan 1986). The symptoms of autism are by no means specific to an ASD 
diagnosis alone, but the means by which they are “discovered” can lead to some conclusions 





school psychologists for learning disabilities, Mehan (1986) found that a “test until find” 
approach based upon the referral reason was commonly utilized. Thus, if a child was referred 
for reading comprehension difficulties, the examiner would administer the complete battery of 
reading comprehension tests until the child could be labeled as reading-challenged. Similarly, it 
can be argued that the expectation of autism increases the possibility of an autism diagnosis. As 
Dr. Daly expressed to one parent during ADOS testing with regard to her son: “I assume he’s 
somewhere on the spectrum if you’re here.” 
TRANSLATING AUTISM 
 Parents visiting the AMC are sometimes anxious to receive a diagnosis for their child. 
From their perspective a suitable treatment strategy, and hopefully recovery, can only be 
achieved once a diagnosis is made. The greatest challenge to proponents of demand-side 
explanations of the diagnosis of autism is the finding that parents neither expect nor want (at 
least explicitly) an autism diagnosis. As the AMC clinicians reported, the problem is less of 
parents shopping for a diagnosis than of convincing them that their child is more impaired than 
they would like to think. Parents usually suspected a different developmental difficulty, be it 
speech delay or a hearing problem. Thus, clinicians need to demonstrate the degree of severity 
to parents and communicate that the problem is not going to go away with a little bit of speech 
therapy. The emotionally-charged nature of parent-clinician interaction in the diagnostic 
interview renders these exchanges more complex than what one might typically expect from a 
doctor-patient exchange. Parents want proof of autism, and clinicians have no biological test 
results to support their opinions. As we saw in chapter two, autism is often diagnosed by 





behaviorally. Clinicians at the AMC readily acknowledged their own capability to diagnose in an 
instant, which they understand as deriving from an amassed amount of clinical experience.  
When they describe this particular manifestation of their clinical intuition, clinicians talk 
about autism as something real, a genuine disease entity, that the trained eye can identify 
within seconds. Autistic kids stand out amongst both their neurotypical peers and children with 
other disabilities. But parents and lay observers like myself clearly cannot “see” autism so 
easily. After observing the first ADOS administration I asked the clinician how she could tell the 
difference between autism and something like Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD). In response, 
she offered no details of differentiating symptoms but only explained that children with ADD 
“are very connected” and that I would learn how to spot autistic symptoms when I see them, 
and that until I see them, I could not really know what I was looking for. My own inexperience 
with children was taken as the reason why I could not distinguish autism: 
Dr: So what did you think? Do you know about autism? 
NR: Well yeah, I’ve read about it but this is the first time I’ve seen the ADOS 
done. One think that strikes me is how you can distinguish this from other 
disorders, like for example ADD. 
Dr: Oh, well ADD is very different. They [children with ADD] are connected [to 
other people]. It’s completely different. Well, I mean, autistic kids can be 
hyperactive also, and he was clearly overactive, but… are you around kids? Do 
you have kids? 
NR: No. 
Dr. Yeah, see. ADD kids are connected, they’re interacting with you.  
NR: I see. (Fieldnotes, 06/06/07) 
Thus, recognizing the autistic prototype is not a skill exclusively reserved for those who have 
been medically trained, but can be acquired by anyone who has had enough experience with 





the hallmark of expertise” (779). Expertise is a skill that is acquired through the accumulation of 
experience, which continually refines the ability to make more and more subtle discriminations 
until the expert is able to immediately categorize what is before her. Of course, it is precisely 
the institutional funnel that determines the range of experience clinicians have. For example, 
Dr. Johnson referred to the fact that she has “seen a lot of kids” when I pressed her for a more 
comprehensive explanation of why she had settled on the PDD-NOS for a certain child. As 
described in Chapter 2, she has seen a lot of kids who have already been flagged as probably 
autistic. One might argue that the “gut feeling” is the connection between what the 
practitioner sees and the formal medical knowledge she has internalized over the course of her 
training. As such, this feeling confirms the diagnosis and obviates a symptom-by-symptom 
analysis of each and every individual patient. It effectively erases any discrepancy between the 
definition of the disease and what qualifies as a diagnosis.  
 In the course of my fieldwork, I frequently asked clinicians how and why they had 
arrived at the diagnosis for a particular child. However, they proved rather adept at dodging my 
persistent questioning for more detailed, symptom-based clarifications of their diagnostic 
behavior by deferring to this tacit sort of knowledge. Experts need not make recourse to 
decision rules – those are for beginners (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005). Take, for example, the 
following situation in which I urged Dr. Johnson to offer me a more formal understanding of 
their diagnostic reasoning, as in: 
NR: What about the regression? What role did this symptom play when 
diagnosing Andy? 
Dr: Regression shows up in about 25% of patients, maybe less.  





Dr: Well, not really. Like I said, it shows up in about 25% of cases. (Fieldnotes, 
11/25/07) 
Here, Dr. Johnson did not articulate whether or not Andy’s reported course of regression after 
several days with an extremely high fever was an argument for or against his particular 
diagnosis. As Dreyfus and Dreyfus (2005) warn, “[i]f one asks an expert for the rules he or she is 
using, on will, in effect, force the expert to regress to the level of a beginner and state the rules 
learned in school” (788). References to the statistical averages of medical research were 
littered throughout the diagnostic interviews. Clinicians would frequently place a child’s 
individual symptoms into this broader context, as Dr. Johnson does with Andy’s sensory-seeking 
behaviors: 
Mom: He’s constantly seeking sensory stimulation. He likes to roll things 
between his hands a lot. 
Dr: I think he’s seeking input. There is a small subset of autistic kids who seem to 
need higher input. [...] Some kids just have a very high tolerance for pain. 
(Fieldnotes, 11/25/07) 
To physicians, the gut instinct is proof that the diagnostic category is real; autism exists because 
it can be “seen” in the child. Abstract, medical knowledge is thereby connected to patient 
behavior by a visceral reality. But clinical intuition alone cannot legitimize medical intervention. 
Clinicians must work to present their own interpretation of the patient’s troubles as the natural 
conclusion that any physician would have drawn based on the presentation of symptoms at 
hand. They have to connect-the-dots between the child’s concrete behaviors and the current 
understanding of autism. They must do this not only for observers like myself but for parents as 
well, and not only to explicate what is autism but what is decidedly not autism. Recall from 





 To this effect, clinicians regularly pointed out autistic behaviors to parents during 
diagnostic sessions at the AMC. Dr. Baker, in sleuth-like fashion, would ask a question and 
subsequently re-phrase parents’ answers by thinking out loud:  
Dr: [referring to how Dad has been trying to get Dylan to respond to his name] 
So he doesn’t respond quickly to his name? 
Dad: No. 
Dr: What about before the change [in Dylan’s behavior], at 11 months? 
Dad: Yes, he did. 
Dr: Hmm, interesting... even though his comprehension would have been less 
then. So he’s okay without interaction, he just sits there as he does now. 
Because other [neurotypical] kids his age, they won’t sit there like this.  
Mom: In the summer, when we go to the playground, he will pick up a rock, or 
play with the wood chips on the ground. But he doesn’t have any interest in the 
slide, or the swing. We have to take him to it. But then when we do, he’ll enjoy it 
lots. But he doesn’t show any interest in it on his own. 
Dr: So he doesn’t imitate.  
Through this sort of talk, Dylan’s parents learn to recognize the specific behaviors that make 
their son autistic: he does not respond to his name, he does not seek out social interaction, and 
he does not imitate others. While for the most part Dylan’s parents accepted Dr. Baker’s 
assessments without question, other parents would counter the physician’s declarations by 
clarifying the situations in which the child does exhibit the behavior assumed to be lacking. For 
instance, the following exchange occurred after Dr. Daly had conducted the ADOS with Nathan 
and diagnosed him Autistic Disorder: 
Dr: Well, he has lots of the symptoms associated with autism. He doesn’t talk, he 
doesn’t make gestures like clapping or waving goodbye.  
Dad: He will if prompted. 
Dr: Right, but I’m looking for spontaneous action. He gets caught, really stuck on 
stuff, like the Play-Doh and the Goldfish. And he’s got lots of sensory stuff. So 





In this example, Nathan’s father suggests that the boy can clap or wave goodbye. But Dr. Daly 
takes the parent’s understanding the behavior and rephrases it as deficit as opposed to a skill: 
Nathan will only perform the behavior if he is prompted and not on his own initiative; 
neurotypical kids perform these behaviors spontaneously. In this manner parents learn that 
autism is not only marked by the absence of certain social behaviors, but also the contexts in 
which they arise. What is interesting is that Dr. Daly explicitly employs the language of the 
ADOS, where the “spontaneous use of at least two different gestures” is coded as normal (or 
better, ‘not abnormal’) in the Language and Communication section. The language of the ADOS 
was used even in the interview setting, whether or not the child had done the ADOS. For 
instance, when Lucas brought his grandmother a Ziploc bag of crayons for her to open for him, 
Dr. Johnson commented, “So I see that he’ll take something to you, but there’s no coordinated 
gaze.” Coordinated gaze and integration of eye contact, as it were, are indicated in many ADOS 
items pertaining to Reciprocal Social Interaction.57 
 In all of these cases, autism is talked about as though it is something exhibitable, 
something that the child can present to others. Here, I borrow Goffman’s definition of 
performance as “all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to 
influence in any way any of the other participants” (1990: 15). It is in part through the child’s 
performance in the clinic that autism comes into existence and the autistic identity is assumed. 
An emphasis on performance is a means to teach parents not only what autism looks like, but 
exactly which skills the therapies should target for development. In the interviews, parents 
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explained that it was especially in the course of Early Intervention, but also through their 
interactions with specialists, where they learned about the autism spectrum and how to 
recognize the features of autism in their child. Autism is immediately visible to clinicians; but at 
the outset, parents do not see autism as a “real thing.” Sometimes they do not see autism at all 
but rather suspect either a speech disorder or deafness; many suspected that autism was 
misdiagnosed. The point is not only that the identification of autism is a learned skill acquired 
with the assistance of therapists and clinicians, but that this is done through the deployment of 
a performance-type narrative that makes explicit reference to the discrete behaviors that 
qualify the child for the autism diagnosis. 
 Why might parents experience difficulties perceiving autism in their children, and what 
might autism-as-performance do to resolve these difficulties? Parents of children who are only 
mildly affected are usually shocked to learn that their child shares a diagnosis with the 
character from Rain Man. Many had expectations of a speech disorder that could be remedied 
with a few years of speech therapy, or that their child would simply “grow out of it.” But the 
use of these performance-type narratives and tools such as the ADOS serve both parents and 
clinicians. In practice, clinical intuition is not 100% reliable, and clinicians sometimes deferred 
to performance-based measures such as the ADOS in order to clarify a diagnosis when the child 
was thought to present very mild symptoms. This was routine practice with the “tricky kids.” 
More common practice was the clinician’s switch from a reality- to a performance-type 
narrative in order to clarify a diagnosis for parents. If either a parent was thought to express 
any doubt about the diagnosis, further testing (typically in the form of an ADOS) was ordered or 





Mom: He’s still very self-directed. When he wants to do something, he does it. 
Dr: Do you want him to do the ADOS? 
Mom: Well, what does it do? 
Dr: It’s used a lot for research. 
Mom: Maybe we should… 
Dr: Well, what are you most concerned about? 
Mom: Mostly his language. 
Dr: Do you want to do more developmental tests? 
Mom: What will it do for us? 
Dr: Well, do you have a hard time believing he’s on the spectrum? (Fieldnotes, 
09/05/07) 
This last question could be rephrased as, “If you don’t believe he’s on the spectrum, we can get 
him to perform it for you.” Parents (and in this other cases, patients themselves) like diagnostic 
tests and are more comfortable with the results of tests than a reliance on clinical intuition 
(Nettleton 2006). In the interviews, parents expressed frustration when they felt a physician 
had made a quick diagnosis solely on the basis of appearance without having done any testing, 
and they praised physicians who had really “taken the time to get to know” their child. In a 
sense, both clinicians and parents rely on the same strategy. Clinicians turn to performance 
when the prototype method fails or is inconclusive. Parents, or anyone who lacks the ability to 
“see” autism, rely directly on test results. For both, uncertainty is reduced by the bridging work 
of clinicians to bring objective, medical knowledge – in the shape of formalized scales and 
questionnaires – to bear on diagnostic decisions.  
The threatened permanency and severity of autism is frightening and overwhelming for 
parents, and the diagnosis itself offers little information with respect to prognosis and a course 
of action through which improvement is actualized. As one parent whose son was diagnosed 





behaviors to be modified puts the diagnosis is a more digestible format for parents. They want 
to know what it means to have “impaired social interaction,” and what they can do about it. 
Talking about improving eye contact and learning how to point provides parents with short-
term, manageable goals as well as a strategy – often ABA therapy – with which to achieve 
them. There is no cure for autism, but there are therapies for improving speech, learning how 
to point, and replacing hand-flapping with a more appropriate behavior. No doubt this 
alleviates some anxiety for parents, as concerns about the distant future (Will he make his own 
friends? Get married someday?) are exchanged for something more proximate and obtainable. 
When asked about how autism had changed their lives, a common response among parents 
was that they learned to slow life down and take “one day at a time.” In this sense, the 
delineation of discrete behaviors is a form of bridging work which simultaneously connects the 
manifesting autistic behaviors with the specific therapies that are prescribed. Furthermore, 
with tests like the ADOS modeled closely on the DSM criteria, it is also a bridge to the abstract 
disease entity itself.  
DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS 
The specific disorders that comprise the autism spectrum are conspicuously absent from 
the proposed DSM-V criteria.58 Instead, Autistic Disorder, Rett’s Syndrome, Asperger’s Disorder 
and the all-important PDD-NOS are exchanged for the unitary but inherently multidimensional 
Autism Spectrum Disorder. While the important debates surrounding these proposed changes 
are beyond the scope of this chapter, one implication for clinical practice is obvious: all of the 
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clinical work performed to distinguish AD from PDD-NOS is obviated. But while the job of the 
clinician might become easier in one respect, subsuming all these disorders under one heading 
also introduces new challenges. Namely, parents want to know where there child is on the 
spectrum; they want some indication of the degree of severity they are up against. Knowing 
whether they are dealing with autism, Asperger’s or PDD is informative. It provides parents 
with a more acute sense of the degree of impairment, and it offers clinicians a way to 
communicate it.  
The PDD-NOS/Autistic Disorder distinction has some degree of clinical utility at the 
AMC. Though a symptom-by-symptom comparison of patients was not possible – clinicians did 
not always ask the exact same questions, nor could I always jot them down – two differences 
between AD and PDD-NOS sessions did emerge from the data. First, the children diagnosed 
with AD possessed no expressive language at the time of the interview, though some parents 
had reported the use of words at one point followed by a course of regression. On the other 
hand, the children diagnosed with PDD-NOS were at the very least capable of labeling some 
objects with words, and others could speak in full sentences. Second, and undoubtedly related 
to the first, parents of the AD children reported very little to no progress with the current 
therapies the child was receiving. The one commonality amongst the PDD-NOS children, 
however, was that they were all progressing with the educational therapies. Though some of 
the parents interviewed told of how pediatricians hesitated with the autism diagnosis because 
it could not reliably be made at a very young age, this was not a rule of thumb strictly adhered 





said to have Autistic Disorder, whereas patients as old as seven years were diagnosed with 
PDD-NOS. 
The importance of language and markers of progress in the PDD-NOS diagnosis is 
perhaps best exemplified through a comparison of two patients, James and Dylan. James was 
two months shy of his third birthday when he was diagnosed with PDD-NOS by Dr. Johnson. 
James lacked several of the skills that a typical child his age possessed. He did not babble as a 
baby and did not respond to his name if called. At present, he could not follow simple 
commands (e.g., ‘Get your shoes’) nor express his wants or needs. He was not interested in 
other children nor did he engage in imaginative play, and he was unable to recognize if another 
person was angry. He also displayed many of the unusual and stereotyped behaviors that 
characterize classic autism: he toe-walked, stimmed, was echolalic, lined up toys and turned toy 
cars upside down to spin their wheels. On the other hand, with the aid of speech therapy James 
was now beginning to build two-word phrases. Dr. Johnson reasoned the PDD-NOS diagnosis as 
follows: 
So the [Early Intervention] program seems remarkable. He’s gone from no 
speech to putting words together. He uses the word “I”, which is all very good. 
His behavior can still be described as on the autism spectrum. The ADOS looks at 
severity of symptoms; he came out as PDD-NOS. Some kids lose the diagnosis.59 
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Kids are a work in progress. I wouldn’t classify him as autism; it seems as though 
he’s improving. 
Dr. Johnson hedges her verdict with a quick synopsis of the “remarkable” progress James has 
already made in Early Intervention. And while she feels that PDD-NOS is an appropriate 
descriptor, she adds that this label is only provisional and might be dropped later on, should the 
current success of the therapies continue. The fact that James has responded well to 
therapeutic interventions is understood as evidence that his impairments are more mild and 
possibly surmountable. The positive overtones of this talk was typical of PDD-NOS diagnoses. 
The “nice skills” the child possessed were annotated and followed by a statement that the child 
nevertheless manifests behaviors that put him on the spectrum. In contrast, Dylan’s diagnosis 
was communicated as follows: 
Dr: I would probably put him as autism [Autistic Disorder], not PDD. Do you 
know the difference? 
Dad: No. 
Dr: It’s a large spectrum. [I cannot say?] much with respect to prognosis. His 
communication is a lot less than what we expect with a kid at this age. You really 
have to push him, but he doesn’t look at you. He’s mad but he doesn’t push me 
away, or go to you for help. I’m going to put autism [AD] in his report and 
recommend more services. […] When you don’t engage him, he goes off. He goes 
away. So we want more therapy to engage him. 
Twenty-one-month-old Dylan was brought to the AMC by his father, who was concerned with 
his development as Dylan’s older brother, Noah, was diagnosed with PDD-NOS. Dylan had no 
language and did not react to any of the social overtures initiated by his father or the physician. 
He did not initiate contact with others or engage in imaginary play. He did a lot of visual 
stimming. Dylan was not improving on the GFCF diet, and he was making little progress with the 





the same age, Dylan had yet to make any breakthroughs. Thus, in contrast to the more 
optimistic tone used with James, Dr. Johnson spells out exactly which behaviors Dylan is not 
exhibiting to show what makes autism the appropriate diagnosis. Speaking in more general 
terms, Dr. Johnson explained the difference between the PDD-NOS and AD diagnoses as 
follows: 
PDD[-NOS] is sort of a middle category. As kids get older, PDD[-NOS] can become 
autism, it can remain PDD[-NOS], or it can turn out to be nothing [i.e., the child 
loses the label, is ‘neurotypical’]. It’s really variable. But if a kid gets an autism 
[Autistic Disorder] diagnosis at a young age, it usually stays. It usually means that 
the deficits are more significant. 
Thus, diagnosis is not independent of prognosis. Both are enveloped in uncertainty, but PDD-
NOS even more so than AD. Here again autism is something real, a graded degree of 
impairment in which more severe deficits are more difficult to overcome. Notably, these 
conversations were not about whether the primary diagnosis was to be designated as autism 
or, say, mental retardation. And rarely was the choice between Autism Spectrum Disorder or 
nothing at all. Rather, the choice was between Autistic Disorder and PDD-NOS. The key to 
understanding these exchanges is with respect to prognosis. After I observed Dr. Daly 
administer the ADOS to Luis, who was classified as autistic (and not PDD) on the scale, she 
remarked that he “should blossom.” When I asked why she thought so and if it had anything to 
do with the diagnosis, she replied: 
The key to improvement is EIP [Early Intervention Program]. The diagnosis is only 
for the classification. Essentially, it’s all about the EIP. Some parents even ask for 
the autism diagnosis in order to get better services for their kids. With the 






There may not be a cure for autism, but the question as to how much a particular child can 
improve is always an open question. At the same time, there exists no one-to-one mapping of 
diagnosis and prognosis. For not only does every child respond differently to the treatments, 
but the provision of services itself confounds the relationship between diagnosis and prognosis. 
and it is common knowledge amongst parents and practitioners that a child’s potential is 
maximized to a similar extent as his or her therapy hours. 
AUTISM, PDD-NOS, AND TREATMENT SERVICES 
For some, autism is less a rapidly-spreading disease than an artifact of changing 
diagnostic criteria and practices. Part of the appeal, it is argued, is that an autism diagnosis – 
unlike mental retardation, learning disabilities or other developmental problems – yields a far 
greater number of publically-funded services. Parents are demanding the diagnosis, and 
clinicians are complying. While the evidence presented in the first chapter clearly rules this out 
as the full story, there is certainly truth to the claim that an autism diagnosis will grant a child 
more services. In some states the number of therapy hours almost doubles with the diagnosis, 
or it may be that the diagnosis brings broader insurance coverage. We have already seen how 
formal medical knowledge about autism, best exemplified in the DSM-IV criteria, enter the 
diagnostic situation through the clinician’s instinct and the use of standardized tests like the 
ADOS. We have also seen how diagnosis is not independent of prognosis and the children’s 
response to the therapies they receive in Early Intervention. I now consider a third way in which 
autism is narrated to parents: as a label to obtain services. 
During the diagnostic interviews, neither parents nor clinicians at the AMC hesitated to 





on one occasion Dr. Johnson asked the parents if they were “okay with the autism diagnosis.” 
When I later asked what she meant by this, she replied: 
Well, he had a PDD-NOS diagnosis [from his previous assessment at a different 
clinic]. If I say this [PDD-NOS] in my report, it’s often confusing for parents. 
Sometimes I’ll use it for kids who will meet the diagnosis later on. But with this 
diagnosis, it’s not as easy to get services, whereas the autism [AD] diagnosis will 
help them get services. (Fieldnotes, 10/25/07) 
Thus, the autism label is used as a means for children to obtain the greatest possible amount of 
services and the optimal placement with respect to schooling environment. Within these 
discussions a third narrative style arises, one in which autism is a completely pragmatic 
category for assigning children to services. Here, autism is no longer something that really exists 
or is at least exhibitable, but a means to group together the entire range of atypical children 
who need services. In a reversal of the standard diagnostic logic, it is treatment that determines 
diagnosis, which here becomes an assessment of need. This is by no means an unusual or new 
practice: arguably, diagnosis by treatment almost always defines how physicians operate.  
 That the severity of ASD was sometimes exaggerated in the diagnostic code given to a 
particular child could be used to comfort parents for whom the actual (as opposed to 
administrative) diagnosis is Autistic Disorder. For instance, when Dylan was diagnosed at the 
AMC his father explained that the neurologist they had seen previously reckoned that on a 
scale of severity ranging from 1 to 10, Dylan was a five. Dr. Johnson disagreed: she thought that 
Dylan was closer to seven. But immediately thereafter, in the face of the father’s obvious grief, 





Dr: I see babies a lot worse than him that do very well. I don’t want to take away 
your hope. 
Dad: No, I know… 
Dr: It’s just that we can qualify for more services [with the AD diagnosis] and we 
want to be as intensive as possible.  
Thus, there is a “bright side” to the AD diagnosis: it will support more intensive treatments 
somewhere in the vicinity of twenty to forty hours per week, which the research has shown to 
be most effective. To the same effect, another parent was told to “forget about the scores” and 
instead “focus on the treatments.” The use of the autism label as a means to obtain services 
thereby communicates to parents the urgency of intervention. States and insurance companies 
both recognize this urgency and judge it to be within their economic interests to treat the child 
as intensely and early as possible. Improvement now means a lower likelihood of special 
education, assisted living and therapy bills later in life. It matters little to anyone whether it is 
called autism or PDD; what is important is to secure as many therapy hours as possible, as soon 
as possible.  
 The exigency of services and importance of potential is further emphasized, though 
indirectly, through the labels that are not discussed during diagnosis. For instance, though 
approximately 75% of autistic patients are thought to also be affected by mental retardation 
(Rapin 1997), this was rarely discussed at the AMC. In fact, during the entire course of my 
observations, the possibility of a child being mentally retarded in addition to autistic arose on 
only one occasion. Notably, it was the parents and not the clinician who raised the issue. In this 
case, the parents of 13-year-old Ethan were in search of a physician who specialized in autism, 
as they were frustrated that their current neurologist did “not seem to understand what to 





dissatisfaction with Ethan’s school in the school itself, or whether Ethan was suffering from 
more severe impairments that were responsible for his failure to make more notable progress. 
Dr. Michaels thought that the school was the more likely culprit: 
Dr: Just because he’s got autism, it doesn’t mean he’s not smart. I think for 
Ethan, he should be learning more at school and I’m going to recommend that in 
my report. Maybe the people at his school just haven’t realized his potential. 
Autism is a spectrum, and for something like language, it’s not that these kids 
can’t speak, it’s that they don’t know what language is for. They don’t know how 
to make friends, even if they want to. So we have to teach them how to do these 
things that come naturally to us. But having problems with these things doesn’t 
necessarily affect intelligence. 
Mom: Well, two years ago the neurologist said that he was more affected, she 
said that he was on the more severe side of autism and that he was mentally 
retarded. 
Dr: No! From what tests? 
Mom: I don’t know. 
Dr: No. I would say that Ethan’s somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. He’s 
got some independent skills. He’s not severe. He’s not screaming, or lining up 
toys. Now we haven’t done any tests here so I can’t make any inference on 
Ethan’s intelligence other than from what you tell me. But he’s using the VCR, 
he’s making piña coladas, he knows his directions. He’s not retarded. I can’t tell 
you his IQ, but he can learn. (Fieldnotes, 10/25/07) 
The DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association 2000) defines three diagnostic criteria for 
mental retardation. First, sub-average intellectual functioning as indicated by an IQ of 70 or 
lower, to which Dr. Michaels makes explicit reference. Second, age of onset before age 
eighteen years, to differentiate from dementia. Third, impairments in adaptive functioning in at 
least two areas among the following: communication, self-care and home living, social skills, 
use of community resources (such as public transportation), self-direction (independent 
completion of day-to-day tasks), functional academic skills, work, leisure, health issues and 
safety (ability to recognize dangerous situations). Ethan’s lack of independence or self-direction 





obvious. He was also unable to speak, did not spontaneously interact with others, and his 
parents were deeply concerned about his safety after a recent episode in which he ran out of 
the house and down the street. Nevertheless, even without the results of an IQ test Dr. 
Michaels quickly dismissed the suggestion that Ethan could possibly be mentally retarded, 
which she implicitly equated with being on the more severe side of the spectrum.60 Ethan was 
not retarded, she insisted, because he could learn.  
 There is nothing obvious in the definition of mental retardation (MR) that indicates an 
inability to learn. Persons with Down’s Syndrome, for example, learn to speak and interact with 
others, live independently, and sometimes maintain employment. There are several reasons 
why Dr. Michaels might have preferred to avoid any association with MR. First, for reasons in 
part related to the activism of autism parents in the 1970s (King 2008), autism is perhaps a less 
stigmatizing diagnosis than MR, so parents are reassured when they hear that their child does 
not have MR. Since its inception, autism has been – and it still remains – enveloped in mystery, 
a curious disorder that hides a unique person from the rest of the world. Second, and related to 
this first point, because of the notion of the spectrum and the understanding that low-
functioning or severe autism already implies MR, there is no need for the co-morbid diagnosis. 
As a diagnostic label, MR is redundant alongside autism. The individualized prescriptions for 
treatment should not differ, and the diagnosis would not yield more therapy hours, so from a 
purely pragmatic perspective the MR diagnosis could do no good – though quite possibly harm. 
Third, and arguably most significant, the MR label is avoided because what it implies with 
                                                             
60 In an unrelated conversation with Dr. Johnson, she explicitly indicated that a lack of independent skills was 





respect to a child’s potential is grossly incongruent with that of the autism diagnosis. Mental 
retardation is permanent – we do not hear stories of persons who overcome a diagnosis of MR 
get PhDs, write books, or go on inspirational speaking tours. The autistic (as exemplified by 
Temple Grandin) have this potential, but the mentally retarded do not. In fact, many parents 
expressed in the interviews that this potential was something they had learned about persons 
with autism: 
I thought it was a condition that had no hope in the beginning. I thought that 
what Charles was when he was diagnosed was all that he was going to be. And 
now I know that’s not true. Because he grows every day. There’s something new 
every day, and I know that he’s capable of learning. You just have to ask him 
questions in a different way.  
We saw above that the notion of potential embodied in the autism diagnosis is also evident in 
the distinction that is made between Autistic Disorder and PDD-NOS. The former is associated 
with a higher degree of impairment and, accordingly, more treatment services. On the other 
hand, PDD-NOS connotes less impairment and an unknown outcome. Thus, when a clinician 
tells parents that the child has PDD-NOS but she will diagnose AD, she simultaneously attributes 
greater potential to the child and communicates how this potential is best maximized.  
That autism is at times narrated as a currency, a meaningless label to exchange for 
services, is not meant to imply that there is anything phony or artificial about the diagnosis. It is 
significant that in none of the exchanges I witnessed was autism one-dimensional in this 
fashion: not once did a clinician offer to diagnose a child with autism without also indicating her 
own self-conviction that the ASD label was appropriate. On the whole, clinicians do believe that 





patients, something that is distinctly different from other disabilities. When this is not the case, 
but the diagnosis is given, clinicians are dissatisfied. For instance, twenty-two month old Tyler 
was described to his mother as being “mildly on the spectrum.” He was given a diagnosis of 
PDD-NOS “because he’s already had an autism [spectrum] diagnosis.” I later asked if the 
diagnosis would have been given without this diagnostic history: 
Dr: I probably would have, because he still has some sensory issues. But he does 
interact and share. A PDD[-NOS] diagnosis in kids this young is always 
provisional. Development is on a trajectory. I’m going to guess that given my 
experience – and I’ve seen a lot of kids – he’ll end up in a normal preschool.  
Upon further reflection, Dr. Johnson later admitted that she was “not really impressed with the 
PDD diagnosis” that Tyler had received previously. She rhetorically asked one of the medical 
residents present during the session, who worked in a clinic for children with learning 
disabilities, “you wouldn’t have really picked out this kid in your clinic, would you?”  
SUMMARY: NARRATIVE VARIANTS IN THE CLINIC 
 The central tenet of this dissertation revolves around the idea that the diagnosis of 
autism is multi-faceted in nature. We have seen some evidence testifying to this already in 
chapter one: while there is some truth to arguments purporting either a biological or social 
motivations for diagnosis, neither is sufficient on its own. In this chapter, I have shown how the 
talk that takes places in the diagnostic and follow-up interview reflects the multi-faceted nature 
of autism. Most crucial is the interlocking nature of these narratives, how they tie into one 
another and constitute the diagnostic situation collectively. Autism is not only a set of 
diagnostic criteria; it is also the performance of discrete behaviors, a label to obtain services, 





multiple, intersection social worlds simultaneously but maintains coherence and 
interdependency across them.  
TREATMENT VARIANTS IN THE CLINIC 
 The translation of autistic symptoms does not end after the diagnostic interview. In fact, 
diagnosis does not even end at the diagnostic interview. Rather, both continue after the initial 
meeting and throughout the follow-up interviews. These follow-up sessions are also an 
assessment of treatments: which are working, which are not, what should be tried next, and so 
on. To the extent that diagnosis is a process that continues as long as clinicians at the AMC 
monitor their patients, treatments are a part of differential diagnosis. For instance, as we saw 
above, response to the treatment regimen is an indication of whether a child is labeled with 
Autistic Disorder as compared to PDD-NOS.  
In this section, I analyze the narratives that surround the treatment therapies. Because 
the AMC does not provide educational treatments, this discussion is limited to the use of 
biomedical and psychopharmacological therapies. At the AMC, biomedical treatments were 
narrated as though targeting the actual cause of autism’s symptoms. In contrast, psychiatric 
treatments are described as being limited to the management of autistic behaviors. They 
cannot treat autism’s core deficits, but they can help make the child amenable to the 
educational therapies. Thus, the distinction between biomedical and psychiatric treatments is 
reflective of that between autism as a reality and autism as a performance.  
THE BIOMEDICAL TREATMENT OF AUTISM  The founders of the AMC pride themselves on its 





while certain medications have been approved for use with autism, there is of yet no 
breakthrough medical treatment for autism. Physicians at the AMC always prescribed 
educational-type therapies chosen from a relatively small pool of options, including speech 
therapy, ABA, occupational therapy, physical therapy, and social skills training. But parents 
rarely rely on these recommendations alone. In an internet survey of treatments used by 
parents of children with autism, Green et al. (2006) found that almost all of the 111 therapies 
included on his survey were used at least once by some parents, and that on average parents 
were using seven treatments at any one time. Supplementing the more mainstream therapies 
recommended at the AMC are a myriad of others, many of which are not empirically validated 
and thus fall into the broad category of alternative treatments, such as the gluten-free casein-
free (GFCF) diet, vitamin supplements, and chelation therapy. The trouble for the clinicians at 
the AMC is that these alternative therapies sometimes work, but no one knows why; or, more 
importantly, no one can predict beforehand which children might benefit and which will likely 
not. As of yet, medical research has not provided an answer, neither to the question of why the 
therapies are effective for some children but not others, nor to that of the underlying 
mechanism. As Dr. Johnson admitted, when it comes to trying these therapies with various 
children, “it’s a lot of trial and error.”  
In chapter two I indicated that uncertainty in the clinic often arose from the 
incompatibility between generalized research findings and the individual patient. With respect 
to alternative therapies for autism, the uncertainty stems from the absence of consensus 
regarding their efficacy in the medical literature. Some AMC clinicians were trying to change 





reducing oxidative stress, part of a larger attempt to identify the differing clinical subtypes of 
autistic patients that she considered the optimal place to begin searching for the as of yet 
unknown biomedical subtypes. But parents need to know now whether they should try a 
certain alternative therapy or not, and at the very least they need to know if these attempts are 
safe for their child. At the AMC, parents continually asked doctors their opinions on a particular 
alternative therapy, be it the GFCF diet, the methyl-B12 shots, chelation or hyperbaric oxygen 
chamber. Physician responses to these queries tended to be of two sorts. First, if parents asked 
if they should try a specific therapy for their child, doctors would offer parents a medically-
rational decision: 
Mom: Would you recommend that they be on a special diet? 
Dr: Some kids do well with the diet. But they [the twins] don’t really have the GI 
symptoms. 
Mom: Would it maybe help with the stimming? 
Dr: I think their stimming is just immaturity of the nervous system.  
[…] 
Dr: I can give you a prescription for blood work to look for any food allergies, but 
I don’t think the diet will do much for them. Fieldnotes, 10/24/07. 
In this example, the diet is not recommended because the patients, 2½ year old twins, do not 
suffer from gastrointestinal problems such as diarrhea, constipation or excessive vomiting. Dr. 
Johnson instead recommends allergy testing to quell any concerns about the boys’ diet. Thus, 
when advising patients on unproven, alternative treatments, doctors still adhere to basic 
medical principles. For instance, they want to check for a B12 deficiency before recommending 
the B12 shots, or for high levels of heavy metals in the blood in the case of chelation. And they 





Dad: At 17 months we started him on the gluten-free, casein-free diet. Then he 
started to change. 
Dr: Really? Even without bowel problems? 
Mom: But when we switched him from formula to milk, then he started waking 
up during the night.  
Dr: Oh yeah, maybe he was a little gassy. Was it a milk- or soy-based formula? 
Mom: It was milk-based. But then after we stopped giving him milk, he started 
sleeping through the night again.  
[…] 
Dr: So the diet seems to help. Fieldnotes, 11/21/07. 
In this case, Dr. Baker is surprised to hear that the patient responded to the diet despite not 
having previous gastrointestinal problems, and later presumes that the boy must have had less 
noticeable GI issues. Overall, however, they still make use of the individualized nature of the 
spectrum to recommend a certain therapy for some patients but not others. If a parent was 
curious about chelation therapy, physicians would first ask whether that child had tested for 
high heavy metals. 
 Another manner in which clinicians respond to parents requesting information on 
alternative therapies is to refer to abstract medical knowledge and scientific procedures, and in 
particular to the lack of supporting evidence for the therapies in the research literature. For 
instance, when Matthew’s parents voiced that they would only try chelation if it had been 
proven safe, Dr. Johnson commented: 
But then that means you won’t do it, because we’re only just starting to study it 
now. […] The problem with the chelation is that their haven’t been any 
controlled studies published on it yet. That’s the problem with that stuff, there’s 
no real evidence that it works. 
One way to understand this is as a safeguard for clinicians against therapies that are attempted 





attribute the success of a biomedical treatment to the presence of an underlying medical 
problem, but attribute failure to the unstudied nature of the treatment. More importantly, and 
a point I will return to at the end of this section, clinicians were more open to accepting the 
medical problems that are the targets of biomedical interventions as the cause of autistic 
symptoms as opposed to a correlate. Psychiatric treatments, on the other hand, were 
understood solely as the latter. 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGICAL TREATMENTS  To date, only two medications are FDA-indicated for 
use with autism, Risperdal and Abilify. Both are classified as atypical antipsychotics and are also 
indicated for use with schizophrenia, mania and bipolar disorder. Their approval for use with 
autism is specific to symptoms of irritability, mood swings and aggressive behaviors (such as 
self-injury) that are common in children diagnosed with an ASD. Seraquel, another atypical 
antipsychotic, is used similarly though it has not received FDA approval for ASD. In addition to 
the three atypical antipsychotics, I saw nine other drugs in use at the AMC. Six of these (Ritalin, 
Adderall, Concerta, Strattera, Clonidine and Tenex) were indicated for ADHD, and the remaining 
three (Wellbutrin, Luvox and Xanax) are used primarily for depression, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, and anxiety disorders.  
 In my observations, no child younger than age six years received pharmacological 
therapies. Clinicians were clear that no pharmacological treatment exists for autism per se. 
There are treatments for associated behaviors like hyperactivity and obsessive-compulsive 
tendencies, but no medication will give a child speech and social skills. Unlike an antibiotic 





with autistic patients only have their effect so long as they are continually used by the patient. 
The proper analogy is a drug used for hypertension: blood pressure lowers with use of the drug, 
but resumes its higher value upon cessation. The same holds for autism. Take away the 
Risperdal, and aggressive behaviors return. Some autistic symptoms can be alleviated with 
psychiatric medication, but the disorder itself is treated through other means. Accordingly, 
when clinicians recommended medications, they couched their suggestions in one of two 
narratives, sometimes both. First, medications could be helpful in managing problem behaviors, 
especially sleep troubles, impulsivity or hyperactivity, and self-injury or other aggressive 
behaviors. For instance, one child was given Clonidine because he had a habit of suddenly 
leaving the house and running into the street. This use of medication was often connected to 
concerns with safety, both the child’s and those around him. But what was clear was that the 
medications, while relieving certain symptoms, were not treating the core autistic deficits. As 
Dr. Baker told one mother:  
Unfortunately there’s nothing we can do medication-wise to help with the social 
stuff. But we have medication to help the anxiety and paranoia so as not to 
inhibit him. 
Clearly, Dr. Baker believes that using medication to alleviate Michael’s anxiety would help with 
the “social stuff,” just not the autism social stuff. Instead, she believes that in addition to 
autism, Michael suffers from an anxiety disorder. Both conditions affect Michael’s ability to 
socialize, but only the component related to the anxiety disorder is treatable with medication. 
The social deficits that result from autism, on the other hand, are treatable only through the 
educational-type therapies. This brings us to the second manner in which the use of 





treatments. The drugs may not treat the core deficits, but they can facilitate the therapies that 
do. For instance, six-year-old Jonathan’s parents were looking for a medication that could help 
with their son’s hyperactivity but that was in a form that he would tolerate as he disliked large 
capsules and skin patches. During one appointment, Jonathan exhibited quite acutely the 
behaviors his parents were speaking of: he was incessantly vocalizing and moving about, 
constantly climbing onto chairs and other objects and jumping off of them. Dr. Baker wondered 
how typical this hyperactivity was of Jonathan: 
Dr: In school, is he like this?  
Mom: Sometimes he’s good, sometimes bad. They give him breaks when he 
needs one.  
Dr: Yeah, the therapy can’t be effective if he’s so hyper. 
Dr. Baker later explained to me that she did not approve of prescribing medication for the 
purpose of improving scholastic achievements, but in a case like Jonathan’s it was necessary to 
exercise some control over the behavioral symptoms if the therapies he received in school were 
going to have any effect.  
 Unlike the various biomedical treatments, the efficacy of psychiatric medications to 
change behavior is unquestioned. Randomized controlled trials are the paragon of medical 
truth-finding. But unlike biomedical treatments, these drugs are only understood as helping to 
alleviate the more peripheral symptoms of autisms, or those caused by other, co-morbid 
disorders. Despite the guessing-game strategy of the biomedical treatments, however, when 
they do work are understood as treating autism itself, directly affecting core symptoms like eye 
contact, speech, and social interaction. Parents spoke of a “completely different child” 





speaking in full sentences within three days of starting the GFCF diet. On the other hand, no 
parent expressed a similar degree excitement about the reduced anger outbursts after 
beginning the Risperdal. To the contrary, many parents questioned whether the psychiatric 
medications were working at all, and it was not uncommon for parents to realize only after 
taking their child off of these medications that they were indeed having a therapeutic effect.  
The translation of autistic versus non-autistic symptoms, it would seem, continues well 
past the initial diagnosis. Autism is consistently translated as a medical, and not psychiatric, 
disorder. This practice likely extends beyond the walls of the AMC. For instance, Siegel (1996) 
notes her clinical impression that self-injurious behaviors are less common now than in 
previous decades, as these symptoms has responded well to both behavioral treatments and 
medication. Though looping, then, these behaviors fall to the periphery of the diagnosis and are 
understood as consequences of the core deficits: the child becomes frustrated because he is 
unable to communicate his wants and needs.  
RESPONSIBILIZATION: TRANSLATING THE PARENT-CLINICIAN RELATIONSHIP 
In chapter one I suggested that as parents traverse the steps of the diagnostic career, 
they are responsibilized for their child’s brain. Here I want to expand on this idea to argue that 
clinicians restructure the parent-clinician relationship so as to responsibilize parents for their 
child’s treatment regimen. During the diagnostic interview and throughout the follow-up 
appointments, clinicians continually clarify their own role as well as imbue parents with a solid 
sense of theirs. Parents learn that they cannot passively accept the care or education that is 
offered to them. It is their own responsibility to learn about different treatments for autism, to 





continually expose the child to as therapeutic an environment as possible. As Dr. Baker told one 
mother:  
Dr: You know, you have to take him to as many social events as possible, like the 
YMCA, Chuck E. Cheese. The more the better. It does make a difference. In ten 
years [as a clinician working with autism] I’ve really seen the difference it can 
make. It’s not enough to rely on the school and the therapy, it’s what you do that 
makes the difference. 
When this same parent asked how she was to secure the various recommended treatments for 
her son, Dr. Baker responded, “with a lot of fighting.” A neurologist’s report can only go so far 
on its own; parents must advocate strongly on their child’s behalf. Through interactions like 
these, parents are transformed from primary caregiver to the multi-faceted role of parent-
activist-therapist-researcher (Eyal, Hart et al. 2010).  
 It should be pointed out that clinicians are indeed the gatekeepers of the autism 
diagnosis and consequently control access to many of the therapies (or at least state-funding 
for them). Though schools may administer the autism label for the purposes of special 
education, and Early Intervention therapists are familiar enough with the disorder to correctly 
identify autism, only a clinician’s word will carry weight with the state, insurance companies, 
and the school district. Physicians at the AMC did indeed conduct some medical testing and 
prescribe medical treatments, but this proved to be only a small piece of the child’s overall 
treatment schedule. With autism, the physician’s role is greatly reduced after diagnosis, and 
arguably they play only a supporting role in overall treatment. Clinicians provide 
documentation of the diagnosis, recommendations for educational therapies and prescriptions 





and should be administered, and see to it that they are, falls in the hands of parents. In the 
words of one parent: 
Everything that I've done, everything has been parent-driven for our son. I 
certainly check in with different doctors and stuff […] We’ll say were doing this, 
this, and this and she'll say you might try a little more of this or a little less of 
that or don't worry about this. But there's no one who... you're the captain of 
your ship. It's something I've discussed with a lot of parents where again, it feels 
like the early days of cancer where doctors coming in and going, well we can do 
this experimental stuff, chemotherapy, we can give him a little bit, we can give 
him a lot, what do you think? And you're sitting there as a parent going, I think 
you're the professional and you tell me what you think. They don't know yet and 
so you are part of the process and you're one of the best people to know your 







CHAPTER 4: DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENTS 
 
"Our preserved theories and the world fit together so snuggly less because we 
have found out how the world is than because we have tailored each to the 
other." Ian Hacking, The Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences (1992: 29) 
 
Any account of the diagnosis of autism would be wanting without consideration of the 
various checklists, scales, and other instruments that have been devised as diagnostic aids. 
Commonly used by clinicians and school psychologists alike in the assessment of children with 
developmental delays, these devices are an important component of the diagnostic enterprise, 
and consequently, a significant part of this story. Yet they are more than just passive pawns to 
be manipulated, using simple formulae to yield quick answers to the complex question of 
whether a given presentation of symptoms is or is not autism. Each diagnostic scale that 
enjoyed prosperity at some point in the history of autism diagnosis is like a snapshot in time, a 
representation of the meaning of autism at that particular moment in time. Taken together, 
they represent the development of the autism prototype and help recreate the social and 
historical context from within which our current practices evolved. The diagnosis of autism does 
not transpire in a social vacuum, but within a matrix of social institutions and practices that are 
historically situated.  
There are two motivations for charting the history of diagnostic instruments. First, these 
scales are an important site of calibration and looping. Looping, it will be recalled, describes the 
mechanism by which a classification can change by means of interacting with what is classified, 
implying that an autism diagnosis can interact with individuals and their actions and behaviors. 





must contend with in terms of their classifications. While they may be useful for organizing 
people into categories, this very act may result in a reaction by the classified to the category, 
such that the diagnostic label – as well as the instrument – as originally applied is longer 
relevant. As a result, either the classification has to change, or the instrument, or both. 
Diagnostic instruments, therefore, can have implications for the dominant autistic prototype at 
a given historical time.  
Over time, the autistic prototype has transformed from Kanner’s specific symptomology 
to a spectrum disorder encompassing a broad range of symptoms with varying degrees  of 
severity. Though an analysis for the causes of this change is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, the role played by looping is evident. The success of autism therapies marginalized 
some of the key features of Kanner’s syndrome. For instance, self-injurious behaviors were 
exceptionally amenable to change (Siegel 1996). At the same time, the activism of the National 
Society for Autistic Children (NSAC) and autistic self-advocates like Temple Grandin attracted to 
the spectrum ever more parents of children who were not classically autistic, thus further 
contributing to looping processes (Eyal, Hart et al. 2010). 
Calibration refers to the means by which new diagnostic instruments are standardized, 
the fine-tuning that occurs between old instruments, current clinical opinion, and the new 
instrument. Calibration is not independent of looping: all new diagnostic instruments are 
calibrated before they enjoy common usage, but because of looping processes, exactly what a 
scale is calibrated on can have a significant impact on its longevity. Tools like the Autism 





population of children that were produced by earlier instruments and prototypes. The ABC, for 
instance, was constructed from Rimland’s Form E-2 as well as Kanner’s original criteria. But as 
the symptoms associated with the autistic prototype broadened in scope, and especially after 
the DSM-III-R criteria were released, the ABC became less and less relevant as it had been  
calibrated on a population produced by earlier instruments and prototypes. In other words, the 
ABC could not keep up with looping and ultimately fell out of step with time. On the other 
hand, the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS), which defines autism as a very 
broad spectrum, is calibrated on clinical judgments. It therefore identifies performances that 
confirm clinical opinion and so participates in the looping process by validating the underlying 
prototype. 
Second, the history of diagnostic instruments also contains a story about the expertise 
on autism and the fluctuating movement of credibility within this network. From the outset, 
amidst the dominant etiological theory held by clinicians that pinned the cause of Early Infantile 
Autism on mothers, parents possessed little credibility within the autism sphere. Rimland, 
however, attacked the credibility of clinicians and elevated that of parents. Form E-2, for 
example, circumvented clinicians completely, and parents could receive both a diagnosis and 
recommendations for treatment from Rimland himself. This was an environment in which the 
expertise of parents was of the highest reliability, and it was in this milieu that the ABC and the 





and therapists, respectively. The ADOS, however, is unique not only for introducing a new, 
interactive format, but it resurrects clinical expertise and elevates it above that of parents.61  
STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTER 
From Bernard Rimland’s Form E-2 to Catherine Lord and colleagues’ Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule, each diagnostic instrument was designed with specific goals and motives 
in mind. Through an analysis of these intentions and the social contexts in which they arose, we 
can uncover the diverse set of interests that the construction of these tests served. Though 
different factors may have been considered important over time, all play a role in the way in 
which autism is conceived of today.  
The first part of this chapter is an analysis of the three major diagnostic instruments that 
have been used in the history of autism. I begin with Bernard Rimland’s Diagnostic Checklist for 
Behavior-Disturbed Children (Rimland 1964), which sought to both limit the diagnosis of autism 
and raise the status of parents who, according to the dominant psychoanalytic theory, were 
thought to be the cause of autistic symptoms in children. Next, I take up the Autism Behavior 
Checklist (Krug, Arick et al. 1980), which was developed primarily for use by teachers of special 
education as a class placement aid. Finally, I discuss the Childhood Autism Rating Scale 
(Schopler, Reichler et al. 1980) whose application was open to a wide variety of professionals. 
This scale, it will be shown, reflected an ever-growing tendency to view autism as a spectrum of 
disorders. 
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The epigraph of this chapter, while made in reference to the instruments of the 
laboratory sciences, applies equally nicely to the scales that have been devised to diagnose 
autism. Similar to the scale that came before it, the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
(ADOS) has become the “gold standard” of all diagnostic scales not because of its superior 
detection capabilities, but because what it means to have autism in terms of the ADOS, and 
what autism looks like, have simultaneously shaped one another. In the second part of this 
chapter I focus solely on the ADOS. Unlike any of its predecessors, the ADOS is an interactive 
scale in which the clinician and child engage in an elaborate performance. Though designed to 
offer clinicians a means to incorporate systematic observations into the diagnostic process, I 
will show how the ADOS nevertheless leaves room for the inclusion of subjective opinion under 
the mask of objectivity. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the various functions that 
the ADOS accomplishes for a number of actors, and clinicians and parents in particular. 
METHODOLOGY 
My discussion of the Diagnostic Checklist for Behavior-Disturbed Children, Autism 
Behavior Checklist, and Childhood Autism Rating Scale is informed by several different sources. 
First, for each scale I analyzed the content of the checklists. Second, if available I studied the 
manuals in order to learn of the goals and motivating factors as recognized by the test 
constructors themselves. Third, I looked at journal articles and other writings of the authors, as 
well as the responses of others to the scales (including, but not limited to, psychometric 
assessments). Finally, I conducted an e-mail interview with David Krug, lead author of the 





To complement my observations of the administration of the ADOS at the AMC, in May 
of 2008 I took part in a two-day ADOS clinical workshop in Philadelphia, PA. The workshop was 
hosted in a large conference room of a hotel. Participants sat along eight rows of rectangular 
tables draped in white linens. The instructor stood at the front of the tables, and behind her 
was a small stage approximately two feet high where the live administrations of the ADOS were 
performed. 
PARTICIPANTS Approximately 90 individuals participated in the workshop, most of whom were 
practicing psychologists. By a count of hands, three participants were medical doctors, six 
speech therapists, three special education specialists, three occupational therapists, and one 
physical therapists. All others were psychologists (about 74 in total). Approximately fifteen of 
the participants were male and 75 female. Some participants were repeat attendees. The 
instructor was also a clinical psychologist (though not one of the original developers of the 
test). By her own admission, her daily work consisted of 70% clinical assessment and 30% 
research.  
WORKSHOP GOALS The goal of the workshop was to introduce participants to the ADOS and 
its theoretical underpinnings, as well as to the administration and coding of the test. It was 
explicitly declared that the workshop was not equivalent to full preparation for clinical use of 
the ADOS, nor was it a replacement for reading the manual. Rather, it was designed to provide 
the background information necessary for further training for both clinical and  research use. 
WORKSHOP PROTOCOL  After a brief (one-hour) introduction to the scale on the first day, the 





(Modules 1 and 2 on Saturday, Modules 3 and 4 on Sunday). After a short break, the instructor 
demonstrated the use of one of the modules through a live administration. Participants 
independently scored the module, and after lunch the administration and scoring were 
discussed with the group. Each day ended with a review and discussion of the day’s modules. In 
order to ensure visibility of all participants, I sat in the middle of the last row of tables. The only 
exceptions were during the two live administrations of the ADOS, where I sat in a chair close to 
the stage.62 I recorded my observations openly, as it was not unusual for participants to be 
taking notes during the course of the workshop. 
DIAGNOSTIC CHECKLIST FOR BEHAVIOR-DISTURBED CHILDREN 
The Diagnostic Checklist for Behavior-Disturbed Children (Rimland 1964), known simply 
as Form E-2, was one of the first attempts to quantify autistic symptomology. It was devised by 
Bernard Rimland who, while holding a doctorate in psychology, had no training in either child or 
abnormal psychology, having “carefully avoided such irrelevant courses” during his studies in 
psychometrics (Rimland 1981: 201). However, upon learning that his son suffered from autism, 
Rimland abandoned his position as director of personnel measurement with the US Navy in San 
Diego and fully devoted himself to the study of the disorder. He found the state of research on 
autism at the time to be “chaotic” and plagued by “abysmal” scholarship, and consequently set 
out to arrange a comprehensive review of the topic (Rimland 1981). This research led to his 
publication of Infantile Autism: The Syndrome and its Implications for a Neural Theory of 
Behavior (1964). The book was an instant classic and the first of several achievements that 
                                                             





would eventually earn Rimland the designation as “father of modern autism research” (Maugh 
2006).  
Rimland accomplished two principle goals with the book. First, he successfully refuted 
the “refrigerator mother” hypothesis – initially formulated by Kanner and further developed by  
Bruno Bettelheim63 (1967) – which claimed that autism was a psychogenic disorder caused by 
cold and distant mothering. Second, through arguing for a theory of biological causation, the 
book encouraged biological research on autism, in terms of both etiology and the search for 
treatments. Yet one goal remained elusive. The first chapter of the text had been devoted to 
establishing that autism was a unique diagnostic entity, distinct both from mental retardation 
as well as childhood schizophrenia, the latter being the most common form of childhood 
psychosis at the time. The problem, according to Rimland, was that the term “autism” was 
being carelessly overused, applied to cases that, while possibly sharing some symptoms with 
autism, were clearly not – at least according to Rimland  –  real cases of autism, but other, 
“autistic-like” syndromes.64 Thus, one of Rimland’s objectives with Infantile Autism was to rein 
in the over-diagnosis of autism and bring clarity to the confused manner in which childhood 
psychoses were being labeled at that time. To assist in the untangling of the muddled mass of 
childhood disorders, he included a multiple-choice questionnaire on the symptoms of autism as 
an appendix to the book. Parents with children who had been diagnosed as autistic, autistic-
like, or with a similar designation, were requested to complete the questionnaire and return it 
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to Rimland, who would subsequently score the form and return the result, along with an 
analysis of the child, back to the parents. 
Rimland devised the 80 multiple-choice questions of Form E-265 to be consistent with 
Kanner’s (1943) original behavioral descriptors. While a few questions address pre- and peri-
natal conditions and behaviors during the early months of life, the majority of items are 
concerned with behaviors exhibited by the child between the ages of three and five years. 
Included were items on the lack of affect, echolalia and other odd speech behaviors, 
stereotypy, obsessiveness and resistance to change, ritualistic behaviors, repetitive behaviors, 
and nonresponsiveness. The final three items ask about the education level of the parents, as 
well as the family’s history of mental illness and mental retardation. Each response can receive 
one of three possible codes: +1 for behaviors which are characteristic of autism, -1 for 
symptoms not associated with autism, or a code of zero for item options which do not fall into 
either of these categories.66 Subtotals of the autism (+1 codes) and “non-autism” (-1 codes) 
scores are calculated, and their simple sum yielded the total score. A score of +20 was said to 
be indicative of autism; lower scores were designated as non-autism. 
Since Rimland never published the scoring key for Form E-2, the positive-scoring item 
responses indicative of autism cannot be ascertained. This renders it nearly impossible to 
                                                             
65 An earlier version of the checklist, Form E-1, appeared in the first edition of the text. Form E-2, a revised version 
of E-1 based on responses from parents, was included in the appendix of the second edition of Infantile Autism. 
Results of data collected through Form E-1 were never published, and Rimland himself admits that the checklist 
was an “armchair” instrument (B. Rimland, On the objective diagnosis of Infantile Autism, Acta Paedopsychiatrica, 
1968, 35, 146-161). Hence, the discussion which follows concerns the second version of the checklist. 
 






reflect on the prototypical behavior pattern that Rimland thought was exemplary of a child with 
autism. But since he so frequently and forcefully restated the belief that only those children 
manifesting the symptoms described by Kanner warranted a diagnosis of autism, and given that 
in one publication he did disclose the coding scheme for six items (Rimland 1971), one can 
surmise that Rimland’s “autistic symptomology” would include the following: nonresponsive 
behavior, such as appearing aloof, remote, indifferent, acting as though deaf, appearing to 
“look through” people or be “lost in thought”; lack of affect, such as showing displeasure at 
being held, not being cuddly, failure to assume an anticipatory posture when being picked up; 
stereotypical in behavior, including rocking oneself, whirling oneself, self-injurious behavior, 
spinning objects, and other repetitive behaviors; ritualized behavior, including insistence on 
particular routines and resistance to change; odd and/or repetitive speech patterns, including 
pronoun reversal, echolalia, use of repetition to answer questions; and the possession of 
specialized knowledge or special abilities in one area, such as remarkable memory or 
exceptional fine motor control. 
Thus, from Rimland’s perspective, Form E-2 was a means to quantify Kanner’s 
syndrome, or Early Infantile Autism (EIA), with the ultimate goal of limiting the number of 
children diagnosed. Rimland had come to despise the way in which the terms “autism” and 
“autistic” were so carelessly used by clinicians that it could not be assumed they were being 
applied correctly. Differential diagnosis became somewhat of a crusade for Rimland, and was 
closely coupled with his search for biological treatments. Indeed, not only was Form E-2 
constructed to yield accurate diagnoses for the purposes of scientific research (while side-





children had the potential to be highly intelligent, a potential that could be accessed through 
early and intensive intervention (Rimland 1984). Rimland emphatically reiterated Kanner’s 
original observation that the parents of autistic children tended to be of high intelligence, which 
to him was strong evidence that autism was not related to mental retardation.67 Thus, in a 
clever move, Form E-2 circumvented the finger-pointing clinicians while elevating the status of 
parents as reliable witnesses. And since the scale was embedded in the same scientific values 
that the clinicians abided by, it was duly protected from accusations of “unscientificness.” 
Throughout the later years of the 1960s and early 1970s, Rimland continued his scathing 
indictment of clinical psychiatry that had begun with Infantile Autism. He made an impassioned 
call for autism to “be rescued from the nosological oblivion toward which it is daily being 
pushed by careless and indiscriminate diagnosis,” arguing that “the existence and identification 
of a syndrome … is actually … a mathematical and statistical problem, and not simply one of 
intuition and judgment” (Rimland 1968; 146, 157). A psychometrician by training, who better to 
investigate the relationship between a latent variable – here, autism – and responses on a 
multiple-choice scale than Bernard Rimland? 
A few years after the publication of Form E-2, Rimland conducted an analysis of over 
2,200 checklists that he had received from parents. He first reported that of all the checklists he 
received, only 9.7% had scores of +20 or higher and could therefore be classified as true cases 
of EIA. Not only did this justify setting the cutoff score at +20, he argued, but it was remarkably 
close to Kanner’s estimate that only about one in ten of all cases referred to him as autism were 
true cases of EIA. Furthermore, upon inspection of the breakdown of responses to the 
                                                             





individual items, the true EIA cases were much more likely to fall into the positively coded 
option, whereas the non-autistics were more likely to be evenly distributed across all item 
options.68 In Rimland’s opinion, these results indicated that, first, EIA is “a unique clinical entity 
and not merely a synonym for childhood psychosis;” and second, Form E-2 is a useful tool for 
differentiating EIA from other diagnoses (Rimland 1971, 170). 
Analyses of Form E-2 by other investigators were less optimistic, and Rimland’s decision 
to withhold the scoring key from publication effectively shielded the checklist from undergoing 
further assessments or critiques. The checklist was criticized for relying heavily on parental 
recall, and not providing for any observation of the child, and there were many open questions 
about of the scale’s reliability and validity. Morgan (1988) notes that while the scale effectively 
differentiates between psychotic (i.e., schizophrenics and autistics) and non-psychotic children, 
it could not separate the autistics from the schizophrenics. Others still questioned whether the 
syndrome of early infantile autism existed at all, since Form E-2’s ability to detect it was not 
significantly better than the base-rate prediction (Masters and Miller 1970). To be fair, Rimland 
himself was more interested in relating the results of Form E-2 to biological variables, which 
would not only provide support for his hypothesis of biological etiology but assist in the search 
for reliable treatments for EIA. He published several studies of the sort, including one which 
reported that children with high E-2 scores responded better to a multivitamin treatment 
                                                             
68 Consider Item 33 as an example. For this item, option 1 is coded +1, and the remaining three options as -1. In 
this case, 73% of EIA cases (i.e., total score of +20 or greater) selected option 1, 8% option 2, 12% option 3, and 8% 
option four. In comparison, the distribution of the non-EIA cases (i.e., total score of +19 or less) was 33%, 23%, 
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regimen than did those with lower scores (Rimland 1971). Yet even these studies were found 
difficult to replicate (Morgan 1988). 
Despite these replication failures, Rimland’s Form E-2 was successful in several other 
ways. Perhaps even too successful: while the initial challenge for autism was to be recognized 
as a unique syndrome distinct from schizophrenia and mental retardation, by the very act of 
writing the book, autism became susceptible to being over-applied, even if carelessly, to other 
disorders of childhood. Thus, the next order of business was to prevent the overuse of the 
diagnosis. Rimland had effectively carved out a niche for autism, distinct both from childhood 
schizophrenia and mental retardation. However, by his alliance with NSAC and the therapies 
this space was inadvertently extended, enjoying so much popularity as to become an attractive 
diagnosis; the pendulum had swung too far in the opposite direction. In fact, the checklist was 
originally derived from one whose function was to differentiate autism from childhood 
schizophrenia, mental retardation, and brain damage (Polan and Spencer 1959). Yet by the time 
of the checklist’s second edition, the more pressing task was to isolate true cases of EIA from 
other, similar cases, “autistic-like” but nevertheless “non-autism.” The uniqueness of autism 
had been established, and now its presumed rarity needed to be protected. 
Rimland’s checklist was also instrumental in banishing the “refrigerator mother” 
hypothesis, and it was in part through the checklist that Rimland was able to recruit a crucial 
ally for his fight against parental blame: namely, the parents of children with autism. At the 
time when Infantile Autism was published, the psychogenic hypothesis was the leading 





bringing into being their child’s deficits. Rimland offered parents an alternative explanation, 
one free from moral judgment and feelings of guilt. Thus, not only were parents exonerated of 
personal responsibility, but they were empowered with a new, higher status in the hierarchy of 
credibility: while it was not uncommon for clinicians at the time to cast serious doubt on 
parental reports of the child’s behavior, including with Form E-2, Rimland defended parents. 
Not only was the record of reliability and validity of clinical diagnosis extremely poor, he 
argued, but parents know their child best, especially the parents of the sick who must pay 
greater attention to their children, which in all likelihood increases the accuracy of their 
observations (Rimland 1971). 
Rimland went to great lengths to nurture the bond he had created with parents. For 
each completed checklist Rimland received, parents would receive a score as well an 
explanation of what the answers indicated about the child. He was known to speak at length 
with parents over the telephone, as much as two or three hours at time with just a single 
parent. At the same time that the status of parents was elevated, clinicians were circumvented 
altogether and rendered somewhat useless: parents no longer needed them for a diagnosis, nor 
for recommendations for treatment, both of which could be obtained from Rimland, and free of 
blame. This allowed Rimland to secure for himself a prominent position within the network of 
autism expertise while excluding from it the parent-blaming clinicians. There was no role for the 
clinician in Rimland’s exchange with parents. 
Despite the mutual benefits of these exchanges with parents, Rimland remained 





“the unique symptom pattern which Kanner described ‘shuts off’ at about age 5½, and each 
child thereafter follows a path which is very much his own” (Rimland 1968, 156). Indeed, when 
parents mailed their completed E-1 forms to Rimland, he found that an overwhelmingly high 
number of them had noted in the margins that the child had indeed exhibited the behavior in 
question, but only before the age of 5½ years. The major difference between Forms E-1 and E-2 
was that the former instructed parents to answer the questions with respect to the child’s 
behavior between ages three and seven, whereas this was modified in the latter to ages three 
through five. With such a broad age window, neither the syndrome (at least as understood by 
Rimland), nor the instrument designed to identify it, were coherent objects, and the upper age 
limit was adjusted accordingly.  
The use of Form E-2 by researchers other than Rimland appears to have dwindled 
significantly after 1980. There could be several reasons for this. For one, autism was beginning 
to be understood as less distinct from other, similar conditions: not discrete disease entities, 
but a continuum of impairments (Wing and Gould 1979). Yet Rimland insisted that the sharing 
of symptoms did not disprove the existence of a syndrome, and certainly did not prove a 
spectrum of disorders. He referred to this style of thinking as the “continuum fallacy,” and 
insisted that the problem of the existence of separate syndromes was not a rhetorical question 
that needed to be thought out, but a mathematical and quantitative one. Form E-2 was 
designed to do exactly that: differentiate amongst different disorders through the use of 
different scoring algorithms.69 Ironically, the structure of Form E-2 – and, arguably, most scales 
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directed at differential diagnosis – offers more evidence for the existence of a spectrum than 
against it. For one, it suggested that all of the conditions drew from the same pool of 
symptoms: while he never did develop scoring rules for other conditions, the fact that one scale 
collected enough information on all of these symptoms meant that to begin with, they had 
several symptoms in common. Besides, it does not seem likely that any of these symptoms 
were necessary for a diagnosis of autism.70 Furthermore, by basing diagnostic categories on the 
total score alone (as opposed to, for example, requiring particular configurations of symptoms), 
Form E-2 permitted different combinations of symptoms in different children with the same 
diagnosis, although Rimland might not have been aware of this, since he never met most of the 
children from whom he collected data. 
Form E-2 likely fell in to disuse also because scales such as the Autism Behavior Checklist 
and Childhood Autism Rating Scale began to populate the landscape, with both scales 
demonstrating greater discriminative ability than Form E-2. Furthermore, without publishing 
the score rule, Form E-2 could not easily become a widely used diagnostic tool, but was limited 
to its intended use in building a detailed database on autism symptoms and behavior. To the 
present day, Form E-2 can be found on the Autism Research Institute’s website, and parents are 
still encouraged to download the form and mail it in upon completion.71  
THE AUTISM BEHAVIOR CHECKLIST 
The Autism Behavior Checklist (ABC; Krug, Arick et al. 1980) is one of five instruments of 
the Autism Screening Instrument for Educational Planning (ASIEP), with the other four scales 
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addressing vocal behavior, interaction skills, educational skills, and the child’s learning 
acquisition rate. The ASIEP was designed to evaluate children with developmental disabilities in 
terms of their specific deficits and assist professionals in developing appropriate instructional 
programs. The ABC assesses autistic behavior in particular, but can also be used in differential 
diagnosis, in particular to identify differentiate with autism from those with other disabilities. 
For the purposes of diagnosis the ABC is typically used independently of the other scales of the 
ASIEP, and was in fact introduced in a separate article in the same year the complete inventory 
was published, justifying its consideration in isolation here. 
Like Form E-2, the ABC coincides closely with Kanner’s core symptomology. In fact, the 
scale’s 57 behavioral descriptors72 were selected from both Kanner’s original criteria and 
Rimland’s Form E-2, as well as from other definitions and scales dating mostly from the 1960s. 
In total, the original ABC was comprised of criteria from seven different sources, a reflection of 
just how muddled and controversial the field of autism diagnosis was at the time. In fact, one of 
the sources – Creak’s Nine Points (Creak 1964) – was even an inventory of diagnostic criteria for 
childhood schizophrenia, and not autism, although by this point many psychiatrists were calling 
for the dissolution of the former, as it had well-outlived its usefulness as a diagnostic 
category.73 Still, the claim was that the ABC could detect what is referred to today as “classic 
autism” (Kraijer 1997). 
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73 See, for example, Rutter, M. (1972). "Childhood Schizophrenia Reconsidered." Journal of Autism and Childhood 





The ABC has several practical advantages over Form E-2, the most obvious being the 
ease of administration and scoring which render the scale amenable to widespread application 
and discussion. It also has a slightly more sophisticated psychometric structure than Form E-2. 
For one, each item has a weight ranging from one to four, with the higher weights indicating 
that the behavior item is more indicative of autism, as compared to the less common 
behavioral descriptors with lower weights. These ‘weights’ are actually the number of points 
that a child receives if he or she is accurately described by the behavior in question. If the child 
does not exhibit the particular behavior, a score of zero is given for that item. The total score is 
a sum of these weights, and can range from zero to 158. A score above 67 is considered autistic, 
below 54 non-autistic, and scores between 54 and 67 are said to be “difficult to interpret”.  
Furthermore, unlike the uncategorized items of Form E-2,74 the items of the ABC are 
grouped into five areas: Sensory, Relating, Body and Object Use, Language, and Social Self-Help. 
Both the Sensory and Language subscales are straightforward, the former consisting of items 
describing odd or unusual sensory responses to stimuli (e.g., “covers ears at many sounds”), the 
latter basic comprehension and expression, as well as linguistic peculiarities (e.g., “speech is 
atonal and arrhythmic”). Social Self-Help seems to be more of a “garbage can” category, 
encompassing items that are not easily comprehensible within any of the other subscales and 
addressing developmental delay, savant abilities, self-care abilities, as well as aggressive and 
infantile behaviors. The Relating items assess the child’s capacity for social interaction, and the 
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Body and Object Use items are mostly descriptors of stimming75 behavior, as well as several 
rigid and stereotyped behaviors. Of these subscales, the most points are available in the 
Relating and Body and Object Use categories, together amounting to almost half of the 
maximum number of points possible. This is due primarily to the disproportionate amount of 
high-weighted items in those two subscales: 11 out of the total 16 items with a weight of four 
belong to one of these two subscales. In comparison, the Language subscale accounts 
appropriately for about one-fifth of the total possible points, whereas the Sensory behaviors 
and Social Self-Help together account for about one-third of the total (about one-sixth each). 
Thus, many of the stereotypical behaviors that are today referred to as “classic autism” receive 
the heaviest weights on the ABC: whirling oneself, odd speech intonation, rocking oneself, 
hand-flapping, savant skills76, covering ears at sounds, echolalia, ritualistic behaviors like lining 
up toys, toe-walking, staring into space for prolonged periods of time, and the like. 
Interestingly, there are only two descriptors on ABC with a weight of four that the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule – the current “gold standard” in terms of diagnostic 
instruments – considers relevant today: eye contact and the failure to develop friendships, 
constituting further evidence that the ADOS, unlike its predecessors, defines autism as a broad 
spectrum. 
The weighting scheme of the ABC is a distinct departure from Rimland’s Form E-2, in 
which items were scored in an all-or-nothing manner. In a sense, the ABC’s weighting scheme 
                                                             
75 From “stim”, a more recent “term for behaviors whose sole purpose appears to be to stimulate one’s own 
senses” (http://www.autism-resources.com/autismfaq-glos.html, last accessed 9 April, 2009). Examples include 
rocking one’s body, hand-flapping, toe-walking, spinning, and echolalia. Also referred to as stereotypy.  
 
76 Item 19, “Has special abilities in one area – seems to rule out mental retardation” is the only item that explicitly 





primes for the notion of an autistic spectrum, in that it designates some behaviors as ‘core’ 
symptoms (with a weight of 3 or 4), and others as ‘peripheral’ (worth only 1 or 2 points). Of 
course, the most important difference between Rimland’s Form E-2 and Krug et al.’s ABC was 
what each had devised their scales to do. For one, Rimland was arguing against the idea of a 
spectrum. To the contrary, he strove to identify distinct syndromes, so the items on his scale 
need only determine whether a behavior is present or absent. On the other hand, Krug and his 
colleagues, while theoretically not in favor in one way or another (and quite possibly, not even 
cognizant of the debate) with respect to a spectrum of behaviors, were more interested in how 
to place these children in the correct educational program. Thus, not only the character but the 
severity of their problem behaviors would have been of concern. In the classroom, it is more 
important that children be grouped according to the similarity of their symptoms, rather than 
the actual diagnosis. To this same effect, Lorna Wing argued that diagnostic criteria should 
reflect pragmatic and educational considerations: “It soon becomes clear in the field of 
communication problems how pointless it is to draw sharp lines between autistic and ‘not really 
autistic’ in educational practice, even if this distinction is of great theoretical interest. The 
question to ask about each child is – what are his handicaps, what are his skills and what can we 
do to help him?” (Wing 1971: 118). 
Psychometric assessments of the ABC have focused mostly on the discriminant validity 
of the scale and the accuracy of the cutoff scores. The results of these studies have varied 
widely, and offer some insight into changing perceptions of autism in the 1980s. Teal and 
Wiebe (1986) found the ABC, when combined with two other scales of the ASIEP (IA and EA), to 





retarded. Volkmar et al. (1988) found that only 57% of the children with autism in their study 
were classified as probably autistic and 23% were classified as questionably autistic. The test 
was only 62% accurate in discriminating the non-autistic children. Wadden et al. (1991) 
reported that only 49% of their children with autism had scores that indicated a high probability 
of autism, 27% fell within the questionable range, and 24% fell in the unlikely range. The non-
autistic group, however, was correctly classified with 100% accuracy. Sevin et al. (1991) found 
that 50% of their subjects who fulfilled the DSM-III-R criteria were misclassified as non-autistic 
by the ABC.  
The last point is particularly telling: with the advent of the DSM-III-R criteria in 1987, 
which reflected a broader definition of autism, the ABC began to underestimate the prevalence 
of autism. This is evident in the studies by Sevin et al., Volkmar et al., and Wadden et al., which 
all suggest that the cutoff score recommended by Krug and his colleagues is too high and thus 
may not identify a large proportion of individuals with autism. In comparison to the 
recommended cutoff of 68, Nordin et al. (1996) found that children with autism could be 
reliably identified when the cutoff score used was lowered to 45. When Wadden et al. adjusted 
the cutoff score to 44, they found that the ABC correctly classified 87% of the children with 
autism and 96% of the non-autistic group. These authors did admit that the definition of autism 
they were using – new criteria recommended by Denckla (1986) – yielded much higher 
prevalence rates than those reported previously. But the broader implication is that the scope 
of the autism label was widening dramatically, and Krug and his colleagues set the cutoff score 





Evidently, the authors of the ABC were backward-looking in terms of how the behavior 
items of the checklist were selected. Of all the sources from which they derived the items, the 
most recent criteria was Lotter’s checklist of 1974, by this point already six years old in a 
rapidly-changing field. Even more strikingly, all of the other sources date from the 1960s, so it 
could have hardly been expected to produce classes of children coherent with the then-current 
clinical understanding of autism. But the harking to the past should by no means be taken as an 
attempt to restrict the diagnosis of autism to children exhibiting Kanner’s syndrome. The ABC 
was not even meant to diagnose autism at all, but to provide “a tool which is accurate, easily 
used, and can facilitate placement of these children into programs with specialized curriculums 
and reduced student-teacher ratios,” such that “local educational administrators … [could] 
provide appropriate services” (Krug, Arick et al. 1980, 221). It was intended as an initial 
screening device that was short and parent and teacher friendly. The checklist developers were 
not psychiatrists or clinicians, or even autism researchers, but an ambitious young professor of 
Special Education and two of his master’s students. In other words, the ABC was not a call – in 
tune with Rimland – to keep autism rare; rather, it was evidence that a new set of actors had 
arrived on the scene – teachers, schools, and the special education system – that would 
subsequently offer new information about autism, as a new site of looping. In a sense, it 
suggested that Rimland’s efforts might have been in vain: autism, while not yet a spectrum, was 
getting bigger. So big, in fact, that it had enough visibility in schools so as to demand special 
attention there. The prescience of the co-authors can be seen in their reflections on the 





on the checklist, when differentiating between autism and mental retardation, are measuring 
the severity of involvement of the same pathology” (Krug, Arick et al. 1980).  
David Krug had received his doctorate in Special Education at the University of 
Washington in 1972, and his first appointment at Portland State University in the Department 
of Special Education included an assignment as Director of the Practicum Clinic. The clinic 
offered students at the master’s level practical experience working with elementary school 
students with learning disabilities, which was the “hot area of the day” (Krug 2009). Autism, on 
the other hand, was not only considered rare, but also unteachable and even untestable by 
special education experts. Not surprisingly, then, when one parent – who had been turned 
down even by the public schools – sought placement for her autistic son at the clinic, Krug told 
her that they “didn’t work with that disorder.” But the mother insisted, and challenged Krug 
and his clinic to help her child. Intrigued by the challenge, and what in retrospect appears as a 
critical switching point, Krug wrote a proposal for establishing an experimental classroom for 
children with autism. The proposal was funded, and with the assistance of graduate students 
Joel Arick and Patricia Almond, the program was set up after conducting research and 
observations across the country. Within three years, it was taken over by the Portland Public 
School system (Krug 2009). It soon became evident to Krug and his colleagues that the testing 
and screening instruments available at the time were “not teacher friendly and did not lead the 
teacher towards developing effective IEPs [individualized education programs]”. Consequently, 





Since no publisher was willing to take on the ASIEP in 1980, the authors established 
their own company. But just three years later, the ASIEP Ed Company had enjoyed enough 
success to be bought out by another, larger business. What had changed so drastically, that the 
visibility of autism had increased in schools? At the time that the ABC was published, the 
institutionalization of mental retardation was undergoing a massive reversal, meaning that 
more and more children who would have previously been institutionalized were now living at 
home with their parents (Eyal, Hart et al. 2010). Also at this time, NSAC was fiercely advocating 
to have autism included within the definition of “developmental disabilities” (Akerley 1979). 
This put increasing pressure on schools and especially special education. Particular emphasis 
was placed on the early detection of developmental disabilities, and efforts to mainstream 
special needs children educationally emphasized appropriate placement in schools. As more 
and more children with special needs were landing in schools, so increased the need to better 
classify them and devise education plans accordingly. The ASIEP and the ABC, then, were in the 
right place at the right time. As the popularity of the ASIEP increased, by extension so to would 
the visibility of autism, and so the ABC contributes to the looping process: a child enters the 
school system, the teacher administers the ABC and suspects autism, the parent brings the 
child and the diagnosis to the doctor’s office, and so on. As others have noted, the autism label 
was also becoming less stigmatized and applied across a wider variety of social classes at the 
same time that prevalence rates were increasing (Holzman 1982). In fact, estimates of the 
prevalence of autism doubled from the 1970s to the 1980s, from 5 in 10,000 to 10 in 10,000.  
Obviously, I do not wish to claim that the increase in prevalence during this time was in 





within which the ABC was intertwined. The system in place for the surveillance of childhood 
was undergoing an immense overhaul, pushing a large mass of previously undifferentiated 
children with special needs into a school system that was hardly prepared to handle them. The 
implication is that the education system now had a large stake in the diagnosis of autism, and 
the ABC is itself evidence of this, as can be seen in the types of professionals it engaged. For 
one, the ABC was intended for use by teachers and psychologists as well as the more traditional 
psychiatrist. But perhaps more striking is the fact that it was calibrated on the judgments of 
professionals in the field of special education: the initial data on the ABC, which was used to 
determine the cutoff score, came from members of the American Association for the Education 
of the Severely/Profoundly Handicapped and teachers of the so-called ‘trainable mentally 
retarded.’ Psychiatrists and clinicians played no role in the standardization of the scale. It was a 
new node in the network of expertise on autism. 
There is evidence that the ABC might also have fallen out of favor for its inability to 
distinguish between autism and other disabilities (including mental retardation) in some 
groups, and for not allowing for the identification of finer gradations of impairment. For 
instance, using the DSM-IV criteria to identify a group of autistic children, Rellini et al. (2004) 
found that the ABC correctly identified only 54% of them as autistic. Of the 25 autistic children 
that were false negatives, the ABC labeled 19 of them as mentally retarded. The authors 
recommend that the ABC not be used for formulating diagnoses – clearly it was not aligned 
with the prototype indicated by the DSM-IV – although it could be useful for screening 
purposes. But the nail in the coffin for the ABC seems to have been its underperformance in 





early 1990s that compared the CARS to the ABC, all of them concluding that the CARS was a 
better predictive tool. Compared to the ABC’s misclassification of 50% of their subject, Sevin et 
al. (1991) found the CARS to be accurate 92% of the time. Rellini et al. (2004) found an accuracy 
rate of 100% for the CARS. Nordin et al. (1996) too found the CARS to outperform the ABC. In 
fact, the Teal and Wiebe (1986) study that found the ABC to accurately discriminate 100% of 
the children with autism also found that it was outperformed by the CARS. 
One explanation is that by the 1990s, the ABC had lost face validity with what most 
clinicians and researchers believed to be true about autism. In their own psychometric 
assessment of the ABC, Miranda-Linne et al. (2002) explains the divergence of their results from 
those of Krug and his colleagues by the fact that the latter group’s standardization sample 
contained a narrower range of autism spectrum disorders. Ultimately, the ABC could not keep 
up with the very changes that it helped create. Because it was calibrated on a population that 
had been created by earlier tools, the ABC could not accommodate the concept of an autism 
spectrum. The American Academy of Pediatrics advises that because of its low sensitivity the 
ABC is not useful for diagnosis, but that it is still useful for research on intervention strategies 
(Baron 2004). To be fair, this is in fact how the ABC was intended to be used. On the other 
hand, the CARS is intended for the purposes of diagnosis, equally easy to administer, based on 
more recent diagnostic criteria, and able to distinguish between different degrees of severity of 
autism. But the subscale structure of the ABC did reflect that people were now starting to think 
about autism in terms of categories of deficits, as evidenced by the four distinct subscale scores 





prototype would appear in the American Psychiatric Association’s 1987 version of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R). 
THE CHILDHOOD AUTISM RATING SCALE 
The Childhood Autism Rating Scale (Schopler, Reichler et al. 1980) developed out of the 
Treatment and Education of Autistic and related Communication-handicapped Children 
(TEACCH) program, which provides services and therapies for children with autism and their 
families. TEACCH was founded in 1966 by child psychologist Eric Schopler at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and was unique in its explicit recruitment of parents as co-
therapists in the treatment of children with autism and other developmental disorders 
(Schopler and Reichler 1971). In the beginning, Rimland’s Form E-2 was completed for all 
children evaluated at TEACCH, but the authors “had the clinical impression that very few of our 
children were autistic according to Kanner’s criteria,” and developed the CARS “in response to 
the limitations of existing classification systems.” The resulting scale was originally referred to 
as the Childhood Psychosis Rating Scale (CPRS), avoiding the word “autism” to minimize 
confusion with Kanner’s syndrome since the CPRS reflected a broader conceptualization of 
disorder. The decision to change the name to CARS came “in light of increasing evidence that 
the definition of autism has expanded and is no longer restricted to Kanner’s use of the term” 
(Schopler, Reichler et al. 1980: 91-2). 
The CARS consists of fifteen scales each scored along a 7-point continuum: a score of 1 
denotes normal behavior; 2, mildly abnormal; 3, moderately abnormal; and 4, severely 
abnormal. There are also three half-point scoring options to be used when the child fits neither 





various structured activities (such as behavior in the classroom) and situations related to each 
scale. Summing the 15 individual ratings yields the total score, which may range from 15, when 
the child’s behavior is rated as normal on all scales, to a high of 60, when the child’s behavior is 
rated as severely abnormal on all scales. Children with scores below 30 are categorized as non-
autistic, those with scores from 30-36 as mildly to moderately autistic, and those with scores 
exceeding 36, and with a rating of three or higher on at least five of the fifteen scales, as 
severely autistic. 
The structure of the CARS is markedly different from that of the ABC. First, the CARS 
employs scales instead of items, which are scored to reflect a certain degree of impairment, 
whereas deviant behaviors are either present or absent on the ABC. Even more significant is the 
shift from items of autistic behavior as the objects of focus to categories of behavior. On the 
ABC, each item was a description of a behavior (e.g., “Strong reactions to minor changes in 
routine/environment”) whereas on the CARS, each scale is a category of behavior (e.g., 
“Impairment in Human Relationships”).77 Although the ABC score could be broken down into 
different subscales, most researchers and clinicians tended to use the checklist as a whole, 
focusing only on grand total score and whether or not it exceeded the single cutoff score 
(Miranda-Linne and Melin 2002). Consequently, the categorization of symptoms and behaviors 
fell below the radar of those using the scale. Both of these innovations in the CARS reflected 
changes in the way which autism was understood. Unlike the instruments before it, the CARS 
                                                             
77 The other 14 scales of the CARS are: Imitation; Inappropriate Affect; Bizarre Use of body Movement and 
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Peculiarities of Visual Responsiveness; Peculiarities of Auditory Responsiveness; Near Receptor Responsiveness; 
Anxiety Reaction; Verbal Communication; Nonverbal Communication; Activity Level; Intellectual Functioning; and 






forced practitioners to think of autism as affecting certain categories of behaviors, as opposed 
to the appearance of a small subset of symptoms. Different degrees of impairment in different 
aspects of behavior meant that the question of whether it is autism was now one of what kind 
of autism. While still a relatively crude categorization, the CARS’ breakdown of autism into two 
levels of severity was revolutionary for its time. 
In addition, the shift from specific symptoms to broader categories creates a space for a 
wider variety of symptoms. For instance, the category of “Bizarre Use of Body Movement and 
Persistence of Stereotypes” (CARS) can encompass many ABC behaviors – whirling oneself, toe-
walking, rocking oneself – but also any other unusual or inappropriate bodily movements. At 
the same time, the CARS changed the relationship between the different dimensions of autism 
to one another; many of the ABC behaviors that would be classified as “Body and Object Use” 
on the ABC carried the maximum weight of 4. But on the CARS, exhibiting all of these behaviors 
would only add a maximum of four points to the child’s CARS score, as opposed to a possible 
25% of the ABC total. Thus, while making space for more types of body movements to be 
counted as a symptom of autism, the CARS also severely restricted the importance of this 
category for a diagnosis of autism, and put it at par with fourteen other categories. Similarly, 
categories that were given less weight on the ABC have been upgraded on the CARS. One 
example is the scale for “Imitation”, of which there is only one corresponding item (with a 
weight of 3) on the ABC. 
Schopler and his colleagues made no effort to hide the fact that the CARS included more 





with autism. To the contrary, they celebrated it. When they tested the CARS on 537 children 
who had visited the TEACCH clinic, they found about half of the children to be autistic (27% 
severe and 23% mild to moderate). When 450 of these same children were also administered 
Rimland’s Form E-2, only 8 (1.8%) were found to be autistic, and the CARS even labeled 3 of 
these 8 as non-autistic. Not only was autism more broadly defined on the CARS, but it also 
produced a different type of autistic person than Form E-2. 
What kind of a different person? Certainly one that distorted the traditional boundaries 
between mental retardation and autism, a boundary which Rimland had taken great pains to 
enforce. Schopler and his colleagues found a positive relationship between the degree of 
autism and the degree of intellectual functioning. It is possible, they explain, that the Kanner 
syndrome children are considered to be of higher intelligence not on the basis of standardized 
intelligence tests, but because they possess savant skills in one area. Or it could be that the 
Kanner-type autistic child is recognized as mildly or moderately autistic on the CARS. Either 
way, what is certain is that the CARS somewhat blurred the distinction between autism and 
mental retardation. It accomplished this in part by raising the status of certain categories – 
Verbal Communication, Resistance to Environmental Change, Inappropriate Affect – that 
overlapped significantly with behaviors associated with mental retardation. 
How did this blurring take place, if so many prominent autism researchers had labored 
to maintain the division between autism and mental retardation? The key is the TEACCH 
program itself. The real innovation of the CARS was that it brought the therapies and therapists 





involved in the academic debate over the definition of autism, they were also heavily immersed 
in the therapies. Yet they were not dealing exclusively with autistic children, but those with 
other developmental disabilities as well. We saw above that only about 50% of the children 
visiting the clinic were even considered autistic, even given the CARS’ apparent generosity with 
the label. Thus, any child exhibiting symptoms that could be worked on by the therapies offered 
at TEACCH – and the clinic employed various types of professionals – was seen there. This 
meant that Schopler and his colleagues were continually presented with children with many 
different diagnoses but much overlap in symptomology, and who were constantly changing in 
response to the therapies. They therefore had to contend with a new type of autistic patient, 
one that might exhibit a different pattern of behaviors after several months of therapy, thus 
leading to new ideas about what were the “core” symptoms of autism, and which were 
peripheral and treatable. Thus, it is no surprise that the old definitions were inadequate for the 
CARS.  
Schopler and colleagues’ updated understanding of autism and its connection to the 
TEACCH program is perhaps nowhere more obvious than in their explanation of the change in 
name of the Journal of Childhood Schizophrenia to the Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders (Schopler, Rutter et al. 1979). Here they argued that autism was not a “unitary 
disease entity” but was indeed linked to other developmental disabilities. Since there were 
some symptoms occurring in some autistic children but not in others, successful treatment 
depends on factors which are unique to each child. It was not the similarity of symptoms that 





understanding of autism as overlapping with other developmental disabilities would prove 
beneficial to research as well as treatment. 
THE AUTISM DIAGNOSTIC OBSERVATION SCHEDULE 
 There are at least three reasons which justify a more in-depth examination of the ADOS 
as compared to the scales discussed earlier. First, in both the literature and at the AMC, the 
ADOS is constantly referred as the ‘gold standard’ of current diagnostic tests. This was also 
emphasized at the workshop, where the instructor informed participants that in terms of 
autism research, it would be difficult to publish any results that were not based on the ADOS. 
Second, the ADOS is unique in its mode of administration, which follows a very specific script 
and must be executed by an autism specialist. Thus, unlike the development of the CARS in 
which newer editions became less reliant on administrator expertise, the ADOS requires 
professional training and the accumulation of numerous ‘administration hours’ before one is 
certified to perform the test reliably. Finally, the ADOS is important because its terminology has 
become the common language through which autism is explained, acted upon and understood. 
It structures the set of goals established for the child as well as the treatment plan with which 
to reach them. As autism researcher and blogger Michelle Dawson has noted in response to the 
proposed DSM-IV criteria, “in many ways DSM-V autism is autism altered to conform to the 
current ‘gold-standard’ autism diagnostic instruments (see the role of Catherine Lord in both), 
whose predominance, weaknesses and limitations have come to determine what autism is and 
isn't.”78   
                                                             






 I focus solely on the ADOS for the remainder of this chapter. First, after a brief 
discussion of the scale’s history, I demonstrate how the ADOS narrates autism as a 
performance. Second, I examine how through a complex process of administration, coding and 
scoring, the ADOS adds an air of scientific legitimacy to the diagnosis of autism. Yet there is 
ample space within the structure of the scale for subjective opinion to affect the results of the 
ADOS. As a result, through the use of the scale these beliefs are granted the authority of 
science. Next I discuss how this faith in the ADOS persists despite the fact that when clinicians 
are initially trained to use the scale, they express much discontent over the coding scheme. I 
conclude the chapter with a discussion of the various functions that the ADOS serves for both 
parents and clinicians. 
HISTORY OF THE ADOS 
 The ADOS was created by clinical psychologists Catherine Lord, Pamela DiLavore and 
Susan Risi, and psychiatrist Michael Rutter. The current form of the ADOS is a combination of 
two earlier instruments: the 1989 version of the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (Lord, 
Rutter et al. 1989) and the Pre-Linguistic Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale (PL-ADOS; 
DiLavore, Lord et al. 1995). The development of the original ADOS was intended to solve a 
specific problem in the clinic: while clinicians often wanted to incorporate their own 
observations of the child’s behavior into the diagnosis, there existed no way in which to 
standardize these observations, neither with respect to the context in which they occurred nor 
the behavior of the clinician herself. Thus, the ultimate purpose of the ADOS was to provide a 
standardized context in which to observe the social and communicative behavior of persons 





identifying high-functioning autism, which had become more visible in the 1980s when self-
advocates like Temple Grandin arrived on the scene. In contrast, the ADOS aimed to 
differentiate those behaviors that were specific to autism from those that could be exacerbated 
from MR.  
 The creators of the 1989 ADOS claimed that the new scale was innovative in two ways. 
First, it is an interactive schedule in which both the context and examiner behavior are 
standardized. It incorporates a series of what the creators refer to as “social presses,” along 
with toys and other props to serve as contextual presses, that are designed to elicit specific 
social and communicative behaviors. As written on one of the PowerPoint slides at the ADOS 
workshop, the schedule “creates a ‘social world’ in which behaviors related to the autism 
spectrum can be observed.” Second, the scale allows for ratings of the quality of social 
behaviors, not only their presence or absence. Thus, the examiner has to have significant 
experience with autism in order to qualify to administer the test.79 This marks the return of 
clinical expertise which, after having been marginalized by Rimland and remaining unnecessary 
with the ABC or the CARS, is reasserted on a new, higher level: unlike the CARS or the ABC, 
parents or other non-specialists are not permitted to administer the ADOS. Consequently, the 
scale cannot be used as a screening instrument but is specifically intended as a diagnostic aid. 
 The original ADOS was intended for use with both children and adolescents at least five 
years old and with language skills that were at a minimum equivalent to the level of a three-
year-old. The PL-ADOS, on the other hand, was intended for use with children who had limited 
                                                             






or no language skills. Its development reflected a growing need and interest to diagnose autism 
in children younger than three years of age. According to its creators, instruments like the CARS 
overdiagnosed autism in two-year-olds and children without phrase speech. Like the ADOS of 
1989, the purpose of the PL-ADOS was to provide a set of standardized observations that could 
assist in a formal diagnosis of autism based on the DSM-IV/ICD-10 diagnostic criteria. However, 
the context for the presses was modified so as to accommodate younger children. For instance, 
it used shorter activities with fewer of them requiring the child to sit at a table for significant 
periods of time. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ADOS 
 While the PL-ADOS effectively discriminated the autistic from the non-autistic, it tended 
to be under-inclusive for children who were thought to have autism but possessed some 
expressive language. In other words, there was a discontinuity between the PL-ADOS and the 
original. Furthermore, neither of the schedules consisted of activities appropriate for the 
assessment of autism in older adolescents and adults. Modifications were therefore needed to 
address these issues. The current ADOS provides a means to standardized observations of 
persons suspected of having autism who range in age from toddlers to adults. It consists of four 
different modules from which the examiner may select, based on the expressive language 
abilities80 and chronological age of the child or adult: pre-verbal/single words (Module 1); 
phrase speech (Module 2); fluent speech in child or adolescent (Module 3); and fluent speech in 
adolescent or adult (Module 4). Each module can be administered in 30 to 45 minutes. While 
the protocols for each module differ, all consist of three parts: observation, which describes the 
                                                             





different activities and behaviors that are to be performed and observed; coding, which 
explicitly lists and describes the behaviors that are to be graded, with each behavior typically 
accompanied by three or four different coding options; and finally the algorithm, which 
instructs the examiner on how to aggregate the codes in order to arrive at a diagnostic 
classification. The examiner takes notes during the administration of the ADOS (there is space 
specifically allotted for this purpose in the booklets), and the ratings are completed 
immediately after administration. Neither child nor parent is present during the coding process. 
The ratings are then plugged into the algorithm and a diagnostic classification is derived. Each 
module has two cut-off scores: a lower score for the autism spectrum cut-off, and a higher 
score that corresponds to a “traditional, narrower conceptualization of autism” (Lord, Rutter et 
al. 2002: 110). At the AMC, these were in practice referred to the PDD and autism cut-offs, 
respectively. 
THE ADOS AND THE PERFORMANCE OF AUTISM 
Out of a total of eleven ADOS observations at the AMC, Module 1 was used on all but 
one occasion. This was not surprising, since the majority of children given the ADOS were three 
years old or younger. For this reason, and in order to portray a more vivid picture of the ADOS, I 
will describe the administration of this particular module in greater detail. Module 1 of the 
ADOS is based on the PL-ADOS. The observation phase consists of ten activities, with 29 ratings 
in the coding section (see Figure 4-1). It is intended for children who are pre-verbal or do not 
yet consistently use phrase speech.  
The administration of the ADOS is best understood as a staged performance (Goffman 1990). In 





child – the performer – responds in the way in which the audience – or examiner – intends, 
such that the behaviors most salient for an autism diagnosis are elicited. According to the 
manual, since the ADOS focuses on social and communicative behavior, the activities are 
intended to create a standard social setting in which interactions naturally occur, and the 
creators claim to wanting an “imposed structure as invisible to the subject as possible” (Lord, 
Rutter et al. 2002: 2). The goal of the activities is to “present tasks that are sufficiently intriguing 
so that the child … being assessed will want to participate in social interchanges” (Lord, Rutter 
et al. 2002: 2). To this effect, Module 1 includes several materials and activities that are 
presumed to be of interest for young children, such as an electric bunny than can be animated, 
a balloon, bubbles, and the simulation of a birthday party. Before the child enters the room, the 
examiner assembles the stage of the testing environment with all the requisite props. The 
layout is always the same: the birthday party materials are set on a table and covered with a 
blanket so as not to attract the attention of the child before the intended presentation of the 
activity; a variety of toys are laid out on the floor in such a location that they can immediately 
be seen by the child as he enters the room; the electric bunny is also on the floor, but covered 
with a blanket. A toy truck is placed atop a bookcase so that it is visible to yet unreachable for 
the child. 
Once the child enters the testing room, he is directed towards the cluster of toys on the 
floor. Testing begins with an activity referred to as ‘Free Play:’ the child is given time to adjust 
to the environment, but the examiner also assesses his use of the toys, interaction with the 






FIGURE 4-1: OBSERVATION ACTIVITIES OF MODULE 1 
Activity Focus of Observation 
1. Free Play Whether  and how child spontaneously seeks interaction 
with caregiver; child’s symbolic or functional exploration 
of materials; attention to a particular activity and 
repetitive behaviors. 
2. Response to Name Consistency of response to a hierarchy of auditory stimuli. 
3. Response to Joint Attention Child follows shift of gaze alone or with pointing. 
4. Bubble Play Child’s affect, initiation of joint attention, shared 
enjoyment, requesting, and motor behavior while bubbles 
are present. 
5. Anticipation of a Routine with Objects Child’s affect, initiation of joint attention, shared 
enjoyment, requesting, and motor behavior. 
6. Responsive Social Smile Consistency of smile in response to examiner smiling; 
caregiver smiling; caregiver smiling and implying  physical 
contact; being touched. 
7. Anticipation of a Social Routine Child’s affect and attempts to initiate repetition of the 
routine. Extent to which child integrates gaze, facial 
expression, vocalization, and gesture in actions. 
8. Functional and Symbolic Imitation Child’s use of miniature objects and a placeholder in 
imitation of familiar actions with social awareness and 
shared enjoyment. 
9. Birthday Party Child’s interest and ability to joint in the “script” of a 
doll’s birthday party. 
10. Snack How the child indicates preference and requests food. 
Source: C. Lord, M. Rutter et al. (2002). ADOS Manual. Los Angeles, Western Psychological Services.  
Module 1 activities: all other activities are highly structured so as to provide the appropriate 
prompt or cue for the child when the performance of a specific behavior is desired. Consider as 
an example the examiner’s instructions for the ‘Response to Name’ activity: 
When he/she is involved with a toy or other activity of interest, make sure that 
you are positioned so that he/she has to turn in order to look at you. From a 





him/her to look toward you. If he/she does not respond, or lifts his/her head 
without orienting toward you, repeat the press for a total of four attempts. If the 
child still does not clearly respond, the parent/caregiver should be asked to call 
the child’s name in an attempt to get his/her attention without physical contact. 
If the child does not respond to two of these presses, ask the parent/caregiver, 
“Is there any way you can get him/her to look at you without touching him/her?” 
If the child still does not respond, encourage the parent/caregiver to use any 
method to get a response, including touching the child. (Lord, Rutter et al. 2002: 
10) 
Thus, not only are vocal cues highly structured, but the examiner must also position herself in a 
certain region of the stage when she offers the cues. At other times, the examiner’s body must 
be controlled in an even more specific way in order to function properly as a prompt for a 
certain behavior. For instance, in the Response to Joint Attention activity the examiner tries to 
direct the child’s attention to a toy without pointing or touching the child. Instead, she calls out 
“Look, [child’s name]!” while turning her head and eye gaze towards the toy. This gesture was 
always performed at a slower pace than one would naturally use, in an almost exaggerated 
manner. While it would have likely seemed odd if viewed out of context, in the testing room 
this cue appeared appropriate amongst all the other calculated motions.  
There is at least one ‘prop’ on this stage which the examiner cannot completely control: 
at the AMC, at least one parent was typically present during administration of the ADOS. To 
adequately manage this random element, parents are requested to refrain from prompting the 
child to participate in any of the activities unless specifically instructed to do so by the 
examiner. If a parent should prompt a child during the examination without the examiner’s 
request, he or she is quickly reprimanded. For instance, after Dr. Daly had placed the toy 
airplane in front of Luis, the following exchange occurred:  





Dr. Daly: No, Mom, don’t do that [talk to him]. I have to ask things in a specific 
way. 
Mom: Oh, I’m sorry, I’m sorry. 
The ADOS, then, is a tightly controlled and structured performance. Each of the ten activities 
has a specified purpose that is clearly delineated in the manual. The Birthday Party encourages 
symbolic and functional play; the Snack offers the child an opportunity to make requests; 
Bubble Play elicits eye contact, vocalization, and pointing to direct another’s attention.  
CODING THE PERFORMANCE 
There are twenty-nine items to be scored on Module 1, separated into five categories 
(see Figure 4-2). The coding scheme for the items of the ADOS, which is common to all four 
modules, is given in Figure 4-3. While all items allow for a score of zero to denote age-
appropriate, neurotypical behavior, the other options may vary from item to item. Most items 
range from zero to two (‘definitely abnormal’ behavior) or three (‘markedly abnormal’ 
behavior). Occasionally there is an option for a score of seven or eight. The latter applies when 
the behavior in question did not occur (and so there was no opportunity to observe 
abnormality) such that the rating is inapplicable. For example, this option appears in the coding 
scheme for the item measuring immediate echolalia – obviously, if the child is nonverbal, one 
cannot observe instances of the repetitive use of language. A code of seven is used when a 
behavior is abnormal along a dimension that is not encompassed by codes one through three. 
In Module 1, this option is only available for the Overactivity item; a code of seven is given 






FIGURE 4-2: MODULE 1 ITEMS 
Section A: Language and Communication 
1. Overall Level of Non-Echoed Language. 
2. Frequency of Vocalization Directed to Others. 
3. Intonation of Vocalizations or Verbalizations. 
4. Immediate Echolalia. 
5. Stereotyped/Idiosyncratic Use of Words or Phrases. 
6. Use of Other’s Body to Communicate. 
7. Pointing. 
8. Gestures. 
Section B: Reciprocal Social Interaction 
1. Unusual Eye Contact. 
2. Responsive Social Smile. 
3. Facial Expressions Directed to Others. 
4. Integration of Gaze and Other Behaviors During Social Overtures. 
5. Shared Enjoyment in Interaction. 




10. Spontaneous Initiation of Joint Attention. 
11. Response to Joint Attention. 
12. Quality of Social Overtures. 
Section C: Play 
1. Functional Play with Objects. 
2. Imagination/Creativity. 
Section D: Stereotyped Behaviors and Restricted Interests 
1. Unusual Sensory Interest in Play Material/Person. 
2. Hand and Finger and Other Complex Mannerisms. 
3. Self-Injurious Behavior. 
4. Unusually Repetitive Interests or Stereotyped Behaviors. 
Section E: Other Abnormal Behaviors 
1. Overactivity. 
2. Tantrums, Aggression, Negative or Disruptive Behavior. 
3. Anxiety. 





FIGURE 4-3: ADOS CODING SCHEME 
Code Behavior 
 
0 No evidence of abnormality. 
 
1 Mildly abnormal or slightly unusual, but not necessarily grossly abnormal. 
 
2 Definitely abnormal. 
 
3 Markedly abnormal such that it interferes with the interview, or so limited 
that judgments about quality are impossible. 
 
7 Abnormal of a type that is not encompassed by the other ratings. 
 
8 Did not occur and/or rating in inapplicable. 
 
Source: C. Lord, M. Rutter et al. (2002). ADOS Manual. Los Angeles, Western Psychological Services.  
The coding process begins once the testing period is complete and the child and 
caregiver(s) have left the room.81 While one actor leaves the stage, another one enters: the   
idealized child,82 the neurotypical aptly represented by the set of ratings with a score of zero 
denoting the absence of abnormality. This is the child who “uses eye contact effectively with 
words or vocalizations or gestures to communicate social intention,” “rarely or never uses 
stereotyped or idiosyncratic words or phrases,” and “shows definite and appropriate pleasure 
with the examiner during more than one activity” (ADOS, Module 1). He plays appropriately 
with toys and does not turn cars upside down for the sensory stimulation of spinning its wheels. 
He smiles to express pleasure and does not try to injure himself. We have seen this same child 
                                                             
81 At the AMC, Dr. Daly did not herself return the results of the ADOS to parents. Instead, she prepared a report for 
Dr. Johnson that stated the classificatory result of the ADOS as well as a description of the child’s behavior during 
the examination. Only the classification (autism or PDD) was shared with parents, not the final score. 
 
82
 During one of the coding sessions at the ADOS workshop, one participant asked why there was so much 
emphasis on the “typical” in the coding options. The instructor replied, “I don’t know, that’s just the way it’s 





before: he manifests in the multitude of parenting handbooks and guidelines for developmental 
milestones. He points in order to get his needs met by twelve months of age, uses at least ten 
words by eighteen months, and by twenty-four months he enjoys being around other children 
his age.  
  Like the instructions the examiner follows to performs the ADOS activities, the rating 
descriptions too are highly specific. Consider again the rating for the Response to Name item. A 
score of zero is given only if the child looks at the examiner and makes eye contact immediately  
after his name is called on either the first or second attempt. If the child instead looks at the 
parent/caregiver after the first or second call of his name, or he looks at the examiner after the 
third or fourth attempt, he receives a score of one. A score of two is slightly more complicated: 
Does not make eye contact with either the examiner or the parent/caregiver 
after his/her name is called in six attempts, but shifts gaze briefly (no eye 
contact), OR looks at least once when and interesting or familiar vocalization or 
verbalization is made (e.g., tongue clucking; “I’m gonna get you”).  
A score of three means the child didn’t look at anyone after any type of attempt. Dr. Daly would 
rate the child’s responses according to these and other rating criteria and, presumably for my 
benefit, verbalize her thought process as she negotiated among the possible alternatives. Thus, 
post-performance I was permitted backstage, where I was privy to all the previously 
undisclosed observations and assumptions that would serve as input to the diagnostic 
algorithm.  
SCORING THE ADOS 
 Although the particular items included in the scoring algorithms differ for each module, 





items from the Communication, Reciprocal Social Interaction, Play and Stereotyped Behaviors 
and Restricted Interests sections are subtotaled,83 after which the subtotals for the first two 
sections are combined to yield the final score. The scoring algorithm for Module 1 is shown in 
Figure 4-4. Thus, in the determination of the diagnostic classification, only a subset of twelve 
items from the Communication and Reciprocal Social Interaction sections are used. In other 
words, one dimension of the triad of impairments has no direct impact on the ADOS 
classification. The developers’ rationalize this significant omission by distinguishing between 
low- and high-threshold items. High-threshold are those which allow for a behavior to be 
observed repeatedly during test administration. Eye contact and facial expressions, for 
example, should occur with relatively high frequency throughout the duration of the 
observation period. In contrast, hand-flapping and other odd mannerisms are low-threshold 
behaviors which may not occur even once in the examiner’s presence. These items are 
therefore excluded from the algorithm, due to the floor effects that would occur if they were 
included. The few items that are included in the algorithm were selected on the basis of a 
factor analysis, through which they were found to be the best predictors of the correct 
diagnostic classification. Still, the developers argue that the other seventeen codes are 
nevertheless important because given their strong correspondence to the DSM-IV criteria, they 
help diagnosticians formulate their clinical judgments. In other words, these items complete 
the prototype.  
  
                                                             





FIGURE 4-4: MODULE 1 SCORING ALGORITHM* 
Communication 
 A-2 Frequency of Vocalization Directed to Others    _____ 
 A-5 Stereotyped/Idiosyncratic Use of Words or Phrases   _____ 
 A-6 Use of Other’s Body to Communicate     _____ 
 A-7 Pointing        _____ 
 A-8 Gestures        _____ 
       Communication Total _____ 
           (Autism cut-off = 4; autism spectrum cut-off = 2) 
 
 
Reciprocal Social Interaction 
B-1 Unusual Eye Contact       _____ 
B-3 Facial Expressions Directed to Others     _____ 
B-5 Shared Enjoyment in Interaction     _____ 
B-9 Showing        _____ 
B-10 Spontaneous Initiation of Joint Attention    _____ 
B-11 Response to Joint Attention      _____ 
B-12 Quality of Social Overtures      _____ 
       Social Interaction Total _____ 
            (Autism cut-off = 7; autism spectrum cut-off = 4) 
 
     Communication + Social Interaction Total _____ 




 C-1 Functional Play With Objects      _____ 
 C-2 Imagination/Creativity       _____ 
 
 
Stereotyped Behaviors and Restricted Interests 
 D-1 Unusual Sensory Interest in Play Material/Person   _____ 
 D-2 Hand and Finger and other Complex Mannerisms   _____ 
 D-4 Unusually repetitive Interests or Stereotyped Behaviors   _____ 
 
*In the scoring algorithm, score of 3 on the protocol are converted to 2, and all scores other than 0-3 are   
   treated as 0. Thus, each item on the algorithm is worth a maximum of 2 points. 
 





BLACK-BOXING THE ADOS: LEARNING HOW TO CODE AT AN ADOS WORKSHOP 
Thus far, the story of the ADOS reads like an open-and-shut case. It is a tool that 
functions like a well-oiled machine: the stage is set, the test is administered then coded and 
scored, all according to a very elaborate and specific set of instructions. With such detailed 
coding descriptions, there is little room for inter-rater differences across item scores. After only 
two or three observations of Dr. Daly administering the ADOS, I was impressed by how similarly 
she performed across the different instances, as if using the same script each time. Of course, I 
understood the inherent logic: if we wish to arrive at an objective result, we must administer 
the test in an identical fashion each time. Still, I was struck by how little she struggled when 
scoring the ADOS. How, for instance, did she know when to code a behavior as mildly as 
compared to moderately abnormal? What counted as a ‘gesture’ as opposed to a ‘behavior’? As 
a child development specialist, Dr. Daly has internalized the prototype of the ideal child to such 
an extent as to respond almost automatically when scoring the test. Of course, at the AMC I 
bore witness to ready-made science (Latour 1987), where disputes over what counts as a 
symptom of autism and what does not have already been resolved. But the ADOS workshop 
permitted access to science in-the-making. It was here where I witnessed the live 
administration of two of the ADOS modules, followed by a discussion of the coding for each 
module. In a room full of child development specialists there was a great deal of disagreement 
with respect to coding the modules. In fact, before the first live administration was coded, the 
instructor informed us that “most people usually get 50% of the codes correct the first time.” 
Thus, during the ADOS workshop, a large proportion of time was used to teach participants how 





boxed, where all of the conflict surrounding the instrument is isolated, silenced, and swept 
under the rug. 
 On the whole, coding instructions were not passively accepted by the workshop 
participants. To the contrary, there was much dispute over the codes and how they applied in a 
given administration. The determination of item scores could be problematic for several 
reasons. One type of disagreement arose when coders attempted to reconcile the overt 
behavior of the child with the sentiment it was assumed that the child was attempting to 
express. This difficulty seemed to be unavoidable, for while the ADOS is advertised as relying 
solely on overt behavior, several of the items require examiners to speculate on the intent 
which motivates the action. For instance, the first item of Module 2 – Overall Level of Non-
Echoed Language – includes the following option: “All speech is echoed (immediate or delayed), 
with or without communicative intent.” In this case, the examiner must infer whether the child 
wanted to communicate something or whether the verbalization instead represented 
meaningless repetition. These types of inferences proved challenging, even confusing, for 
workshop participants. For instance, during the discussion of the appropriate code for the 
Gestures item for Megan, the instructor informed the group that the correct code was a one, as 
Megan only performed one gesture on one occasion. This item initiated a discussion that was 
lengthier than most, as participants tried to understand the difference between a gesture and a 
behavior: 
Q: What is a gesture, other than pointing? 
I: Holding the hand out [to receive or request something], clapping, motioning 





but during the birthday activity it is. I gave her credit for blowing out the candles. 
What else did we see? 
C: She lay on the floor, turning her head away from the activity. 
I: That’s a behavior, not a gesture. 
Q: What about when she covered her eyes from the bubbles? 
I: That’s not a gesture. 
Q: What about waving bye-bye to the bunny? 
I: Yes, but did she do that? 
C: No. 
I: So what do we end up with? She blew out the candles. So that’s a one, because 
it’s only one gesture, done only one time.  
One factor of relevance is that to be included on this item, a gesture must be communicative.84 
This proved particularly problematic for participants: 
Q: What’s communicative about blowing out candles? 
I: We still just code it there. So that’s why you coming to the coding [workshop]. 
Q: Why isn’t jumping up for the balloon communicative? 
I: She just wanted to get it [the balloon]. The birthday was more social. 
There are at least two interesting aspects of this interaction. First, to continue the above 
discussion, at times the examiner must speculate on the child’s intention before a behavior can 
be coded. In this example, the instructor distinguishes between Megan’s jumping for the 
balloon in order to request that the activity be repeated and jumping to try to reach for the 
balloon for her own use. The former would indicate a gesture that communicated a social 
desire for the examiner to repeat the balloon activity, whereas the latter expressed more of an 
individual interest in the object itself. Second, not all coding disputes were reconciled during 
the workshop. In fact, in several cases the instructor closed the discussion by invoking because-
I-say-so type argumentation, as she did when responding to a participants question about the 
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 In yet another odd twist, sign language is coded not as communication but as a gesture. Apparently, this is 
because the creators of the ADOS did not themselves know sign language and therefore could not code it 





communicative nature of blowing out candles. The most heated dispute over coding occurred 
in the scoring of item A6 on Module 3 after five-year-old Jake’s live administration: 
I: There was one question that he asked, and that’s how we code this item. I said, 
‘I play games with my friend’ and he said, ‘What are they?’ So at least one clear 
example gets you to a [score of] one. 
C1: But then what does ‘rarely’ [in the description of a code of three] mean? 
I: That’s true. That’s why we have training. 
C1: You gave him many chances [to ask questions].  
C2: But [the code for option] one says “at least one clear example.” 
I: Well, it’s true, but that’s what I’m telling you. 
C3: It should be clarified in the next edition. 
I: I can see that some of you are really upset with me, but he did ask.  
C4: Rarely, never, occasionally… these really should be clarified in the next 
edition. 
The coding instructions and options for this item, Asks for Information, is given in Figure 4-5. 
What is interesting is that even though participants may not know exactly what gestures are, 
they did not question the fact that their absence can be a symptom of autism. 
In other cases, participants did not ‘see’ autism at all, but surmised that something else 
was going on. For instance, when discussing Jake’s score for item A8, Conversation, the 
following exchange occurred:  
C: The give-and-take is elaborate. He didn’t really talk about his own interests. 
The timing is good. His behavior was shy, maybe even depressed, but not 
necessarily autistic. 
I: I understand what you’re saying, thank you. [To group:] Anything else? 
Not everything about the ADOS – or even then autism diagnosis – is obvious to clinicians, even 
in a group dominated by child psychologists. Prototypes must be learned. Interestingly, though 





voiced a concern with the legitimacy of the ADOS itself, whether it be the symptoms that were 
coded or the items that comprised the algorithm. 
FIGURE 4-5: ITEM A-6 OF MODULE 3, ASKS FOR INFORMATION 
The focus of this item is on the participant’s spontaneous expression of interest in the examiner’s ideas, 
knowledge, experiences, or reactions. This should not be part of a preoccupation. When assigning a 
rating, exclude asking for information that is not related to the examiner, or about the ADOS materials, 
or about particular facts not specific to the examiner; include these instead when assigning a rating 
under “Conversation.” For this item, questions do not necessarily have to lead to a sustained 
conversation. Questions about relationships or possessions may be coded here if  they refer to an 
activity rather than filling in a list. 
0 Asks the examiner about his/her thoughts, feelings, or experiences on several 
occasions. 
1 Occasionally (at least one clear example) asks the examiner about his/her 
thoughts, feelings, or experiences. 
2 Responds appropriately to examiner’s comments about his/her thoughts, 
feelings, and experiences, but does not spontaneously inquire about them. 
3 Rarely or never asks the examiner about his/her thoughts, feelings, or 
experiences, nor expresses interest in them. 
Source: C. Lord, M. Rutter et al. (2002). ADOS Manual. Los Angeles, Western Psychological Services.  
THE ADOS IN ACTION 
Of course, one cannot expect that even with the accumulation of ADOS training, all 
clinicians will code alike. As strict as the guideline in the ADOS manual may be, practice is never 
perfect. Clinicians are, after all, human beings. And surely the occasional smile is missed 
because notes were being taken in that moment, or the child was facing the opposite direction. 
We have already seen some of the challenges that arise when clinicians learn how to code. Still, 
the ADOS is considered to have high validity, and at the AMC it was often used with children 





ADOS was diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder. My observations at the AMC suggest that 
diagnostic classifications made by the ADOS rest on more than just the examiner’s observations 
during the twenty minute interaction with the child. As I now demonstrate, while the ADOS is 
meant to supplement clinical judgment, in practice the ADOS classification actually incorporates 
it.  
With practice, clinicians quickly learn which items contribute to the diagnostic 
algorithm. For instance, while Dr. Daly was scoring Nelson’s ADOS, she admitted that “he’s 
probably got autism” after she had scored the Communication section but before she had 
begun scoring the Reciprocal Social Interaction items. Later, when she reached the final RSI 
question, she said: 
Quality of Social Overtures [item B12], that’s a two. There wasn’t much [quality] 
there. Even if he looked or smiled, it wasn’t really the quality you expect. 
Actually, I could give him a one. He’s gonna fit the criteria [for autism] anyway. 
Item B12 is included in the ADOS algorithm.85 While Dr. Daly begins her reasoning with some 
certainty that “there wasn’t much there,” she allowed herself to be slightly more generous with 
this score on this item, as she had already calculated that Nelson was indeed going to meet the 
ADOS criteria for autism. This was not the only instance in which I observed Dr. Daly changing 
her mind about an item in consideration of its effect on the final score. For instance, when 
coding James’ behavior, she initially gave him a score of two for item A6 (Use of Other’s Body to 
Communicate) and a score of one for item A8 (Gestures), after which she said, “Yeah, he’s 
                                                             
85 Quality of Social Overtures is a “summary item that focuses on the quality of the child’s attempts to initiate 
social interaction” (10). This item, intended to generalize across all aspects of the child’s behavior, offers clinicians 
an opportunity to insert into the ADOS score their overall feeling as to whether or not the child merits an ASD 
diagnosis, and therefore it can be easily manipulated to tip the balance in favor of the diagnosis or in opposition to 





probably gonna be PDD.” Later, after coding all of the items and moving on to summing the 
scores in the algorithm, she noticed that James’ total in Section A (Communication) surpassed 
the Autistic Disorder threshold. At this point, Dr. Daly paused and began to rethink her coding:  
Well, Use of Others’ Body to Communicate, that’s really a one because he only 
did it once. He’s probably going to be autistic because of it. Gestures, I’m going 
to give him a zero here, because he made two different kinds of gestures. There 
was the clapping, which is an emotional gesture, and the blowing, which is a 
descriptive gesture. But he has at least spontaneous use of two of them, so 
that’s a zero. You see, sometimes I change things once I think about them. He’s 
probably going to be PDD. [She adds the scores.] Yes, you see, because he meets 
the criteria in one section [B: Reciprocal Social Interaction], but not the other [A: 
Communication]. Even if it were to be autism, then he would be really high-
functioning. I know that Dr. Johnson won’t say autism when she sees him. 
Of course, using the original codes Dr. Daly assigned, James did meet the ADOS criteria for 
autism, but the modifications she made had the effect of putting his Section A score below the 
autism cut-off, although he still met the threshold for Autism Spectrum Disorder. The adjusted 
codes are justified with reference to what is believed will be Dr. Johnson’s diagnosis. The 
objectivity of the ADOS, it would seem, is secondary to concerns about its agreement with 
more subjective clinical judgments. In its development and in practice, the instrument is shaped 
to coincide and thereby reaffirm clinical intuition. As the epigraph of this chapter suggests, the 
ADOS does not so much uncover a new reality as add credibility and further legitimacy to 
current practices. Clinical judgment and test results are mutually adjusted to one another, 
thereby becoming a ‘closed system’ that is essentially irrefutable (Hacking 1995). 
There are consequences to this approach. For one, though the results are fairly reliable 





classify children with a clinical diagnosis of PDD-NOS as autistic.86 In fact, Module 3 of the ADOS 
is just as likely to correctly diagnose PDD-NOS as to diagnose a child with PDD-NOS incorrectly 
as Non-spectrum.87 But what is most interesting is that the ADOS is calibrated not against other 
diagnostic instruments, but against clinical diagnoses. In other words, the ADOS has been 
constructed to conform to current diagnostic practices. As Hacking puts it, “[t]hrough 
calibration, a network of mutually consistent and self-confirming testing devices is set in place” 
(Hacking 1995: 100). Moreover, in part because of the rigorous psychometric testing that has 
been gathered to support it, the ADOS wears a badge of legitimacy that only rigorous statistical 
testing can provide. Therefore, in practice the ADOS – like other such tests – has the effect of 
bestowing scientific authority not only on the scale itself, but its object as well.  
Also of particular note was the manner in which describing her intuition of the child’s 
behavior, Dr. Daly alternated between a presentation of her impressions as objective facts and 
one of subjective interpretation. To comprehend this, it is useful to distinguish between the 
expression that the child gave, and the one that he gave off. In everyday interaction, an 
audience attributes greater weight to the expression giving off – the unintended signs that are 
interpreted as indicating a performer’s true intentions (Goffman 1990). But during the ADOS, it 
is the intended behavior, those actions the child purposefully performed in order to convey 
information – the smile to indicate pleasure, the eye contact to indicate joint attention – that 
                                                             
86 If we allow ourselves to follow Michelle Dawson’s reasoning as mentioned above, we see that the proposed 
criteria for the DSM-V – which eliminate the distinct disorders like AD and PDD-NOS, replacing them with the all-
inclusive Autism Spectrum Disorder – then we would find that one of the major flaws of the ADOS, the inability to 
clearly differentiate between AD and PDD-NOS, is eliminated. 
 
87 This group included children diagnosed with impairments other than autism, including language disorders and 





are the ones believed to indicate the child’s true intentions. Of course, with pre-verbal children 
one can never determine what the child intended to indicate with his actions. Thus, Dr. Daly 
used a lot of guesswork, as in the following instance: 
Dr: Functional interaction, that’s the frog. I think he just didn’t want to do it. His 
mom said he didn’t like it but I don’t think that’s it, I think he just didn’t want to 
do it. 
Me: I thought she meant that he didn’t like the material? That he didn’t want to 
touch it? 
Dr: Maybe, because he’s very sensory, like with the balloon and the airplane 
propeller. But I think he just didn’t want to do it. 
Dr. Daly is referring to the portion of the ADOS administration in which she pressed two-year-
old Luis to imitate her previous action of hopping a small toy frog across the table. Luis did not 
reach for the frog when it was placed in front of him, and his mother explained that this was 
because he didn’t like the texture of the plastic material of which the frog was made. Even 
though Luis displayed other sensory symptoms throughout the testing period, Dr. Daly insists 
that he simply did not want to play with the frog. Through the interpretation of intent, one 
finds space to shape the ADOS to conform to the clinical impression. 
Where is the danger in permitting clinical impressions to influence the ADOS 
classification? After all, as was stressed at the training workshop, the ADOS alone is not 
sufficient for diagnosis: it must be supplemented by clinical judgment. But systems of 
measurement can bring a new fact into being. For example, Hacking argues that the 
Dissociative Experiences Scale, in part constructed to better comprehend multiple personality 
disorder, brought about the “fact” that dissociation is a continuum. One can see how the rating 
scale for the ADOS items coincides with the notion of a spectrum, with some behaviors being 





zero to two or three, with some also offering an eight. The one exception is the item which 
rates eye contact, for which there are only two coding options: zero for “appropriate gaze with 
subtle changes meshed with other communication” and two to denote eye contact that is 
“poorly modulated” and “limited in flexibility, appropriateness, or contexts” (Lord, Rutter et al. 
2002: 7). Poor eye contact has become one of the most distinctive autistic symptoms. Parents 
often note its absence, or its improvement after trying a new therapy, and it is one of the 
targets of ABA therapy. In Module 1, it is one of the items that is included in the scoring 
algorithm. Yet it is not an easy quality to measure. During the ADOS training, the instructor 
revealed that the original options for this item were zero, two and one. But when the scale was 
tested by clinicians, the creators found that few clinicians were willing to give a child a rating of 
two. Rather, clinicians tended to avoid both extremes and only employ the middle rating of 
“mildly abnormal.” Interestingly, instead of removing the seemingly uninformative item from 
the scale, the developers dropped the one rating that clinicians considered the most 
appropriate behavioral descriptor. Since the zero option applies only to the appropriate use of 
eye contact, it is likely that what were previously ones are now twos. In other words, what was 
originally an item that offered little discriminatory power was transformed so as to give it more 
weight in the determination of a diagnostic classification. Calibration, therefore, can create a 
defining symptom out of a quality that is difficult to assess.  
I do not want to claim that as in Hacking’s case, a new fact about autism – namely, eye 
contact – was created by the ADOS. Rather, I want to highlight the significance of the work that 
was done to keep the eye contact item as part of the scale. Why, for only a single item, deviate 





scheme that so aptly mirrors the concept of a spectrum disorder? Because the ADOS is more 
that a means to separate the autistic from the PDD-NOS from the normal: the set of behaviors 
denoted by the items are constitutive of the autistic prototype. These behaviors, if not 
meaningful in terms of being included in the ADOS algorithm, therefore have a symbolic 
significance which justifies their inclusion. Indeed, in the ADOS manual the decision to include 
item in the modules that did not contribute to the scoring algorithm rested on whether “it was 
felt that they contributed to the possible assessment of improvement over time … or the 
description of behaviors of clinical importance” (113). They provide what test constructors refer 
to as face validity: a scale must look like it measures what it claims to measure. Just as it would 
appear odd to include on the ADOS a item to measure the amount of affection the caregiver 
give the child, so too would it be questionable to exclude the eye contact item. The 
construction of diagnostic tests and scales is, after all, grounded in the common understanding 
of what it means to be autistic. This is further evidenced by the inclusion of a subset of the 
Stereotyped Behaviors and Restricted Interest Items in the scoring section, despite the fact that 
they are not included in the algorithm. 
Of course, I also do not want to claim that the ADOS has not brought new facts about 
autism into being, only that an answer to this question falls beyond the scope of this 
dissertation and its methodology. To the contrary, my interviews with clinicians suggests that 
the structure of diagnostic scales can quite possibly influence the autistic prototype. For 
instance, when I asked clinicians to describe how they know when someone has autism, most 
described to me the triad of impairments in communication, social interaction, and stereotyped 





I think it depends on what your individual feeling is, but I think what you’re really 
looking at is a lack of communication for the individual and social reciprocity, 
that in terms of social interaction, being able to read social interactions, being 
able to truly have a give-and-take socially. I’m not really into the stereotypic 
stuff. 
Earlier in the conversation, Dr. Daly – who was the only clinician administrating the ADOS at the 
AMC – explained that one would use different diagnostic criteria depending upon whether one 
referred to the DSM or the ADOS. Note that the ADOS developers were not suggesting that this 
particular dimension of the triad was less important to the diagnosis. They are not included in 
the algorithm, it is explained, because they are high-threshold behaviors88 that may not occur in 
the short time span of the test administration even though the child does indeed flap his hands 
or bang his head. Naturally, this does not offer conclusive evidence that the ADOS works to 
shape the autistic prototype, but it does open the question to future research. 
FUNCTIONS OF THE ADOS 
 Despite the imperfections of the ADOS, it continues to command respect from those 
who encounter it. One can assume that this is because several different groups serve to benefit 
from the scale. Obviously, the developers of the ADOS are one such group. At the very least, 
they have become an obligatory point of passage (Latour 1987) for anyone wishing to publish 
research on Autism Spectrum Disorder. Yet in order to reach this point, the scale’s creators 
must have successfully translated the interests of other groups such that they were enticed to 
adopt the ADOS for their own good. In this section I discuss those who benefit most from the 
ADOS, as well as the specific needs that it serves. 
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Obviously, clinicians are one such group. Not only does the use of the ADOS validate 
their research, but as we learned in Chapter 2, the ADOS can be strategically deployed by 
clinicians in order to convince parents that their child in on the spectrum and thus 
simultaneously legitimize medical intervention. Parents, in turn, like to have tests done on their 
children (at least to the extent that they are not harmful) so they can be confident that their 
child has been correctly diagnosed, and can therefore be appropriately treated. Moreover, the 
ADOS also teaches clinicians how to “see” autism; through it, symptoms are separated from the 
individual. It creates a ‘thin’ person and thereby reinforces the reality of the spectrum while still 
making room for clinical judgment. The significance of this goes beyond the mere jurisdictional 
claim to territory (Abbott 1988). Arguably the most important function of the ADOS is to outline 
a set of discrete behaviors that can be used both as evidence of illness as well as the targets of 
treatment. It is through such means that clinicians can displace parental hopes for a cure to a 
plan for treatment. Thus, through diagnosis, not only are parents responsibilized for their 
children’s brains, but they begin to learn how to alter the trajectory of development, and what 
their own role is in the process. 
Autism is a devastating diagnosis for families. Unexpected by many, parents are 
overwhelmed with the news and the uncertainty that surrounds both treatment and prognosis. 
They quickly learn that there is neither a cure nor a “magic pill” to alleviate symptoms. Most do 
not know where to start in order to help their child, and doctors can offer no certainties. But 
the language of the ADOS facilitates the transformation of what is initially a great uncertainty, a 
mysterious disorder with unknown etiology and no known cure into a much less daunting – and 





tangible and attainable set of goals, giving parents the basis on which to manage the “ticking 
kindergarten clock” by “taking it day by day.” Though not all children are assessed with the 
ADOS en route to diagnosis, it nevertheless infiltrates the clinician-parent interaction, and 
especially the parent-therapist interaction. The behaviors delineated by the ADOS are the focus 
of the therapies as well as a means through which to mark a child’s progress. 
CONCLUSION 
Analyzing previous diagnostic practices, and in particular the administration of checklists 
and scales, is significant for several reasons. First, creating and applying a system of 
measurement can bring a fact into being (Hacking 1995). Items which are included in a 
diagnostic checklist for autism, as well as those excluded, tell us something about what it 
means to have autism, what does or does not count as a symptom at a given point in time. 
Different weights assigned to items both create and reinforce perceptions about which 
behaviors are core symptoms and more central to the autism prototype, and which are more 
peripheral. Scoring rules and the breakdown into subscales create sensitivities to particular 
clusters of symptoms, and facilitate the mapping of discrete behaviors to abstract disease 
categories and subcategories. In other words, checklists and scales produce and validate a 
mental image, or prototype, of the disorders they diagnose. They can bring a new type of object 
into being, or modify its properties. Consequently, this is also a site of looping. 
Second, new instruments have to be calibrated not only against old instruments, but 
also against judgments, clinical or otherwise (Hacking 1995: 100). Sometimes calibration calls 
for the instrument to be changed. For instance, we saw that the cutoff score of the ABC was 





must be altered. Many clinicians initially struggled with the coding scheme of the ADOS, thus 
the workshop training serves to adjust clinical judgments to align with the scale. Calibration is 
significant because it is a means through which “a network of mutually consistent and self-
confirming testing devices is set in place” (Hacking 1995: 100). While the ADOS purports to add 
a layer of objectivity to clinical diagnoses, in practice it actually incorporates subjective 
opinions. Yet at the same time, with its compendium of results of psychometric testing, it leads 
the clinician to believe that the tool is scientific. The ADOS validates clinical judgments, not just 
the other way around. 
Finally, diagnostic tests offer a mechanism whereby an actor can gain credibility and be 
incorporated into the network of expertise on autism. For instance, When Krug et al. (Krug, 
Arick et al. 1980) created the ABC, calibrated it on special education professionals, and 
demonstrated that teachers could effectively administer the test, they were able to successfully 
insert themselves into the discourse on autism. More importantly, each of these instruments – 
Form E-2, ABC, CARS and ADOS – enjoyed success because they were able to recruit as allies the 
parents of autistic children. These relationships, of course, were mutually beneficial, as parents 
themselves initially had little to lose. Before Rimland, they were viewed as the least credible 
witnesses: not only did they cause their child’s disorder, but they could not even be counted on 
to reliably report on his behavior. Rimland offered parents a way out of this predicament, by 
scapegoating the clinicians and offering them a direct link to research on their children through 
Form E-2. The ABC answered parents’ demand that the school system adjust to the needs of 
their children. TEACCH would not have been possible without parents, who were needed as co-





2010). Finally, the ADOS offers parents a means to understand the disorder such that it enables 
them to knowledgably manage their child’s treatment regime. If offers parents something 
attainable; a means to understand and begin to treat the disorder; a way in which to organize 







Why did nearly every child who visited the AMC leave with a diagnosis of ASD? I argue 
that this empirical observation can be best understood if diagnosis is viewed as a node in a 
network through which the interests of various participants in the diagnostic process are 
translated. This offers an alternative to the notion prevalent in the sociology of professions that 
professional interests are preconceived and thereby dictate the actions of professionals, whose 
primary interest is assumed to be the expansion of professional jurisdiction (Abbott 1988). 
Instead, as I show, the configuration of interests with respect to an autism diagnosis hinges on 
the particular matrix of institutions in which it is embedded. Interests are not rigidly predefined, 
but are constituted in the diagnostic process. Similarly, following Heritage and Maynard (2006), 
the current approach shows how professional dominance is interactionally achieved. The 
implication of this is a conception of expertise that is not primarily the possession of the 
powerful and dispensed in a top-down fashion, but distributed across actors and ultimately the 
product of negotiation between them. The emphasis on the importance of the institutional 
chain runs against most current discussions of the diagnosis of autism, which tend to focus on 
either supply- or demand-side factors. 
This dissertation makes four contributions to the sociology of medicine. First, it brings to 
the fore the role played institutions such as Early Intervention and their agents in the diagnostic 
process. This is important because these institutions and their agents not only pass patients 
through the institutional funnel, but they also serve to shape the moral experience of patients 





Second, it shows how institutionalized routines at a diagnostic clinic can favor one 
diagnostic outcome over others (Mehan 1986; Berg 1992). Thus, the “epidemic” – though 
attributed by clinicians to diagnostic changes in the DSM – is reproduced (and taken for 
granted) by the staff at the AMC. Yet this results as much by the clinic’s own practices as its 
positioning in the institutional network.  
Third, this dissertation demonstrates that in the doctor-patient interaction, diagnosis is 
achieved through translation. Clinicians do not simply hand over labels to passive parents, but 
strategically deploy autism narrative variants based on parental responses. These translations 
are moored in the current institutional matrix in which autism is embedded: the medical 
community views autism as a real, biological entity; the ADOS parses the syndrome into the 
performance of discrete behaviors that are the targets of therapy; autism as a label ensures 
that services are funded by the state or insurance companies; and autism as set of symptoms 
justifies the use of psychoactive medications. 
Fourth and final, the calibration of diagnostic instruments can modify both diagnostic 
category and process. This, along with the observation that the definition of autism has 
changed since it was first described nearly seven decades ago, emphasizes that diagnosis 
cannot be envisioned as a static process in which the rules of interaction are constant over 
time. With the DSM criteria as vague as they are and more definitive tests like genetic or blood 
screenings for autism being absent, and also because clinical intuition constitutes the 
foundational diagnostic logic, there is ample room for diagnostic change to happen over time. 





its core characteristics from the original, possibly suggesting that the increase in autism 
diagnosis numbers could simply reflect a broadening prototype. 
It is worth reiterating that the findings reported in this dissertation do not offer an 
account for the increased prevalence of autism recorded in recent decades. While it does make 
the claim that the diagnosis of autism is a product of the institution matrix in which it is 
embedded, this work does not – and cannot – consider the question of how this particular 
institutional matrix came into being, or how we have come to think of it as natural and even 
necessary. In fact, one should not even generalize that the findings reported here would be 
replicated in another autism diagnostic clinic, or with respect to a different condition. We might 
expect some commonalities – for instance, similar clinical norms existing outside of the AMC – 
but whether or not a diagnosis will thrive or disintegrate will depend at least in part on its 
consonance with the supporting institutional culture. Furthermore, one cannot deny the 
significance of history: each condition is surrounded by its own set of institutions and entails its 
own looping processes. I see no need to assume that there exists a unique underlying structure 
according to which all diagnosis occurs. To the contrary, my interest has been in how diagnosis 
takes place day-by-day and within a specific institutional and socio-cultural structure. Looping, 
after all, depends on the clinical culture of today as much as that of the past, which renders it 
necessary to be a bit particularistic. 
I hope that it is clear to the reader why a translation model of diagnosis is 
advantageous. Parents are not born “autism agents.” Before they come into contact with Early 





tackle their children’s disorder. They do not know that they will forfeit any hope for a cure in 
exchange for a new temporality of ‘one day at a time.’ Suddenly, their concerns about whether 
their child will have good friends, go to college, find a good job, and get married are all pushed 
aside. They are less important than getting as much therapy, as intensely as possible, by the 
best therapists. Now, unexpectedly, they have to fight for the best school to accept their child; 
now, they have to turn their home into a makeshift laboratory; now, they hope for their child’s 
diagnostic label of autism to change before the critical window of development closes. Parents 
learn to change their priorities, their interests, and their behavior through diagnosis. They 
adjust to the content of the autism category, and the process through which the diagnosis and 
the prescribed treatment is formulated. 
Few parents suspect autism in their children: he is not like Rain Man, he is very 
affectionate, he loves to cuddle; he just needs a little speech therapy and everything will be 
fine. But this changes with greater familiarity with the content of the autism diagnosis, and in 
particular the spectrum definition of the disorder. Rain Man is not my son at all, as they 
suspected; but the autism spectrum describes him perfectly. Of course, this change does not 
occur naturally, is not generated by themselves alone. It is mediated through the stories of 
others, through reading medical commentary, and then through exchanges with therapists, 
with clinicians, with professionals who point out concrete behaviors in the children and identify 
them with the symptoms of autism. Through these exchanges, parents learn to abandon the 
desire for a cure and begin to embrace uncertainty. The goal now is progress: what is important 





Parents are not only taught what it means to have autism, but they learn what their own 
role is to be, what their moral duty is as caregiver. It’s what you do that will make the 
difference. They discover that they are not only responsible for their children’s well-being, but 
also for their brains, and for their neurological development. To them, wait-and-see is not an 
option: either those typical neural pathways are going to be stimulated or the opportunity to 
develop them (and for their children to develop neurotypically) will be lost permanently.  
There is no single treatment regimen appropriate for all children on the spectrum, so 
the search ensues for whatever works, for anything that helps the child’s development 
progress. Hence the motivation behind why parents use so many different therapies at one 
time, and are constantly on the lookout for new ones. Always moving forward feels like the 
best, or even the only, thing they can do. Thus, upon initial diagnosis, the children become 
patients-in-waiting, embraced by the uncertainty that characterizes surveillance medicine. Yes, 
they have a diagnosis, but it need not be permanent, at least while that developmental window 
is still open; the diagnosis is a classification that can be revised, and in some cases removed 
altogether. Children at the AMC undergo therapy daily, but only visit the clinic every six months 
for a progress update and, possibly, hopefully, diagnostic reassessment if enough improvement 
is noted. Feeling responsible for a patient-in-waiting, parents adjust to a new temporality – 
their interests are displaced from ‘cure’ to ‘improvement.’ 
Differential diagnosis, an institutional process apparent in the finding that most children 
at the AMC received an ASD diagnosis, actually begins long before the child steps foot in the 





directed to the appropriate diagnosticians, and in the M-CHAT screening that was given to 
parents over the telephone, the results of which directed parents and child to the AMC (or the 
CDI if the test was negative). Thus, by the time the child arrives at the AMC, the decision to be 
made is less about whether it is autism or another developmental disability, but exactly where 
the child is on the autism spectrum, i.e., whether it is AD or PDD-NOS. I assume he’s somewhere 
on the spectrum if you’re here. Children presenting milder symptoms and those who show 
potential by responding to the prescribed therapies are labeled as PDD-NOS; AD is for more 
severe cases and those who have been less responsive to treatments – both are presumed to 
have a lower likelihood of ‘losing the label.’  
The position of the AMC within the institutional funnel helps explain how clinicians are 
able to instantly “see” whether a new patient is on the spectrum. Children who have 
progressed to this point have passed several diagnostic pre-tests. They are not a random 
sample of disturbed children but a group sharing many similarities, even though individual 
symptoms may vary from one child to another. The clinician has “seen a lot of kids,” which from 
her perspective explains why she is able to diagnose by a glance. The institutional funnel shapes 
what she will see and ensures that the children who reach the clinic are a fit for the ASD 
diagnosis. Through a looping process, she learns to expect children that look different from the 
classic prototype, but who look the same (or at least similar enough) to the autism prototype.  
Since it serves different needs in different social worlds, the autism diagnosis can be 
thought of as a boundary object. It is this characteristic which permits the diagnosis to 





reality, performance and label – are deployed when communicating autism. Clinicians 
effectively switch between these different narrative frames according to the needs of parents. 
For clinicians, autism is a real thing which they can immediately see in the child. This is not so 
obvious for parents who must rely on clinicians and therapists to identify aspects of the child’s 
behavior and relate them to the symptoms on the spectrum. To accomplish this, clinicians must 
switch from a reality to a performance frame that will usher parents into a new temporality of 
“one day at a time.” Parents’ original interests in diagnosis and cure are translated into the 
concrete task of getting the child to perform differently, to improve if only incrementally. 
Diagnostic tools such as the ADOS are deployed not least to convince parents that their child is 
on the spectrum, to help them accept the label. At the same time, these instruments identify 
discrete performances that are to be worked on, and will be hopefully modified, by the 
therapies.  
The various narrative frames also illuminate the distinction between biomedical and 
psycho-pharmaceutical therapies that are used in the treatment and management of autism at 
the AMC. Biomedical treatments, on the one hand, are narrated as though they target the root 
cause of autism’s core deficits and hence belong to the discourse in which autism is 
communicated as a reality. Psychiatric treatments, on the other hand, are described as being 
limited to the management of autistic behaviors and therefore view autism as a performance. 
The latter therapies, in contrast to the aforementioned, cannot alter the course of development 
(i.e. the reality, the existence of the disorder) but can only modify the presentation of 





Throughout the history of autism diagnosis, several different diagnostic instruments 
have been devised to identify the disorder and differentiate it from others. These tools are an 
important object of this study because of their potential contribution to looping processes that 
can modify the dominant autistic prototype at a given point in time. Each of the instruments I 
discussed was the dominant model amongst its contemporaries, and therefore best represents 
what was considered the core autistic symptomology during the period of their prevalence. Of 
course, we would expect that these instruments are only accepted and put to regular use once 
they have been calibrated to previous measures and to clinical judgments. At times the scales 
had to change in order to ensure compatibility with clinical assessments. A scale like the ABC, 
for instance, was calibrated against former instruments (and the judgments inherent in them). 
But then diagnostic rates were rapidly increasing, and as a consequence the autism prototype 
was changing; rather suddenly, the ABC could not stand the test of time any longer. In other 
words, as a result of looping processes and the modification of the prototype, scales like the 
ABC (and later, the CARS) quickly fell out of favor. The ADOS is different in that regard. It is 
standardized on clinical judgments, so it actually serves to reinforce the current clinical 
prototype – it actually participates in the looping process. 
The history of diagnostic scales also tells a story about the alternating movement of 
credibility. From the outset, amidst the dominant etiological theory held by clinicians that 
pinned the cause of Early Infantile Autism on mothers, parents possessed little credibility within 
the autism sphere. Rimland, as shown, attacked the credibility of clinicians and elevated that of 
parents through the development of a new tool. His Form E-2, for example, circumvented 





treatment from Rimland himself. This was an environment in which the expertise of parents 
was of the highest reliability. At the same time, the introduction of new scales also introduced 
new agents of expertise: teachers and therapists, respectively. Ultimately, the ADOS 
resurrected clinical expertise and elevated it above that of parents. 
Needless to say, there are several limitations plaguing the research presented in this 
dissertation. They are not uncommon to most ethnographies. My sample size is small: I 
regularly observed only four clinicians at the AMC. Though this represents the total number of 
clinicians operating at this clinic, I also only conducted observations at this one clinic. Though I 
found support for many of my observations in the literature, future research should extend the 
sample size to maximize generalizability. 
There were some additional problems I encountered that may have been exaggerated 
by the choice of a clinic as an ethnographic site. The most significant of these problems was the 
limited insight I was able to obtain concerning the doctors’ perceptions of patients. Although it 
was clearly visible when the doctor was observing the child, I could not know what particular 
aspects of the child’s behavior she was paying attention to and their significance to her. To 
remedy this, I attempted to informally interview clinicians after each appointment to get a 
clearer idea of how they were assessing the child. Dr. Baker and Dr. Michaels were usually able 
to take three to five minutes to sit with me and answer my questions, but this was rare for Dr. 
Johnson. It appeared as though her administrative responsibilities interfered with her ability to 
treat her patients in a timely fashion, and this translated into my inability to spend a few 





Dr. Johnson who was most often diagnosing new patients. Still, the most I could do was try to 
ask as many questions as possible whenever I found the opportunity to do so. What could also 
have been an important confounder in my research was the effect of my presence on the 
behavior of doctors and parents, as there was no way could I have avoided any social 
desirability effects. Although I do not have the means to estimate the extent to which this 
might have been true in the course of my research, such effects may have been minimized in 
that my research took place in the presence of doctors and other professionals. I refer here to 
the possibility that any pressure perceived by parents would emanate from the physicians and 
not me. Similarly, one limitation I feel I suffered from most was having to rely on what people 
were doing to infer what they were thinking, particularly in the case of the doctors. Informally 
interviewing clinicians to get a better understanding only seemed to introduce a new 
confounder: now I had to distinguish between what people did and the stories they told about 
themselves. Although I found it extremely helpful when Dr. Daly would “think out loud” while 
coding and scoring the ADOS, the fact that the behavior is inherently social implies that social 
desirability effects immediately come into play. Finally, though I made every effort to include all 
aspects of the interactions in my field notes, by virtue of being human I am of course subject to 
the same biases of perception that I attribute to my subjects. Just as clinicians “know” what 
autism looks like, I arrived at the clinic with several ideas as to what diagnosis would look like. It 
would be interesting to learn how other researchers portray the diagnostic process. Likewise, I 
would like to extend my research on autism to the creation of a theory of diagnosis, and 







Abbott, A. D. (1988). The system of professions : an essay on the division of expert labor. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
Ahern, K. (2000). ""Something is wrong with my child": A phenomenological account of a search 
for a diagnosis." Early Education & Development 11(2): 187-201. 
Akerley, M. S. (1979). "The politics of definitions." Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders 9(2): 222-231. 
American Psychiatric Association (1952). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 
first edition (DSM-I). Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Association. 
American Psychiatric Association (1968). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 
second edition (DSM-II). Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Association. 
American Psychiatric Association (1980). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 
third edition (DSM-III). Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Association. 
American Psychiatric Association (1987). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 
third edition revised (DSM-III-R). Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Association. 
American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual, fourth edition (DSM-
IV). Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Association. 
American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders : 
DSM-IV-TR. Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Association. 






Bakwin, H. (1958). "The tonsil-adenoidectomy enigma." Journal of Pediatrics 52(3): 339-361. 
Baron-Cohen, S., J. Allen, et al. (1992). "Can autism be detected at 18 months? The needle, the 
haystack, and the CHAT." The British Journal of Psychiatry 161(6): 839-843. 
Baron, I. S. (2004). Neuropsychological evaluation of the child. Oxford ; New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
Bearman, P., R. Faris, et al. (1999). "Blocking the future - New solutions for old problems in 
historical social science." Social Science History 23(4): 501-533. 
Becker, H. S. (1953). "Becoming a Marihuana User." The American Journal of Sociology 59(3): 
235-242. 
Berg, M. (1992). "The construction of medical disposals. Medical sociology and medical problem 
solving in clinical practice." Sociology of Health & Illness 14(2): 151-180. 
Bettelheim, B. (1967). The Empty Fortress: Infantile Autism and the Birth of the Self. New York, 
The Free Press. 
Bill, B. R. and D. H. Geschwind (2009). "Genetic advances in autism: heterogeneity and 
convergence on shared pathways." Current opinion in genetics & development 19(3): 
271-278. 
Blaxter, M. (1978). "Diagnosis as category and process: The case of alcoholism." Social Science 
& Medicine 12(1): 9-17. 
Bloor, M. (1976). "Bishop Berkeley and the Adenotonsillectomy Enigma: An Exploration of 
Variation in the Social Construction of Medical Disposals." Sociology 10(1): 43-61. 
Brown, P. (1990). "The name game: Toward a sociology of diagnosis." The Journal of Mind and 





Brown, P. (1995). "Naming and framing : the social construction of diagnosis and illness." 
Journal of Health and Social Behavior (Extra Issue): 34-52. 
Callon, M. (1986). The sociology of an actor-network: The case of the electric vehicle. Mapping 
the dynamics of science and technology : sociology of science in the real world. M. 
Callon, J. Law and A. Rip. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Macmillan: xvii, 242 ill., 
charts 223 cm. 
Callon, M. and J. Law (1982). "On Interests and Their Transformation: Enrollment and Counter-
Enrollment." Social Studies of Science 12(4): 615-625. 
Center for Disease Control (2009). "Prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorders --- Autism and 
Developmental Disabilities." Surveillance Summaries 58(SS10): 1-20. 
Chawarska, K., R. Paul, et al. (2007). "Parental recognition of developmental problems in 
toddlers with autism spectrum disorders." Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders 37(1): 62-72. 
Committee on Children with Disabilities, American Academy of Pediatrics (2001). 
"Developmental Surveillance and Screening of Infants and Young Children." Pediatrics 
108: 192-196. 
Conrad, P. (1975). "The discovery of hyperkinesis : notes on the medicalization of deviance." 
Social Problems 23(1): 12-21. 
Corbin, J. and A. Strauss (1985). "Managing chronic illness at home: Three lines of work." 
Qualitative Sociology 8(3): 224-247. 
Creak, M. (1964). "Schizophrenic syndrome in childhood: further progress report of a working 





Croen, L. A., J. K. Grether, et al. (2002). "The changing prevalence of autism in California." 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 32(3): 207-215. 
Dawson, M. (2010). Proposed new autism criteria: the DSM-V. The Autism Crisis: Science and 
Ethics in the Era of Autism Politics. 2011. 
Denckla, M. B. M. D. (1986). "New Diagnostic Criteria for Autism and Related Behavioral 
Disorders-Guidelines for Research Protocols." Journal of the American Academy of Child 
Psychiatry 25(2): 221-224. 
DiLavore, P. C., C. Lord, et al. (1995). "Pre-linguistic autism diagnostic observation schedule." 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 25(4): 355-379. 
Dover, C. J. and A. Le Couteur (2007). "How to diagnose autism." Archives of Disease in 
Childhood 92(6): 540-545. 
Dreyfus, H. L. and S. E. Dreyfus (2005). "Peripheral Vision: Expertise in Real World Contexts." 
Organization Studies 26(5): 779-792. 
Elliott, J. (2005). Using narrative in social research : qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
London ; Thousand Oaks, SAGE. 
Eyal, G., B. Hart, et al. (2010). The Autism Matrix. Boston, MA, Polity Press. 
Filipek, P. A., P. J. Accardo, et al. (1999). "The Screening and Diagnosis of Autistic Spectrum 
Disorders." Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 29(6): 439. 
First Signs, Inc. (2010).    Retrieved August 23, 2010, from www.firstsigns.org. 






Freidson, E. (1970). Profession of medicine; a study of the sociology of applied knowledge. New 
York, Dodd. 
Freidson, E. (1986). Professional powers : a study of the institutionalization of formal 
knowledge. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
Gernsbacher, M. A., M. Dawson, et al. (2005). "Three reasons not to believe in an autism 
epidemic." Current Directions in Psychological Science 14(2): 55-58. 
Gill, V. T. and D. W. Maynard (1995). "On "Labeling" in Actual Interaction: Delivering and 
Receiving Diagnoses of Developmental Disabilities." Social Problems 42(1): 11-37. 
Goffman, E. (1961). Asylums : Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other 
inmates. Garden City, NY. 
Goffman, E. (1990). The presentation of self in everyday life. New York N.Y., Doubleday. 
Goin-Kochel, R. P., V. H. Mackintosh, et al. (2006). "How many doctors does it take to make an 
autism spectrum diagnosis?" Autism 10(5): 439-451. 
Green, V. A., K. A. Pituch, et al. (2006). "Internet survey of treatments used by parents of 
children with autism." Research in Developmental Disabilities 27: 70-84. 
Grinker, R. R. (2007). Unstrange Minds: Remapping the World of Autism. New York, Basic 
Books. 
Hacking, I. (1992). The self-vindication of the laboratory sciences. Science as practice and 
culture. A. Pickering. Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 29-64. 
Hacking, I. (1995). Rewriting the soul : multiple personality and the sciences of memory. 





Hacking, I. (1999). Making up people. The Science Studies Reader. M. Biagioli. New York, 
Routledge: 161-172. 
Hacking, I. (1999). The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
Heidgerken, A. D., G. Geffken, et al. (2005). "A survey of autism knowledge in a health care 
setting." Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 35(3): 323-330. 
Heritage, J. and D. W. Maynard (2006). "Problems and prospects in the study of physician-
patient interaction: 30 years of research." Annual Review of Sociology 32(1): 351-374. 
Hertz-Picciotto, I. and L. Delwiche (2009). "The rise in autism and the role of age at diagnosis." 
Epidemiology 20: 84-90. 
Holzman, L. (1982). "The politics of autism." Topics in Language Disorders: 64-72. 
Howlin, P. and A. Asgharian (1999). "The diagnosis of autism and Asperger syndrome: findings 
from a survey of 770 families." Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology 41(12): 834-
839. 
Howlin, P. and A. Moore (1997). "Diagnosis in Autism: A Survey of Over 1200 Patients in the 
UK." Autism 1(2): 135-162. 
Jutel, A. (2009). "Sociology of diagnosis: a preliminary review." Sociology of Health & Illness 
31(2): 278-299. 
Kanner, L. (1943). Autistic disturbances of affective contact, Nervous Child 2 1943, 217-250. 
Khazzoom, A. (2010). Can memories yield data? The critique from narrative analysis, and 
evidence from neuropsychology. 
King, M. and P. Bearman (2009). "Diagnostic change and the increased prevalence of autism." 





King, M. D. (2008). Diagnosis, diffusion, and substitution in the autism epidemic. 
Kirk, S. A. and H. Kutchins (1992). The selling of DSM : the rhetoric of science in psychiatry. New 
York, A. de Gruyter. 
Kogan, M. D., S. J. Blumberg, et al. (2009). "Prevalence of Parent-Reported Diagnosis of Autism 
Spectrum Disorder Among Children in the US, 2007." Pediatrics: peds.2009-1522. 
Kraijer, D. (1997). Autism and Autistic-Like Conditions in Mental Retardation. Lisse, Swets & 
Zeitlinger Publishers. 
Krug, D. A. (2009). Interview on construction of the ABC. N. Rossi. Portland, OR. 
Krug, D. A., J. R. Arick, et al. (1980). "Behavior checklist for identifying severely handicapped 
individuals with high levels of autistic behavior." Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry 21: 221-229. 
Larsson, H. J., W. W. Eaton, et al. (2005). "Risk Factors for Autism: Perinatal Factors, Parental 
Psychiatric History, and Socioeconomic Status." American Journal of Epidemiology 
161(10): 916-925. 
Latimer, J., K. Featherstone, et al. (2006). "Rebirthing the Clinic: The Interaction of Clinical 
Judgment and Genetic Technology in the Production of Medical Science." Science, 
Technology, & Human Values 31(5): 599-630. 
Latour, B. (1987). Science in action : how to follow scientists and engineers through society. 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 
Leiter, V. (2007). ""Nobody's just normal, you know": The social creation of developmental 





Leviton, A., K. C. K. Kuban, et al. (2009). "Positive Screening on the Modified Checklist for 
Autism in Toddlers (M-CHAT) in Extremely Low Gestational Age Newborns." The Journal 
of pediatrics 154(4): 535-540.e531. 
Liu, K.-Y., M. King, et al. (2010). "Social Influence and the Autism Epidemic." The American 
Journal of Sociology 115(5): 1387-1434. 
Liu, K., N. Zerubavel, et al. (2010). "Social demographic change and autism." Demography 47(2): 
327-327-343. 
Lord, C., M. Rutter, et al. (2002). ADOS Manual. Los Angeles, Western Psychological Services. 
Lord, C., M. Rutter, et al. (2002). ADOS: Module 1. W. P. Services. Los Angeles, Western 
Psychological Services. 
Lord, C., M. Rutter, et al. (2002). Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule: Manual. Los Angeles, 
CA, Western Psychological Services. 
Lord, C., M. Rutter, et al. (1989). "Autism diagnostic observation schedule: a standardized 
observation of communicative and social behavior." Journal of Autism & Developmental 
Disorders 19(2): 185-212. 
Luhrmann, T. M. (2000). Of two minds : the growing disorder in American psychiatry. New York, 
Knopf. 
Madden, S. and J. Sim (2006). "Creating meaning in fibromyalgia syndrome." Social Science and 
Medicine 63(11): 2962-2973. 
Mandell, D. S., M. M. Novak, et al. (2005). "Factors Associated With Age of Diagnosis Among 





Masters, J. C. and D. E. Miller (1970). "Early infantile autism: a methodological critique." Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology 75(3): 342-343. 
Maugh, T. H. (2006). Bernard Rimland, 78; author was the father of modern autism research. 
The Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles. 
Maynard, D. W. (1989). Notes on the Delivery and Reception of Diagnostic News Regarding 
Mental Disabilities. Interactional Order: New Directions in the Study of Social Order. D. 
Helm, T. Anderson, A. J. Meehan and A. Rawls. New York, Irvington Press. 
McLaughlin, J., L. Sices, et al. (2004). "How Do Primary Care Physicians Manage Children With 
Possible Developmental Delays? A National Survey With an Experimental Design." 
Pediatrics (Evanston) 113(2): 274-282. 
Mehan, H. (1986). Handicapping the handicapped : decision making in students' educational 
careers. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press. 
Miller, J. and B. Glassner (2004). The "inside" and the "outside": Finding realities in interviews. 
Qualitative research : theory, method and practice. D. Silverman. London, SAGE 
Publications: 125-139. 
Miranda-Linne, F. M. and L. Melin (2002). "A factor analytic study of the Autism Behavior 
Checklist." Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 32(3): 181-188. 
Montgomery Hunter, K. (1991). Doctors' stories : the narrative structure of medical knowledge. 
Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press. 
Morgan, S. (1988). "Diagnostic assessment of autism: A review of objective scales." Journal of 





Nettleton, S. (2006). "'I just want permission to be ill': Towards a sociology of medically 
unexplained symptoms." Social Science & Medicine 62(5): 1167-1178. 
Nordin, V. and C. Gillberg (1996). "Autism spectrum disorders in children with physical or 
mental disability or both: II. Screening aspects." Developmental Medicine & Child 
Neurology 38(4): 314-324. 
O'Connor, A. (2004). In Autism, New Goal Is Finding It Soon Enough to Fight It. The New York 
Times. New York. 
O'Malley, P. (1992). "Risk, power and crime prevention." Economy and Society 21(3): 252-275. 
Polan, C. C. and B. L. Spencer (1959). "Checklist of symptoms of autism in early life." West 
Virginia Medical Journal 55: 198-204. 
Rapin, I. (1997). "Autism." New England Journal of Medicine 337(2): 97-104. 
Regier, D. A., W. E. Narrow, et al. (2009). "The conceptual development of DSM-V." The 
American Journal of Psychiatry 166(6): 645-650. 
Rellini, E., D. Tortolani, et al. (2004). "Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS) and Autism 
Behavior Checklist (ABC) Correspondence and Conflicts with DSM-IV Criteria in Diagnosis 
of Autism." Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 34(6): 703-708. 
Richdale, A. L. (1999). "Sleep problems in autism: prevalence, cause, and intervention." 
Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology 41(1): 60-66. 
Rimland, B. (1964). Infantile Autism: The Syndrome and Its Implications for a Neural Theory of 
Behavior. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts. 






Rimland, B. (1971). "The differentiation of childhood psychoses: An analysis of checklists for 
2,218 psychotic children." Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 1(3): 161-
174. 
Rimland, B. (1981). This week's citation classic: Rimland, B. Infantile autism: the syndrome and 
its implications for a neural theory of behavior. Citation Classic Commentaries. 
Rimland, B. (1984). "Diagnostic checklist Form E2: A reply to Parks " Journal of Autism & 
Developmental Disorders 14(3): 343-345. 
Robins, D. L. (2008). "Screening for autism spectrum disorders in primary care settings." Autism 
: the international journal of research and practice 12(5): 537-556. 
Robins, D. L., D. Fein, et al. (2001). "The Modified Checklist for Autism in Toddlers: An Initial 
Study Investigating the Early Detection of Autism and Pervasive Developmental 
Disorders." Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 31(2): 131. 
Rogers, S. J. (1996). "Brief report: early intervention in autism." Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders 26(2): 243-246. 
Rogers, S. J. and G. Laraine Masters (2000). Diagnosis of autism before the age of 3. 
International Review of Research in Mental Retardation, Academic Press. Volume 23: 1-
31. 
Rose, N. (2001). "The politics of life itself." Theory, culture & society 18(6): 1-30. 
Rosenberg, C. E. (2002). "The Tyranny of Diagnosis: Specific Entities and Individual Experience." 
Rutter, M. (1972). "Childhood Schizophrenia Reconsidered." Journal of Autism and Childhood 





Rutter, M. and S. Folstein (1977). "Infantile autism: A genetic study of 21 twin pairs." Journal of 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry 18(4): 297-321. 
Scheff, T. J. (1984). Being mentally ill : a sociological theory. New York, Aldine Pub. Co. 
Schopler, E. and R. J. Reichler (1971). "Parents as Cotherapists in the Treatment of Psychotic 
Children." Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia 1(1): 87-102. 
Schopler, E., R. J. Reichler, et al. (1980). "Toward objective classification of childhood autism: 
Childhood autism rating scale (CARS)." Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 
10(1): 91-103. 
Schopler, E., R. J. Reichler, et al. (1980). "Toward objective classification of childhood autism: 
Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS)." Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 
10(1): 91-103. 
Schopler, E., M. Rutter, et al. (1979). "Editorial Change of Journal Scope and Title." Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders 9(1): 1-10. 
Schopler, R., R. J. Reichler, et al. (1980). "Toward objective classification of childhood autism: 
Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS)." Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 
10: 91-103. 
Sevin, J. A., J. L. Matson, et al. (1991). "A comparison and evaluation of three commonly used 
autism scales." Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 21(4): 417-432. 
Shattuck, P. T. (2006). "The contribution of diagnostic substitution to the growing 






Siegel, B. (1996). The world of the autistic child : understanding and treating autistic spectrum 
disorders. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press. 
Siegel, B. (1996). The World of the Autistic Child: Understanding and Treating Autistic Spectrum 
Disorders. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Silverman, C. (2012). Understanding Autism: Patients, Doctors, and the History of a Disorder. 
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. 
Silverman, D. (1993). Interpreting qualitative data : methods for analysing talk, text and 
interaction. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage. 
Smith, B., M. C. Chung, et al. (1994). "The path to care in autism: Is it better now?" Journal of 
Autism & Developmental Disorders 24(5): 551-563. 
Star, S. L. and J. R. Griesemer (1989). "Institutional Ecology, 'Translations' and Boundary 
Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-
39." Social Studies of Science 19(3): 387-420. 
Teal, M. B. and M. J. Wiebe (1986). "A validity analysis of selected instruments used to assess 
autism." Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 16(485-494). 
Timmermans, S. and M. Buchbinder (2010). Expanded newborn screening: Defining the 
ontology of diseases with bridging work in the clinic, UCLA. 
Timmermans, S. and M. Buchbinder (2010). "Patients-in-Waiting: Living Between Sickness and 
Health in the Genomics Era." Journal of Health and Social Behavior 51(4): 408-423. 
Volkmar, F. R., D. V. Cicchetti, et al. (1988). "An evaluation of the Autism Behavior Checklist." 





Wadden, N. P., S. E. Bryson, et al. (1991). "A closer look at the Autism Behavior Checklist: 
Discriminant validity and factor structure." Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders 21(4): 529-541. 
Wing, L. (1971). The Handicaps of Autistic Children: A Review of Some Aspects of Work in the 
UK. Conference and Annual Meeting of the National Society for Autistic Children, San 
Francisco, National Institute of Mental Health. 
Wing, L. (1981). "Asperger's Syndrome: A Clinical Account." Psychological Medicine 11: 115-
129. 
Wing, L. (1997). "The autistic spectrum." The Lancet 350: 1761-1766. 
Wing, L. (2005). "Reflections on Opening Pandora's Box." Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders 35(2): 197-203. 
Wing, L. and J. Gould (1979). "Severe Impairments of Social Interaction and Associated 
Abnormalities in Children: Epidemiology and Classification  " Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders 9(1): 11-29. 
 
 
